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I. INTRODUCTION
In order to understand post-conviction relief (PCR), it is first necessary to
understand where it came from. Thus, this discussion must begin with the law of
habeas corpus and how PCR came to "branch off' from this area of the law.'
Habeas corpus, also known as the "Great Writ, is a mode of procedure for
obtaining a judicial determination of the validity of an individual's
incarceration.3 While the writ of habeas corpus predates the founding of this
Nation , it was not forgotten by the Founding Fathers and was given explicit
recognition when the United States Constitution was written.5  It was
incorporated in the Judiciary Act of 17896 and has had many patriotic
descriptions both before and since becoming a staple of American
jurisprudence.7 In the eighteenth century, Sir William Blackstone called habeas
corpus "the most celebrated writ in the English law," and this sentiment has
been echoed for all of its history in American jurisprudence. 9 The appeal of
habeas corpus to prisoners is that it is designed to alleviate restraints contrary to
1. For an excellent discussion of the history of habeas corpus, see generally Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391, 399-414 (1963), overruled in part by Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)
(citations omitted).
2. See Scott R. Grubman, What a Relief? The Availability of Habeas Relief Under the
Savings Clause of Section 2255 of the AEDPA, 64 S.C. L. REv. 369, 369 (2012) (citing Jennifer
Ponder, The Attorney General's Power of Certification Regarding State Mechanisms to Opt-in to
Streamlined Habeas Corpus Procedure, 6 CRIM. L. BRIEF, Fall 2010, at 38, 39); see also BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 778 (9th ed. 2009) (defining habeas corpus as "[a] writ employed to bring a
person before a court, most frequently to ensure that the person's imprisonment or detention is not
illegal").
3. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 401-02.
4. See generally Grubman, supra note 2, at 371-78 (citations omitted) (providing a brief
history of habeas corpus).
5. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 ("The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.").
6. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81-82.
7. See, e.g., Fay, 372 U.S. at 399-400 (citations omitted) (providing examples of
expressions used to describe the writ).
8. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 129 (photo.
reprint 1978) (1783).
9. See generally Ezra Spilke, Note, Adjudicated on the Merits?: Why the AEDPA Requires
State Courts to Exhibit Their Reasoning, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 995, 998-1000 (2006) (providing
a brief history of habeas corpus in American law).
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fundamental law-such as the United States Constitution-and inquire into the
legality of an individual's detention.' 0 "[I]f the imprisonment cannot be shown
to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled
to his immediate release.""
Originally, the writ of habeas corpus was available only to federal
prisoners.12  This limitation changed after the Civil War when Congress
amended the Habeas Corpus Act to allow state prisoners to pursue habeas
relief' 3 This amendment was passed partly out of fear that southern states
would target freed slaves, who would need adequate redress.' 4 Several changes
occurred, albeit slowly, over the next eighty years from the amendment in 1867
to the middle of the twentieth century regarding the claims cognizable on habeas
review and the jurisdiction of the courts to entertain them." Most relevant here
is the United States Supreme Court's increasing concern in the middle of the
twentieth century regarding the lack of a sufficient avenue for state prisoners to
address alleged violations of fundamental law. 16 These concerns of exhaustion
and comity came to somewhat of a head (or quasi-resolution) in the case of Case
v. Nebraska.'7
In Case, the petitioner alleged that he was "unconstitutionally denied the
assistance of counsel" when he entered a guilty plea to a burglary charge.' The
Nebraska Supreme Court recognized that, if true, the petitioner's claim would
establish a violation of the United States Constitution but held that, in Nebraska,
habeas relief was not available if the court imposing the sentence had jurisdiction
to do so and the sentence was within the power of the court.19 The United States
Supreme Court "granted certiorari to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that the States afford state prisoners some adequate corrective process
for the hearing and determination of claims of violation of federal constitutional
guarantees."20 Because Nebraska enacted a statute providing a post-conviction
procedure before the Court could answer this question, the case was remanded in
light of the supervening statute and the question was never addressed.2 In a
concurring opinion, however, Justice Clark noted the "great variations in the
scope and availability of such remedies" among the states and "a tremendous
10. See Fay, 372 U.S. at 409.
11. Id. at 402.
12. See id. at 409 (citingExparte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103, 105 (1845)).
13. Spilke, supra note 9, at 999 (citing Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385,
385-86 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (2006))).
14. Id.
15. See id. at 999-1000 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1995)).
16. See Simpsonv. State, 329 S.C. 43, 45, 495 S.E.2d 429, 430 (1998).
17. 381 U.S. 336 (1965).
18. Id. at 336.
19. Id. at 336-37 (quoting Case v. State, 129 N.W.2d 107, 112 (Neb. 1964), judgment
vacated by Case, 381 U.S. 336).
20. Id. at 337.
21. Id. (citing H. 836, 1965 Leg., 75th Sess. (Neb. 1965)).
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increase in habeas corpus applications in federal courts" as a result thereof.22 He
applauded Nebraska for enacting a PCR statute that allowed prisoners to "air
out" their claims and encouraged other states to follow this lead.23 As a result,
"the Commissioners on Uniform State Law promulgated the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act."24
South Carolina adopted a version of the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act with the enactment of what would eventually become sections 17-27-10 to
-160 of the South Carolina Code (PCR Act).25 The General Assembly intended
the PCR Act to take the place of "'all other common law, statutory, or other
remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or
sentence' and 'shall be used exclusively in place of them."' 26 PCR is "not a
substitute for appeal or a place for asserting errors for the first time which could
have been reviewed on direct appeal." 27  The PCR process was specifically
designed to allow for the inquiry into relevant facts surrounding a prisoner's
allegations and, where needed, to provide a hearing for factual development and
claim clarification. 28 As the South Carolina Supreme Court noted in Al-Shabazz
v. State,29 "The courts, the state Office of the Attorney General, the state Office
of Appellate Defense, private attorneys, prison officials, and many inmates have
grown familiar with a well-defined process developed under the PCR Act during
the past thirty years."30
II. DIRECT APPEAL IN RELATION TO PCR
Direct appeal is an important step to consider prior to pursuing PCR. In
contrast to PCR, claims raised on direct appeal usually revolve around the
22. Id. at 338 (Clark, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 340 (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
24. Simpson v. State, 329 S.C. 43, 45, 495 S.E.2d 429, 430 (1998); see also UNIF. POST-
CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT, 11 U.L.A. 666-871 (2003) (providing the 1966 Act).
25. See Simpson, 329 S.C. at 46, 495 S.E.2d at 430-31 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-27-10
to -160 (2003) (original version at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-601 to -612 (Supp. 1970))).
26. Pennington v. State, 312 S.C. 436, 438, 441 S.E.2d 315, 315-16 (1994) (quoting S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-27-20 (1976)), abrogated by Simpson, 329 S.C. 43, 495 S.E.2d 429.
27. Drayton v. Evatt, 312 S.C. 4, 8, 430 S.E.2d 517, 520 (1993) (citing Peeler v. State, 277
S.C. 70, 71, 283 S.E.2d 826, 826 (1981) (per curiam); see also Simmons v. State, 264 S.C. 417,
423, 215 S.E.2d 883, 885 (1975) (expressing that this sentiment is "universally held").
28. See Delaney v. State, 269 S.C. 555, 556, 238 S.E.2d 679, 679 (1977) (per curiam) (citing
Coardes v. State, 262 S.C. 493, 498, 206 S.E.2d 264, 266 (1974); Chambers v. State, 262 S.C. 202,
205-06, 203 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1974); Rogers v. State, 261 S.C. 288, 291, 199 S.E.2d 761, 762
(1973)); see also Simpson, 329 S.C. at 45, 495 S.E.2d at 430 (stating that the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure Act was written, in part, "to bring together and consolidate into one simple
statute all the remedies, beyond those that are incident to the usual procedures of trial and
[appellate] review, which are at present available for challenging the validity of a sentence of
imprisonment" (quoting UNIF. POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE ACT § 1 cmt., 11 U.L.A. 667 (2003)
(enacted 1966) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
29. 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d742 (2000).
30. Id. at 363, 527 S.E.2d at 746-47.
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assertion that the trial court erred in ruling upon a prior motion or objection.3 '
For example, issues often raised in a direct appeal are allegations that the trial
judge erred in refusing to grant a motion for a mistrial or claims that a
defendant's motion to suppress evidence was erroneously decided.3 2 In PCR, the
prisoner "attempts to show that his or her attorney erred in a manner that a
reasonably proficient attorney would not, and that the error prejudiced his
case."33 Therefore, PCR claims are generally framed to allege a violation of
one's Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.3 4 While
direct appeals focus primarily on claims that the presiding judge in a case failed
to make a correct ruling on an issue,35 direct appeals may also include claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel if they are evident from the record alone.36 An
action for PCR cannot be initiated while a direct appeal is pending.3 7
Additionally, the one-year statute of limitations for filing a PCR action is tolled
during the time a direct appeal is in progress. 38  Prisoners often find this
"breathing room" provided by their time on appeal allows them time to better
understand the PCR process should the reviewing court deny their appeal.
Historically, the distinction between an appeal and a PCR action is "based
on the fact that an appeal [is] a contiuation of the original criminal proceeding,
whereas [PCR is] a separate civil action attacking the result in the criminal
case." 39 Also, "appeal courts are bound by the factual record developed by the
trial court," but PCR courts "may undertake independent fact finding and expand
the record beyond what was generated in the trial court."4 0
Deciding whether to pursue a direct appeal is not always an easy decision for
a prisoner to make, and ideally, the decision should be made in consultation with
the prisoner's plea or trial counsel prior to, or immediately after, a conviction. A
prisoner, however, does not have all the time in the world to meet with counsel
once he is within the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC). The
several days following a prisoner's date of conviction are vital to any prisoner
wishing to appeal a recently received sentence.
31. See id. at 363, 527 S.E.2d at 747.
32. See, e.g., State v. Spears, 393 S.C. 466, 472-73, 713 S.E.2d 324, 327 (Ct. App. 2011)
(noting that defendant claimed the trial court erred in denying motions to suppress evidence and a
motion for a mistrial).
33. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 364, 527 S.E.2d at747.
34. See id. at 363, 527 S.E.2d at 747 (citing Drayton v. Evatt, 312 S.C. 4, 9, 430 S.E.2d 517,
520 (1993); Richardson v. State, 310 S.C. 360, 363, 426 S.E.2d 795, 797 (1993); Hyman v. State,
278 S.C. 501, 502, 299 S.E.2d 330, 331 (1983) (per curiam)).
35. See id.
36. See United States v. Gigley, 213 F.3d 509, 515 n.2 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing United States
v. Carter, 130 F.3d 1432, 1442 (10th Cir. 1997)).
37. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 363, 527 S.E.2d at 747 (citing S.C. R. Civ. P.71.1(b)).
38. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-45(A) (2003).
39. MARK E. CAMMACK & NORMAN M. GARLAND, ADVANCED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A
NUTSHELL 467 (2d ed. 2006).
40. Id.
1174 [VOL. 64: 1167
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South Carolina requires that a notice of appeal be filed "within ten (10) days
after the sentence is imposed,"4' so an individual wishing to do so-if his
counsel has not-may already be on dangerous grounds. Reception and
evaluation at Kirkland Correctional Institution is intended to be completed
within fourteen days ,2 but the process frequently lasts upwards of two months.
During this time period, prisoners typically do not leave their assigned cells
except to undergo a variety of tests and evaluations, with time set aside for meals
and showers. 43 Therefore, prisoners who wish to inquire into the appropriateness
of an appeal often have a hard time doing so because attempts to obtain leave to
use the institutional law library are often met with skepticism. Guards typically
assume prisoners are simply attempting to liberate themselves from their
restrictive living conditions and deny or ignore legitimate requests and inquiries.
Failure of a prisoner to timely file a notice of appeal may require a prisoner to
demonstrate that he attempted to do so in a later PCR hearing as opposed to
automatically having a right to appeal at that time. The procedure for pursuing
a belated appeal is more thoroughly discussed later in this text.45
As important as a direct appeal may be to prisoners seeking relief after a
criminal conviction, it is often difficult for a prisoner to pursue one on his own
within ten days of being convicted and subsequently transferred to the SCDC.
While SCDC policy provides that prisoners who can prove upcoming court
deadlines should be provided with access to the law library to conduct
research, this access is rarely afforded at Kirkland Reception and Evaluation
for two primary reasons. First, prisoners at this stage of incarceration are
generally unaware of what steps need to be taken in order to ensure an appeal has
been filed on their behalf or to file one themselves. Many come to prison with
little more than the clothes they are wearing and a sentencing sheet. Thus,
prisoners are not generally able to show that they have a court deadline in order
to gain access to the law library.47  Additionally, many guards are under the
impression that a prisoner needs to present a letter from the court or its officers
stating a deadline in order to be given access to the law library under this policy
provision.4 8 No consideration is given to the rules of court expressly stating time
41. S.C. APP. CT. R. 203(b)(2).
42. S.C. DEP'T OF CORR., No. OP-21.04, OPERATIONS MANUAL: INMATE CLASSIFICATION
PLAN § 4 (Jan. 1, 2011) [hereinafter INMATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN].
43. See id. §§ 4-5.7.
44. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 243(i).
45. See infra Part XI.B.
46. S.C. DEP'T OF CORR., No. GA-1.03, GENERAL ADMINISTRATION MANUAL: INMATE
ACCESS TO THE COURTS § 7.3 (June 1, 2004) [hereinafter GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL].
47. But see Magee v. Waters, 810 F.2d 451, 452 (4th Cir. 1987) (quoting Cruz v. Hauck, 515
F.2d 322, 333 (5th Cir. 1975)) (citing Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1986))
(stating that limited access to library in a short-term facility is not a denial of access to courts).
48. See GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 46, § 7.6 ("Intake Inmates Access to the Law
Library: Since inmates in intake status (IN) at a Reception and Evaluation Center are considered
high custody, those inmates who have paperwork that shows a pending court deadline will be
1175
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frames for filing documents, pleadings, actions, and motions, such as the ten
days a prisoner has to file a notice of appeal.49
Secondly, if a prisoner is able to show a deadline, it is doubtful that such a
prisoner would know SCDC policy allows them access to the law library because
all SCDC policies are kept in the institutional law library for prisoners to
review. o Therefore, a prisoner would have to know that such a policy exists
before being able to view it because the qualifications for receiving law library
access are not commonly advertised. In short, if a prisoner's plea or trial counsel
has not filed a notice of appeal and a prisoner wishes to evaluate the rules and
procedures that apply to him in an attempt to determine whether he should do so,
he is not likely to file a notice of appeal in the required time. Of course, if plea
or trial counsel has already filed a desired notice of appeal, then such a prisoner
will have no cause to worry. This, however, is not always the case.
All criminal defendants have a right to pursue a direct appeal," and
attorneys who proceed to trial are required to consult with their clients about
their right to appeal.52 However, absent exceptional circumstances, a defendant
who pleads guilty is not required to be informed of his right to a direct appeal.53
In addition to tolling the one-year statute of limitations for the filing of a PCR
action5 4 -time that applicants wisely use to prepare for a possible PCR-upon
the filing of a direct appeal, the South Carolina Office of Indigent Defense will
appoint counsel to represent an indigent prisoner,5 5 and counsel will provide the
applicant with a transcript, or transcribed copy, of the proceedings below. 5 6
Prisoners do not have a right to transcripts on collateral review like PCR.5 7
Furthermore, although an appellant does not have a federal or state constitutional
afforded use of the law library. If an intake inmate does not have such paperwork, institutional
personnel should contact the Office of General Counsel for guidance.").
49. See generally S.C. APP. CT. R. 203(b)(2) (stating that a notice of appeal shall be filed
within ten days after the sentence is imposed).
50. See GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 46, § 2.1.
51. See, e.g., Dennisonv. State, 371 S.C. 221, 223, 639 S.E.2d 35, 35 (2006) ("Unlike review
of a conviction, which is by direct appeal and is a constitutional right, review of a decision in a PCR
matter is discretionary by way of a writ of certiorari.").
52. See Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 (2000); see also Frazer v. South Carolina,
430 F.3d 696, 705 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that Supreme Court precedent clearly establishes "[t]he
necessity of counsel's consultation with the defendant regarding the fundamental decision of
whether to appeal").
53. Jones v. State, 382 S.C. 589, 596, 677 S.E.2d 20, 23 (2009) (citing Turner v. State, 380
S.C. 223, 224, 670 S.E.2d 373, 374 (2008)).
54. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-45(A) (2003).
55. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-360(C) (Supp. 2012).
56. See Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971) (citations omitted) ("[T]here can be
no doubt that the State must provide an indigent defendant with a transcript of prior proceedings
when that transcript is needed for an effective defense or appeal.").
57. Gunter v. State, 267 S.C. 486, 488, 229 S.E.2d 723, 724 (1976).
1176 [VOL. 64: 1167
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right to proceed pro se in an appeal from his criminal conviction," the court
may, in its discretion, allow an appellant to do so.
If a prisoner's direct appeal is denied, he must then decide whether to pursue
this denial to the next stage-namely, the South Carolina Supreme Court-by
way of a petition for writ of certiorari. 0  Once an appeal is denied, a prisoner
must file a petition for rehearing no later than fifteen days after an order is
filed. 6  Filing a petition for rehearing is a prerequisite to filing a petition for writ
*62of certiorari. If such a prisoner wishes to pursue a petition for writ of certiorari
where a petition for rehearing has been denied, a prisoner will have thirty days
from the date of that denial to file a petition for writ of certiorari with both the
clerk of the South Carolina Court of Appeals and the clerk of the South Carolina
Supreme Court.63 Review by writ of certiorari is discretionary and will only be
exercised in exceptional circumstances where there are "special and important
64reasons" to do so. As a result, only a handful of prisoners who pursue a
petition for writ of certiorari actually have their cases reviewed.
If a prisoner elects not to pursue certiorari review, the remittitur ' will be
sent to both the lower court and the prisoner to notify them that the order of the
court of appeals is final. Generally, a prisoner must pursue all available state
remedies in order to have his claim deemed exhausted for possible later federal
habeas review. In South Carolina, however, a prisoner need not pursue
certiorari after direct appeal or after the denial of PCR in order for his claims to
be deemed exhausted.
58. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000).
59. State v. Roberts, 364 S.C. 583, 588, 614 S.E.2d 626, 629 (2005).
60. See generally S.C. APP. CT. R. 242 (governing certiorari to the South Carolina Court of
Appeals).
61. S.C. App. CT. R. 221(a).
62. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 242(d)(1).
63. S.C. App. CT. R. 242(c).
64. S.C. App. CT. R. 242(b). The court is likely to grant certiorari
[w]here there are novel questions of law; where there is a dissent in the decision of the
[South Carolina] Court of Appeals; where the decision of the [South Carolina] Court of
Appeals is in conflict with a prior decision of the [South Carolina] Supreme Court; where
substantial constitutional issues are directly involved; and/or where a federal question is
included and the decision of the [South Carolina] Court of Appeals conflicts with a
decision of the United States Supreme Court.
Haggins v. State, 377 S.C. 135, 137 n.2, 659 S.E.2d 170, 170 n.2 (2008).
65. A "remittitur of record" is defined as "the action of sending the transcript of a case back
from an appellate court to a trial court; the notice for doing so." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1409
(9th ed. 2009).
66. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 221(b).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982)
(holding that a district court may only hear a habeas petition containing exhausted claims).
68. In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal & Post-Conviction Relief Cases, 321
S.C. 563, 564, 471 S.E.2d 454, 454 (1990).
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III. INCARCERATION
A. Classification
By definition, the vast majority of individuals who pursue PCR have been
convicted and are incarcerated. 69 A prisoner's classification in the SCDC
determines the restrictiveness of the prisoner's custody as well as the privileges
and programs he will be afforded. 70 This Commentary is intended to examine all
of the hardships, to the extent possible, of pro se litigants pursuing relief at PCR.
As such, an examination of a prisoner's living condition and prison life in
general is properly encompassed within the scope of this Commentary. The
SCDC classification policy classifies a prisoner based on many subjective factors
that are coupled with an abundance of discretion.7 ' Consequently, a detailed
analysis of the policy cannot be sufficiently accomplished without quoting the
policy itself verbatim. However, this Section is merely intended to provide the
reader with a brief overview of some of the more important aspects of the policy
with which prisoners generally concern themselves. Upon reception into the
SCDC, male prisoners are taken to and housed at Kirkland Correctional
Reception and Evaluation Center-commonly referred to as Kirkland R&E72
and female prisoners are taken to the Camille Graham Reception and Evaluation
Center.73  Both facilities are in Columbia. A prisoner's custody and
classification levels are initially determined at these facilities.75
1. Custody Levels
The principal security-level designations in the SCDC are, from lowest to
highest, Level 1A, Level 1B, Level 2, and Level 3. A prisoner's security level
is based on his behavioral and criminal history and is principally designed to be
"behavior driven."7 7  Factors used to determine a prisoner's security level
include, but are not limited to: "[s]everity of current offense; [i]ncarcerative
69. However, an applicant who is not incarcerated may also bring a PCR action. See Jackson
v. State, 331 S.C. 486, 489, 489 S.E.2d 915, 916 (1997) ("[A]n applicant, regardless of whether he
served jail time, may bring a PCR action if he demonstrates he is prejudiced by persistent results of
his conviction." (citing Jones v. State, 322 S.C. 101, 102, 470 S.E.2d 110, 110 (1996); McDuffie v.
State, 276 S.C. 229, 231, 277 S.E.2d 595, 596 (1981))).
70. See INMATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN, supra note 42, § 1.3.
71. See id. §§ 2.5, 2.6, 2.8, 2.9.
72. See Kirkland Correctional Institution, S.C. DEP'T CORRECTIONS, http://www.doc.sc.gov/
institutions/kirkland jsp (last visited May 4, 2013).
73. See Graham (Camille Griffin) Correctional Institution, S.C. DEP'T CORRECTIONS, http://
www.doc.sc.gov/institutions/camille jsp (last visited May 4, 2013).
74. Id.; Kirkland Correctional Institution, supra note 72.
75. See INMATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN, supra note 42, § 2.1; see also id. § 8 (providing
security criteria); id. § 44 (providing custody criteria).
76. See id. § 3.1.
77. Id. §§ 2.6, 2.9 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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sentence based on time to max out; [p]rior commitments over [ninety] days;
[a]ssaultive disciplinary convictions; [e]scape history; ... [d]etainers," and
special considerations such as mental health and separation requirements.7 " The
initial assessment to determine the impact or applicability of these factors, as
well as other medical and educational considerations, takes place at Kirkland
R&E upon a male prisoner's entry into the SCDC. 79 Although a prisoner has
"no right to any particular custody level,"o a prisoner who does not feel that he
has been assigned the proper custody level may appeal a classification decision
through the agency's grievance system.8 '
2. Level lA and Level IB
There are a total of over 2,600 prisoners at eight Level 1 institutions within
the SCDC.8 2 Level 1 prisoners are those with the least security concerns, with
Level 1A being the lowest security level possible.83 Level 1 institutions provide
prisoners with the most freedom and are enclosed with either a single fence
around the perimeter or no fence at all.8 4 A prisoner is eligible to receive a Level
lB status if he has eight years or less to max out and a Level 1A if he has five
years or less to max out.8 ' This eligibility, however, does not depend on time
alone, and a prisoner must meet several other requirements in order to obtain this
status. 6  The primary difference between Level 1A and Level lB prisoners is
that Level lA prisoners are allowed to work at off-institutional-property work
programs and Level 1B prisoners are not.
Level 1 institutions do not resemble the "concrete fortress" surrounded by
razor wire that most members of the public envision. Most Level 1 prisons,
especially the pre-release centers, would take hard scrutiny to recognize their
penitentiary status and could easily be mistaken for a retirement home or similar
structure. One of the main incentives that prisoners target Level 1 institutions
78. Id. § 2.5. The term "max out" is commonly used to describe the amount of time a
prisoner has to serve without the benefit of good-time credits or parole.
79. See id. §§ 4-6.
80. Id. § 2.8.
81. Id. §§ 1.5, 33.
82. Population Counts and Capacities, S.C. DEP'T CORRECTIONS (May 4, 2013, 3:07 PM),
https://sword.doc. state. sc.us/population/summary.do. This number does not include female
prisoners. See id.
83. See Institutions, S.C. DEP'T CORRECTIONS, http://www.doc.sc.gov/institutions/
institutions jsp (last visited May 4, 2013).
84. See id.
85. INMATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN, supra note 42, § 8.
86. For example, prisoners advancing to Level 1A cannot have more than two major
disciplinary convictions in the last twelve months, no drug disciplinary convictions in the last thirty-
six months, and no prior sex convictions or arrests in order to do so. Id.
87. See id. § 43; see also id. § 50 (providing additional information on work programs).
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for is the institutions' overall relaxed visitation procedures." It is not
uncommon for prisoners and their families to enjoy visitation outside in a park
setting at a Level 1 institution as opposed to a maximum security setting at Level
3 institutions. While most Level 1 institutions do not contain law libraries, the
overall consensus of prisoners is that it is much better to be imprisoned at a
Level 1 prison than any other level prison. However, some prisoners do attempt
to avoid placement at Level 1 facilities in the legitimate belief that rules are more
strictly enforced at Level 1 facilities than Level 2 or 3 facilities. Level 1
institutions include: Campbell Pre-Release Center (PRC), Catawba PRC,
Livesay Correctional Institution, Lower Savannah PRC, Manning Correctional
Institution (CI), Palmer PRC, Walden CI, and Coastal PRC.8 9
3. Level 2
A total of over 7,900 prisoners reside at nine Level 2 institutions within the
SCDC.90 Level 2 prisons are the most populated security class9' and can house
all prisoners-except those prisoners serving life without parole-who have
served ten years in the SCDC or who have ten years or less to max out.92 As
with all primary security level designations, a prisoner must meet certain
disciplinary and other requirements to obtain this status.93 By design, there is
less tolerance for a prisoner's criminal and behavioral history at each of the
lower security levels. For example, a prisoner may have up to two category 4 or
94category 5 prior offenses on his record and obtain a Level 2 status, while a
prisoner seeking Level lB status may only have one prior category 4 offense and
no category 5 offenses to obtain such a status.95 To be eligible for security status
Level 1A, a prisoner may not have any prior violent or category 4 or 5
convictions or commitments on his record.9 6
Level 2 prisons typically enclose a prisoner from the public by a fence.97
These institutions are prisons in every sense of the word, and a lot of prisoners
serve most of their time at Level 2 prisons because they do not meet the
88. See generally S.C. DEP'T OF CORR., No. OP-22.09, OPERATIONS MANUAL: INMATE
VISITATION § 2 (Aug. 1, 2006) (providing the visitation procedures for Level 1 institutions).
89. Institutions, supra note 83. Goodman CI, which is technically classified as a Level 4
prison, is the only minimum-security female institution in the SCDC. See Population Counts and
Capacities, supra note 82.
90. Population Counts and Capacities, supra note 82. This number does not include female
prisoners. See id.
91. See id.
92. INMATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN, supra note 42, § 8.
93. To advance to Level 2, a prisoner must not have had more than two sexual disciplinary
convictions or more than four major "disciplinaries" in the last twelve months. If a prisoner has had
a major disciplinary conviction in the past six months, review is on a case-by-case basis. Id.
94. Id.
95. See id.
96. Id.
97. See Institutions, supra note 83.
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eligibility requirements to advance to a Level 1 status.98 Level 2 institutions
include: Allendale CI, Evans CI, Kershaw CI, MacDougall CI, Ridgeland CI,
Trenton CI, Turbeville CI, Tyger River CI, and Wateree CI.99 Most prisoners
either start their prison term at a Level 2 prison or are placed at one shortly
thereafter. While most Level 2 prisons are the same in terms of programs
offered that prisoners may participate in, 00 some institutions-such as Kershaw
CI and Tyger River CI-offer prison-industry programs that allow prisoners to
make minimum wage and generate income during their incarceration. 10
4. Level 3
Over 4,700 prisoners are housed at six Level 3 institutions within the
SCDC.102  Level 3 prisons are the most restrictive and the most dangerous
prisons of all the prisons in the SCDC.103 These prisons can house all prisoners,
regardless of crime or sentence,104 and are generally where Level 1 and Level 2
prisoners are sent when they gather numerous disciplinary infractions at a lower
custody prison.105 Upon entry into the SCDC, prisoners who have ten years or
more to serve in prison before their max out date are assigned to Level 3
prisons. 06 These prisons usually have dorms designated for "problem prisoners"
that are more restrictive than the other housing units on the compound. 0 7 As the
amount of time a prisoner has to serve in prison is not the only factor in Level 3
placement, prisoners with exceptionally bad disciplinary records are usually
98. For example, a lot of prisoners of Hispanic descent are not allowed to receive Level 1
status due to their inability to show in-state residence.
99. Id.
100. Prison Industries, S.C. DEP'T CORRECTIONS, http://www.doc.sc.gov/programs/pi jsp (last
visited May 4, 2013).
101. See Tyger River Correctional Institution, S.C. DEP'T CORRECTIONS, http://
www.doc.sc.gov/institutions /tygerriver jsp (last visited May 4, 2013); Kershaw Correctional
Institution, S.C. DEP'T CORRECTIONS, http://www.doc.sc.gov/institutions/kershawjsp (last visited
May 4, 2013).
102. Population Counts and Capacities, supra note 82. This number does not include female
prisoners. See id. Camille Graham and Leath CI are the only maximum security prisons for
females in the SCDC. They house a combined total of just over 500 female prisoners. Id.
103. See Institutions, supra note 83.
104. See INMATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN, supra note 42, § 8.
105. See id. Level 1 prisoners are not typically housed at Level 3 prisons. See id. § 47.1.
Prisoners who are designated as "out of custody" must be assigned a cell only with other prisoners
of the same custody level. See id. § 47.2.
106. See id. § 8.
107. See generally S.C. DEP'T OF CORR., No. OP-22.12, OPERATIONS MANUAL: SPECIAL
MANAGEMENT UNIT (Sept. 1, 2012) [hereinafter SPECIAL MGMT. UNIT] (providing the policies and
procedures for housing "inmates requiring more intense levels of supervision and monitoring"
separate from the general prison population).
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classified as a Level 3 status regardless of sentence. 08 Level 3 prisons include:
Broad River CI, Kirkland R&E, Lee CI, Lieber CI, McCormick CI, and Perry
cI. 109
Being at a Level 3 prison itself does not signify that a prisoner is a "problem
prisoner."11o In most instances, it is simply the fact that a prisoner has a
significant amount of time to complete that requires placement at a Level 3.111
Something such as a prior escape, however, can restrict a prisoner to a Level 3
facility.112 These prisons do not differ only in location; prisons such as Kirkland
and Broad River CI have a positive reputation among prisoners for being a less
oppressive prison in which to serve a sentence, while Lee CI is notorious for
lockdowns, stabbings, and riots and is thus one prison that the majority of
prisoners attempt to avoid. While prison is an undesirable place to be by nature,
prisoners often closely watch their classification progress in order to depart
Level 3 prisons as soon as possible.113
5. Other Security Levels
It should be noted that just because a prisoner is designated Level 2, this
designation does not mean that he will not or cannot be housed at a Level 3
prison. 1 1 4 In such a case, a Level 2 prisoner would be allowed to be at a Level 3
prison provided plans to transfer him to a Level 2 are in place and he is housed
in a cell with another Level 2 prisoner.1 1 5 Level 1 prisoners, however, are not
allowed placement at a Level 3 prison absent special circumstances or a custody
108. See INMATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN, supra note 42, §§ 2.5 2.6; see also id. § 8 (noting
that a Level 3 security conditions result where "[flive or more "Major" disciplinary convictions
[occur] within 12 months").
109. Institutions, supra note 83. These institutions do not include those for women. See id.
110. See generally INMATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN, supra note 42 (providing the criteria and
procedures for determining prisoners' classifications).
111. See generally id. (providing the criteria and procedures for determining prisoners'
classifications).
112. See generally id. § 68 (outlining the impact of an escape or attempted escape on a
prisoner's classification).
113. According to a report by the SCDC, in 2008 there were 339 assault charges for inmate-
on-inmate assaults, 516 charges for inmate-on-staff assaults, and 23 charges for inmate assaults on
other people. S.C. DEP'T OF CORR., INMATE ASSAULTS FY 2008 2012, http://www.doc.sc.gov/
research/SystemOverview/InmateAssaultsFY2008-2012.pdf
114. The SCDC's INMATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN provides that "[t]he meeting of custody
criteria does not guarantee placement at any particular level. An inmate's custody classification
involves the exercise of discretion in regard to security needs and overrides may be used." INMATE
CLASSIFICATION PLAN, supra note 42, § 42. Section 2.8 additionally states that "[ilnmate custody
classification is based on different factors and embodies correctional discretion. An inmate has no
right to any particular custody level." Id. § 2.8.
115. See id. § 47.2.
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change. "6  While guidelines are set, classification and placement are assigned
with wide discretion." 7  Because the exceptions and considerations are too
numerous to name, the reader is again referred to the SCDC's classification
policy for more specific information.""
As stated above, Level 1A, Level iB, Level 2, and Level 3 are not the only
security levels assigned to prisoners within the SCDC but are simply the primary
ones.119 The primary levels do not account for the over 1,800 prisoners in
institutional Security Maximum Units (SMUs) or inmates who are assigned to
special classification status such as protective custody 20 and safekeeping.121
B. Hardship Transfers
When a prisoner leaves intake status at Kirkland R&E for placement at a
more permanent institution, no consideration is given to a prisoner's place of
residency when assignments are made.122 Accordingly, prisoners routinely find
themselves housed at prisons several hundred miles away from where they live.
Therefore, the SCDC allows prisoners who meet certain criteria or qualifications
to be transferred to a facility closer to their place of residency as an incentive for
prisoners to exhibit good behavior.123  These transfers are known as "hardship
transfers," 24 and prisoners generally rely heavily on them.
Each prisoner receives a classification review annually, which provides the
prisoner with the opportunity to sit down with his caseworker and review his
classification status; requests for hardship transfers must be made at this time.125
Hardship transfers are usually based on a family hardship a prisoner is
encountering, such as having elderly family members who are unable to travel
long distances or a family member that requires special medical attention.126 A
116. See, e.g., id. § 48 ("[Level] lB inmates housed in labor crew dorms and specialized work
units at Level 2/3 institutions will be exempt from the cell assignment process (designated dorms
must house labor crew inmates only).").
117. See id. § 2.8.
118. See generally id. (providing the criteria and procedures for determining prisoners'
classifications).
119. See id. § 3.1 ("The principal security level designations are: lA, 1B, 2, and 3").
120. For more information on protective concerns and other special status categories, see id.
§§ 39,42.
121. A "county safekeeper" prisoner is "an individual awaiting trial who has been deemed to
be in a high profile/high risk status and who cannot be housed in a county facility." S.C. DEP'T OF
CORR., No. OP-21.09, OPERATIONS MANUAL: INMATE RECORDS PLAN § 5 (Nov. 1, 2007)
[hereinafter INMATE RECORDS PLAN]. A "death row safekeeper" prisoner is "an inmate who is
sentenced to death and housed in the SCDC for the committing county until his/her execution." Id.;
see also S.C. DEP'T OF CORR., No. SK-22.02, OPERATIONS MANUAL: SAFEKEEPERS (July 1, 2006)
(providing the procedures for safekeepers).
122. See INMATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN, supra note 42, §§ 2.5 2.6.
123. See id. § 69.
124. Id.
125. See id. § 69.2.
126. See id. § 69.
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prisoner is basically requesting to be moved on the ground that transfer would
make visitation for these family members less burdensome.127  The SCDC,
however, does not allow a prisoner to be transferred by way of a hardship
transfer on bare allegations alone and generally will require a prisoner to show
the following:
(1) That the family member he is requesting to be moved for is an
immediate family member and on his visitation list or relative screen;
(2) That, at the time of his annual review, the prisoner provided a
doctor's statement (on official stationery) verifying family illness;
(3) That, at the time of his annual review, the prisoner provided
documents from a community representative or official (such as a pastor
or congressman) requesting transfer; or
(4) That, at the time of his annual review, the prisoner provided a copy
of an elderly family member's driver's license or birth certificate
showing that he or she is 65 years of age or older.128
In order to be eligible for a hardship transfer, a prisoner must have no major
disciplinary convictions and not more than one minor disciplinary conviction
within the last twelve months; have satisfactory job performance over the past
twelve months; have been in the SCDC for at least twelve months; have no
separations or cautions at the requesting institution; and be requesting to go to an
institution that is the appropriate security level and meets a prisoner's
programmatic needs, such as addiction treatment, counseling, and mental health
needs.129 If a prisoner's request is accepted and he is transferred to the desired
institution, he will be subject to removal from that location if he receives any
major disciplinary convictions.'3 0 If removal occurs, the prisoner will not be
eligible for another hardship transfer for three years from the date of the
disciplinary infraction.13
As a final note, prisoners should ensure that they have all the necessary
documentation to request a hardship transfer prior to their annual review dates.
If a prisoner knows his annual review will be held in June, he should have the
documentation he wishes to submit ready by May. A prisoner will sometimes be
told that he will be having his annual review late in a month and be unprepared
when a caseworker decides to hold his review at the beginning of the month.
When this change occurs, prisoners who are not prepared are often told that they
must wait another year to submit their documentation and request for a hardship
transfer.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Id. § 69.1.
130. See id. § 69.3.
131. Id.
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IV. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
In Pennsylvania v. Finley,13 2 the United States Supreme Court held that there
is no federal constitutional right to counsel for indigent prisoners seeking state
post-conviction relief' 3 3 The Court distinguished the requirement of
appointment of counsel on direct appeal as a constitutional mandate and placed
PCR actions in the context of discretionary reviews not supported by an
underlying constitutional right to counsel. 3 4  The Court noted that
"[p]ostconviction relief is even further removed from the criminal trial than is
discretionary direct review. It is not part of the criminal proceeding itself, and it
is in fact considered to be civil in nature." 35 The Court held that "States have no
obligation to provide this avenue of relief, and when they do, the fundamental
fairness mandated by the Due Process Clause does not require that the State
supply a lawyer as well." 36
While federal law provides no support for state prisoners to be appointed
counsel in PCR actions, and thus renders ineffective assistance of counsel claims
on PCR counsel virtually impossible to raise, 137 South Carolina state law gives
indigent applicants who have been granted a hearing in PCR actions the right to
court-appointed counsel.138  This appointment of counsel, however, is not
automatic upon the filing of a PCR action by a prisoner.139 In an Administrative
Order issued by Chief Justice Jean Toal on October 6, 2008, the Chief Justice
directed the post-conviction relief section of the South Carolina Attorney
General's Office to either recommend counsel be appointed to prisoners seeking
relief or recommend counsel not be appointed when they file their return.14 0 If a
recommendation by the attorney general's office is made against the
appointment of counsel because the attorney general asserts that the application
is successive or untimely, counsel will be appointed only by written order of the
132. 481 U.S. 551 (1987).
133. See id. at 555, 556-57.
134. See id. at 556-57; cf Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (concluding
denial of counsel to indigents on first appeal as of right amounted to unconstitutional discrimination
against the poor). But cf Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) (holding no constitutional right
to counsel when seeking a discretionary appeal on direct review of conviction); Douglas v. State,
369 S.C. 213, 215 n.1, 631 S.E.2d 542, 543 n.1 (2006) (noting no Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in pursuing discretionary appeal (citing Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586, 587-88 (1982) (per
curiam))).
135. Finley, 481 U.S. at 556-57.
136. Id. at 557 (citation omitted).
137. See, e.g., Torna, 455 U.S. at 587-88 ("Since respondent had no constitutional right to
counsel, he could not be deprived of the effective assistance of counsel .... ).
138. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-60 (2003); S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(d); see also Whitehead v.
State, 310 S.C. 532, 535, 426 S.E.2d 315, 316 (1992) ("[W]hen a PCR application is not dismissed
before a hearing is held, the PCR judge must appoint counsel or obtain a knowing and intelligent
waiver .... ).
139. See S.C. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2008-10-06-01 (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://
www.sccourts.org/courtOrders/displayOrder.cfm?orderNo=2008-10-06-01.
140. See id.
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chief administrative judge in that circuit and only when the facts of the case fall
within one of the exceptions allowing successive or untimely petitions. If the
attorney general cites any other reason for not recommending the appointment of
counsel, only the written order of a circuit court judge will overrule such a
recommendation using the standard contained in Rule 71.1 of the South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure.142 This directive by Chief Justice Toal is an apparent
effort to further judicial economy and to relieve "an unnecessary burden on the
appointed counsel." 43 This Administrative Order, however, has been criticized
for allowing the applicant's opponent in a PCR action to decide whether or not to
appoint counsel to indigent applicants and for creating such a broad sweeping
rule without the input or approval of the legal community.144 The criteria used
by the attorney general's office to determine whether counsel should be
appointed is not mentioned in Chief Justice Toal's Administrative Order, but the
jurisprudence in this area has always been that, to receive a hearing-and
implicitly, the attorney general's recommendation-the applicant must allege
that an issue of material fact is in dispute (as opposed to a purely legal issue that
can be resolved without the need for a hearing).145
Once counsel has been appointed-usually about sixty to ninety days after
an applicant has filed his application with the clerk of court-the applicant will
be notified of his appointed attorney (usually by an introductory letter sent by the
attorney) and the attorney-client relationship will commence. 4 6  Appointed
counsel handle an overwhelming majority of PCR cases in South Carolina. 4 7
While most appointed counsel are competent and experienced enough to handle
the majority of claims a prisoner may ultimately present at his PCR hearing,
appointed counsel usually work under a strenuous workload that makes it
unlikely that they will conduct more than a cursory review of a prisoner's claims
prior to an evidentiary hearing.14 Indeed, there is somewhat of an unspoken
understanding that prisoners will research and locate issues they believe to have
merit and appointed counsel will in turn review and pass judgment on these
issues sometime prior to the actual hearing. Appointed counsel typically confer
face to face with their clients rarely more than once or twice before a prisoner's
141. See id.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. See John H. Blume & Emily C. Paavola, A Reintroduction: Survival Skills for Post-
Conviction Practice in South Carolina, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 223, 250-51 (2010).
145. See Pelzerv. State, 378 S.C. 516, 519, 662 S.E.2d 618, 619 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-27-70(b)-(c) (2003); Leamon v. State, 363 S.C. 432, 434, 611 S.E.2d 494, 495
(2005)).
146. See generally ASHLEY A. MCMAHAN, SOUTH CAROLINA POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
MANUAL 2-3 (2d ed. 2008) (describing steps an appointed attorney should take in relation to the
applicant).
147. See John H. Blume, An Introduction to Post-Conviction Remedies, Practice and
Procedure in South Carolina, 45 S.C. L. REV. 235, 236 (1994).
148. See id. at 236-37 & n.4.
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scheduled PCR hearing.149 Many times the sole meeting an applicant has with
his appointed counsel occurs a day or two before the evidentiary hearing takes
place or else on the day of the hearing itself.o The amount of claim
development that goes into a PCR application usually depends on the amount of
time and effort a prisoner has dedicated to the application himself' It is not
outlandish to say that if a prisoner depends on his appointed counsel to locate,
research, and brief issues for him, it is unlikely that the prisoner will have any
claims or issues to present at his PCR hearing.
In addition, the economic recession of the past several years has virtually
eliminated the funds available to pay for the appointment of counsel in PCR
cases.152 In a letter from the Executive Director of the South Carolina
Commission on Indigent Defense, members of the South Carolina Bar were
informed that the General Assembly "did not provide any funds for 2010-2011
to compensate attorneys for work performed" in civil appointment cases such as
PCR.153 The letter also mentioned a plan submitted to Chief Justice Toal that
would reduce the maximum number of appointments an attorney could receive
from ten to seven, and the letter requested appointed attorneys submit vouchers,
payable when funds become available, for work performed. '5 4  This letter
essentially indicated that appointed PCR counsel would not receive any
compensation for representing indigent prisoners during the economic downturn.
This lack of compensation is likely to affect not only the quality of
representation a prisoner receives but also a prisoner's potential to receive funds
for needed investigative and expert services. While this information does not
paint a pretty picture, prisoners must ensure that any hindrance in presenting a
claim encountered because of the lack of funding is fully detailed at the
applicant's upcoming evidentiary hearing. Prisoners should detail concerns
because when state courts fail to allow a prisoner to fairly present or develop a
constitutional claim, federal courts are more receptive to allowing discovery in a
federal forum and are more lenient in applying its prohibition against factual
development in federal courts.1"s For this reason, and many others, indigent
149. See id. at 237 n.4.
150. See id.
151. See id. at 236-37 & n.4.
152. See Letter from T. Patton Adams, Exec. Dir., S.C. Comm'n on Indigent Def., to S.C. Bar
Members (June 30, 2010), available at http://www.sccid.sc.gov/Civil-Appt-Letter.doc; see also
Press Release, S.C. Comm'n on Indigent Def., S.C. Comm'n on Indigent Def. Voucher Payments
Suspended Until Approximately July 1, 2012 (May 1, 2012), available at http://www.sccid.sc.gov/
indigent-defense-press-releases-detail.cfm?id= 148 (announcing suspension of voucher payments for
civil appointment cases).
153. Letter from T. Patton Adams to S.C. Bar Members, supra note 152.
154. See id.
155. See, e.g., Conaway v. Polk, 453 F.3d 567, 589, 590-91 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating that
petitioner was not barred from obtaining hearing where he reasonably attempted to investigate and
pursue claim in state court). In Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), the United States
Supreme Court modified its procedural rules for obtaining habeas consideration by permitting
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prisoners need to work from a mindset that they are proceeding pro se (even with
appointed counsel on their case) and must prepare themselves and their claims to
the best of their abilities.
Another major concern many prisoners encounter in pursuing PCR is the
lack of communication between them and appointed counsel. From the date of
filing, a PCR application will usually take at least ten months to materialize into
an actual hearing. Prisoners almost invariably attempt to correspond with their
appointed counsel during this time to address various concerns that they may
have and to ensure that any additional issues that they may wish to raise are
included in their application. While some appointed counsel are exceptions,
most simply fail to respond to an inquiring prisoner's correspondence. ' 6 This
lack of communication could occur because the appointed counsel feels that he
will have a better opportunity to review the applicant's position and allegations
when he visits the prisoner in person, or because he may simply have more
pressing matters at the time, both situations occurring with no desire to
intentionally neglect corresponding with the applicant.5 7 Or, this could be due
to the fact that appointed counsel in PCR proceedings are generally more
nonchalant in their duties since later allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel are unlikely.158 This lack of communication also could be due to the fact
that they are given only a nominal wage for representing indigent prisoners-
many are "paid" with vouchers to be redeemed when funds become
available 59-and they sometimes fail to understand the gravity and importance
of the situation from an incarcerated person's viewpoint. In any event, and as a
result of these issues, prisoners frequently request that their counsel be dismissed
and that substitute counsel be appointed so that a more involved attorney may be
appointed to represent them.160  Such a practice is disfavored and has been
addressed and condemned by the South Carolina Supreme Court.' 6'
In Richardson v. State,162 the South Carolina Supreme Court took the
opportunity to address the recurring problem of PCR applicants repeatedly
seeking to have their appointed counsel relieved and substituted without
litigants to raise ineffective assistance constitutional claims at the PCR level where the claim is
based on the attorney's possible procedural defaults. See id. at 1318.
156. See NAT'L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA'S CONTINUING
NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 97 (2009), http://www.constitution
project.org/pdf/139.pdf (discussing the lack of communication between client and appointed
counsel) (citation omitted).
157. See id. at 95-96.
158. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
159. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-50 (2003) (providing that a reasonable fee will be determined
on the basis of "forty dollars an hour for time spent out of court" and "sixty dollars an hour for time
spent in court"); see also Press Release, S.C. Comm'n on Indigent Def., supra note 152 (advising
attorneys of a temporary suspension of voucher payments).
160. See Richardsonv. State, 377 S.C. 103, 105, 659 S.E.2d 493, 494 (2008).
161. See id.
162. 377 S.C. 103, 659 S.E.2d 493.
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sufficient cause.163 In Richardson, the applicant's counsel requested removal
from the applicant's case, based on motions the applicant filed, and counsel's
request was denied by the PCR judge. In reviewing the matter, the supreme
court emphasized that PCR applicants are not entitled to appointed counsel of
their choice and that a "mere disagreement between an applicant and his counsel
as to how to proceed with the PCR application, including the allegations to be
raised, is not sufficient cause, in itself, to require the PCR judge to replace or to
offer to replace court appointed counsel with another attorney." 6 5  The court
went on to recognize that a PCR applicant will commonly file a complaint
against his appointed counsel with the Office of Disciplinary Counsel and then
assert the complaint as a basis for a motion to relieve the appointed counsel in
his case. 16 The court cautioned the bench against this tactic and against the
repeated filing of a motion to relieve counsel by applicants. 6 7 The court stated
that such maneuvers constituted "an abuse of the judicial process" and "should
not be tolerated." ,6" Although the court did state that the basis of a complaint
should be explored and that discretion should be used in accepting a motion to
relieve counsel,169 the overall message to attorneys and PCR applicants seems to
be to "work it out," with the strong presumption that counsel is properly
exercising his duties.
Many applicants feel, and correctly so, that an appointed PCR counsel's
failure to research, amend or supplement an application, subpoena witnesses, and
communicate more generally, is unacceptable and that every effort should be
made to correct these shortcomings prior to the evidentiary hearing. Counsel's
perceived lack of interest is taken by many applicants as a sign of indifference to
the success of their PCR action. Understandably, applicants wish to maximize
their chances of prevailing at PCR by developing facts and presenting evidence
to the best of their ability. While it may not be intended, appointed counsel often
project a lack of belief or interest in these objectives and undermine an effective
attorney-client relationship in the process.
163. Id. at 105, 659 S.E.2d at 494.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 106, 659 S.E.2d at 495 (citing State v. Jones, 270 S.C. 587, 588, 243 S.E.2d 461,
462 (1978)). Although typically individuals have a right to counsel of their choice, indigents with
court-appointed counsel do not have the same constitutional right. Compare United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006) (holding that there is a constitutional right to the choice
of an attorney), with United States v. Basham, 561 F.3d 302, 324 (4th Cir. 2009) ("[A]n indigent
criminal defendant has no constitutional right to have a particular lawyer represent him." (quoting
Millerv. Smith, 115 F.3d 1136, 1143 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
166. Richardson, 377 S.C. at 107, 659 S.E.2d at 495.
167. See id.
168. Id. at 105, 659 S.E.2d at 494.
169. Id. at 107, 659 S.E.2d at 495.
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V. FILING DEADLINES
A. Statute ofLimitations
In 1995, the South Carolina General Assembly enacted a one-year statute of
limitations for the filing of PCR actions.17 0  In order to meet this time
requirement, a prisoner must file a PCR action within one year after the entry of
a judgment of conviction, within one year after the sending of the remittitur to
the lower court from an appeal, or within one year of the filing of the final
decision upon appeal, whichever is later.' 7 ' If a prisoner does not seek an appeal
after a judgment of conviction, his one year will begin to run after the available
time to appeal has expired.172 If a prisoner does seek direct review, the one-year
statute of limitations will be tolled during his direct appeal, during the time he
petitions the court for rehearing, and during the pendency of a petition for writ of
certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court.173 If a prisoner's petition for
writ of certiorari is denied, the court of appeals will send out the remittitur upon
notification and a prisoner's statute of limitations will begin to run on that
date.174 If a prisoner's petition for writ of certiorari is granted, the date the
supreme court issues an opinion on his claims will constitute a "filing of the final
decision upon an appeal" for statute of limitation purposes.175 If no rehearing or
supreme court review is pursued, the remittitur will be sent fifteen days after the
judgment of the court is entered and a prisoner's one year will begin on that
day. 176
Prisoners should be very mindful of the statutory time restrictions and
conscious of the available time remaining for filing. Too often prisoners
procrastinate until the "eleventh hour," and do not realize the burden they will
face at a later time. For example, if a prisoner has not pursued a direct appeal
and has spent several months in the SCDC's reception and evaluation center
without filing a PCR application, then the one-year time period that he has to file
will be lessened by those several months. Prisoners sometimes delay filing a
PCR application, awaiting peripheral matters-such as factual development of
claims, retainer of legal counsel, or the possession of additional discovery
documents-when, in fact, these matters can be pursued just as effectively after
a PCR application has been filed. It is very important for a prisoner to file his
170. 1995 S.C. Acts 7; H. 4323, 110th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (S.C. 1994); see also
Peloquin v. State, 321 S.C. 468, 469-70, 469 S.E.2d 606, 607 (1996) (per curiam) (quoting S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-27-45(A) (Supp. 1995)) (interpreting the recently enacted statute of limitations).
171. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-45(A) (2003).
172. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(b). Rule 203(b)(2) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules
mandates a ten-day time period for the filing of a notice of appeal from the South Carolina Court of
General Sessions. S.C. APP. CT. R. 203(b)(2).
173. See § 17-27-45(A).
174. See id.; see also S.C. APP. CT. R. 221(b) (describing remittiturs).
175. § 17-27-45(A).
176. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 221(b).
1190 [VOL. 64: 1167
22
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 5 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss5/3
20131 SOUTH CAROLINA PCR FROM A PRISONER'S PERSPECTIVE
PCR application at the earliest possible date, even if this means he will have to
amend or supplement his application at a later date. 7 7  South Carolina has
rejected arguments advanced by prisoners who have run afoul of the one-year
time limitation on grounds that they did so because of ineffective assistance of
counsel, 7 s mental incompetence,179 and even where a prisoner failed to do so
because he was incarcerated in another state. so From any perspective, a prisoner
should never step outside the available time period.
Subsections (B) and (C) of South Carolina Code section 17-27-45 provide
the only two exceptions to the one-year statute of limitations. Subsection (B)
provides the following:
When a court whose decisions are binding upon the Supreme Court
of this State or the Supreme Court of this State holds that the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of South Carolina,
or both, impose upon state criminal proceedings a substantive standard
not previously recognized or a right not in existence at the time of the
state court trial, and if the standard or right is intended to be applied
retroactively, an application under this chapter may be filed not later
than one year after the date on which the standard or right was
determined to exist.
1812
In Teague v. Lane, the United States Supreme Court announced that a
state prisoner may not rely on a new constitutional rule to attack his conviction
on collateral review if his conviction has become final. 83 A new constitutional
rule is one that "breaks new ground," "imposes a new obligation on the States or
the Federal Government," or "was not dictated by precedent existing at the time
the defendant's conviction became final." 4 In order for a new constitutional
rule to be applied retroactively on collateral review (such as PCR), it must fall
within one of the two listed exceptions: (1) that the rule "places 'certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-
making authority to proscribe,"' or (2) if it requires the observance of procedures
177. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-70(a) (2003) (stating that the court may issue an
order for an application to be amended, for filing further pleadings or motions, or for extending the
time for filing any pleading at any time prior to entry of judgment); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-
150(A) (2003) (stating that discovery is available to applicants pursuing PCR upon leave of court).
178. See Jones v. State, 382 S.C. 589, 592, 596, 677 S.E.2d 20, 21, 24 (2009) (citing § 17-27-
45).
179. Norris v. State, 335 S.C. 30, 33, 515 S.E.2d 523, 525 (1999).
180. Leamonv. State, 363 S.C. 432, 436, 611 S.E.2d 494, 496 (2005).
181. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-45(B) (2003); see also Talley v. State, 371 S.C. 535, 541-44,
640 S.E.2d 878, 880-82 (2007) (citations omitted) (discussing when new procedural rules and
United States Supreme Court decisions should be applied retroactively on collateral review and
applying § 17-27-45(B) as the applicable statute of limitations).
182. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
183. See id. at 316.
184. Id. at 301.
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that are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 85  Such claims will
undoubtedly be rare because, as the Court noted, "[w]e operate from the premise
that such procedures would be so central to an accurate determination of
innocence or guilt, we believe it unlikely that many such components of basic
due process have yet to emerge. Nonetheless, if a prisoner meets these
criteria he will have one year from the date of the decision to file for a PCR.8 7
Subsection (C) of section 17-27-45, the second statutory exception to the
one-year time limitation for the filing of a PCR, provides that "[i]f the applicant
contends that there is evidence of material facts not previously presented and
heard that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence," then the prisoner may
file within one year of the actual discovery of the facts or within one year "after
the date when the facts could have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable
diligence." 88 The South Carolina Court of Appeals has stated:
To prevail on a motion for a new trial based on after-discovered
evidence, it is necessary to show that the evidence: "(1) would probably
change the result if a new trial is had; (2) has been discovered since the
trial; (3) could not have been discovered before trial; (4) is material to
the issue of guilt or innocence; and (5) is not merely cumulative or
impeaching."1 89
An often underestimated aspect of a claim being successful based on after-
discovered evidence is not being precluded by the phrases "could have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence" and "could not have been
discovered before trial." For example, a common after-discovered evidence
185. Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692-93 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Talley, 371
S.C. at 541, 544, 640 S.E.2d at 881, 882 (finding that the new rule announced in Alabama v.
Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), that the constitutional right to counsel tends to a defendant who
receives a "suspended sentence that may 'end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty,"' is
a "watershed rule" of criminal procedure applicable to collateral review because the right to counsel
undeniably implicates the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the proceeding) (quoting Shelton,
535 U.S. at 658).
186. Teague, 489 U.S. at 313.
187. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45(B) (2003).
188. § 17-27-45(C).
189. State v. Hill, 359 S.C. 301, 316, 597 S.E.2d 822, 830-31 (Ct. App. 2004) (quoting State
v. South, 310 S.C. 504, 507, 427 S.E.2d 666, 668-69 (1993)), rev'd on other grounds, 368 S.C. 649,
630 S.E.2d 274 (2006); see also Dearybury v. State, 367 S.C. 34, 40, 625 S.E.2d 212, 215-16
(2006) (quoting § 17-27-45) (noting that petitioner argued § 17-27-45(C) applied). In Dearybury,
the petitioner alleged that he was under the belief that his divorce attorney represented him on a
criminal charge and that section 17-27-45(C) governed his PCR application because, although he
filed his PCR outside of the allowable one-year time frame, he filed within a month of learning the
newly discovered fact that his divorce attorney did not represent him. See id. at 37, 40, 625 S.E.2d
at 214, 215-16 (quoting § 17-27-45). The court ultimately remanded the case to determine whether
petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived his right to trial counsel in this instance. Id. at 41,
625 S.E.2d at 216.
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claim is one based on the affidavit of a newly discovered alibi witness.190 These
types of claims, however, hardly ever survive scrutiny if the affiant could have
previously been discovered by counsel's reasonable investigation. 191
B. Equitable Measures
Three situations provide for a nonstatutory equitable measure allowing a
prisoner to file a PCR action outside of the one-year statutory time limitation.
These situations arise when a prisoner claims he did not waive his right to
appellate review of a prior PCR order,192 when an applicant is denied legal
counsel,193 and when a prisoner claims that he did not knowingly and
intelligently waive his right to a direct appeal from his criminal conviction.194
In Austin v. State,195 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that a prisoner
may pursue a successive PCR application if he alleges ineffective assistance of
PCR counsel for failure to seek appellate review of his PCR order.196
Recognizing the right of prisoners to seek appellate review of the denial of
PCR,197 and the right to appellate counsel's assistance in doing so,198 the court in
Austin proceeded to craft a procedure to remedy such a claim.199 This procedure,
which is thoroughly discussed in the appellate Part of this Commentary, 200 has
come to be known as an Austin appeal.201 The court has ruled that the one-year
statute of limitations time requirement does not apply to Austin appeals.202
In Odom v. State,203 the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed a PCR
judge's order of dismissal, finding that the petitioner never received the entitled
full "bite at the apple" because both of his PCR applications were dismissed
before he was appointed legal counsel. 4  The court emphasized that because
Odom's Austin appeal attacked the "PCR procedure used in his case, not the
190. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 393 (1993) (explaining that petitioner wanted
to use affidavits as newly discovered evidence in a habeas proceeding).
191. See, e.g., Herrera, 506 U.S. at 423 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Affidavits like these are
not uncommon . .. [and] are an unfortunate although understandable occurrence. It seems that,
when a prisoner's life is at stake, he often can find someone new to vouch for him. Experience has
shown, however, that such affidavits are to be treated with a fair degree of skepticism.").
192. See Austinv. State, 305 S.C. 453, 454, 409 S.E.2d 395, 396 (1991).
193. See Odomv. State, 337 S.C. 256, 263, 523 S.E.2d 753, 756-57 (1999).
194. See Wilsonv. State, 348 S.C. 215, 218, 559 S.E.2d 581, 582-83 (2002).
195. 305 S.C. 453, 409 S.E.2d 395.
196. See id. at 454, 409 S.E.2d at 396.
197. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-100 (1976); S.C. SUP. CT. R. 50(9) (Supp. 1986)
(now available at S.C. APP. CT. R. 243)).
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. See infra Part XI.
201. See, e.g., Odom v. State, 337 S.C. 256, 263, 523 S.E.2d 753, 756-57 (1999) (citing S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-27-45(A) (Supp. 1998)) (describing anAustin appeal).
202. See id. at 263, 523 S.E.2d at 757 (citing § 17-27-45(A)).
203. 337 S.C. 256, 523 S.E.2d 753.
204. Id. at 262, 523 S.E.2d at 756 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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merits of his sentence," the one-year statute of limitations did not apply. 205 The
court stated that "Austin['s] policy would be frustrated if the one-year statute of
limitations applied to procedural errors made by the PCR courts." 206  This
holding does not mean that a prisoner must receive the appointment of counsel
simply because he has filed a PCR application, only that that appointment must
take place once it is determined that an evidentiary hearing is warranted. 207
In Wilson v. State,208 the South Carolina Supreme Court extended the rule of
Odom and Austin and held that the one-year time limitation period in which a
prisoner has to file an application for post-conviction relief does not apply where
a defendant was denied a direct appeal due to ineffective assistance of counsel.2 09
In Wilson, the defendant alleged that, after a jury convicted him, he instructed his
attorney to appeal his conviction, but his attorney never did so. 210 When the
state moved to dismiss Wilson's application as being time-barred, Wilson argued
that the one-year statute of limitations should not apply to defendants who did
not voluntarily waive their right to a direct appeal from a criminal conviction.2 1'
The supreme court agreed with Wilson and held that a defendant has a right to
file one direct appeal as well as the right to file one PCR.212 In other words, a
defendant has the procedural right to "one fair bite at the apple." 213 However,
while a prisoner has a right to seek a belated direct appeal, prisoners are not
entitled to seek a belated writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals decision
on direct appeal regardless of whether they are within the applicable one-year
statute of limitations.214
Equitable tolling is a doctrine rarely applied in South Carolina to stop the
running of a statute of limitations and is reserved for only the most extraordinary
of circumstances.215 Generally, a prisoner seeking equitable tolling bears the
burden of establishing "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2)
205. Id. at 263, 523 S.E.2d at 757 (citing § 17-27-45(A)).
206. Id.
207. See S.C. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2008-10-06-01 (Oct. 6, 2008), available at http://
www.sccourts.org/courtOrders/displayOrder.cfm?orderNo=2008-10-06-01. For an enlightening
discussion of Austin and Odom, see Pettinato v. Eagleton, 466 F. Supp. 2d 641, 650-51 (D.S.C.
2006) (citations omitted).
208. 348 S.C. 215, 559 S.E.2d 581 (2002).
209. See id. at 218, 559 S.E.2d at 582-83.
210. See id. at 217, 559 S.E.2d at 582.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 218, 559 S.E.2d at 582-83.
213. Id. at 218, 559, S.E.2d at 582.
214. See Douglas v. State, 369 S.C. 213, 215, 631 S.E.2d 542, 543 (2006). The South
Carolina Supreme Court declined to impose a duty on appellate counsel to pursue rehearing and/or
certiorari following the decision of the court of appeals in a criminal direct appeal. Id.
Accordingly, no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can be brought against an attorney
pursing certiorari after a direct appeal. Id. at 215 n.1, 631 S.E.2d at 543 n.1.
215. Pelzer v. State, 378 S.C. 516, 520, 662 S.E.2d 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Hooper
v. Ebenezer Senior Servs. & Rehab. Ctr., 377 S.C. 217, 230, 659 S.E.2d 213, 219 (Ct. App. 2008),
rev'd, 386 S.C. 108, 687 S.E.2d 29 (2009)).
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that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way." 216 Equitable tolling is
available only in "those rare instances where-due to circumstances external to
the party's own conduct-it would be unconscionable to enforce the limitation
period against the party and gross injustice would result."217 The special and
unique circumstances necessary to trigger equitable tolling are virtually
unobtainable in most cases.218 An applicant may believe many reasons (and
excuses) entitle him to equitable tolling that simply do not. If an applicant is
attempting to gain PCR review using this avenue, he should be prepared to show
some measure of prudence, activities, or assiduity in diligently pursuing his
rights; and he should know that his chances of prevailing on uncharted grounds
are slim. 219  Obviously, conscious adherence to the PCR Act's statute of
limitations can assure avoidance of most of the circumstances that lead
applicants to seek review under the equitable tolling doctrine.
C. Federal Habeas Considerations
Conscious adherence to the one-year statute of limitations the PCR Act
imposes also requires prisoners to consider the detrimental effect late filing will
have on the pursuit of federal habeas relief. Prisoners in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a state court are given a one-year time limitation to apply for a
federal writ of habeas corpus.220 This limitation period begins to run from the
latest of one of the following dates: (1) "the date on which the judgment became
final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review"; (2) "the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State
action"; (3) "the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review";
or (4) "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented
could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." 221 However,
the time during which a prisoner has properly filed a direct appeal, PCR
application, or any other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment
or claim, is not counted towards a prisoner's one-year limitation period. 222
216. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005).
217. Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 246 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d
325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000)).
218. See Harris, 209 F.3d at 330.
219. See Rouse, 339 F.3d at 246 (citing Spencerv. Sutton, 239 F.3d 626, 630 (4th Cir. 2001)).
220. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006). See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) (explaining
the situations in which applications for writs of habeas corpus should be granted).
221. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D).
222. § 2244(d)(2); see also Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 411 (2005) (holding that
because petitioner's PCR application was rejected as untimely, it was not "properly filed," so he
was not entitled to tolling under § 2244(d)(2)).
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With regard to prisoners filing PCR actions, there are two areas of confusion
that warrant clarification. First, prisoners should know that the one-year statute
of limitations for habeas review and the one-year statute of limitations for PCR
review run simultaneously with each other.223 Accordingly, prisoners who delay
filing PCR actions, when no other action-typically a direct appeal-is pending,
gradually reduce the time they have for filing for federal habeas review as
well. 224 For example, if a prisoner was convicted on January 1, 2011, and did
not pursue a direct appeal, that prisoner would have until January 1, 2012, to file
a PCR action. If this prisoner did not file his PCR application until nine months
later on October 1, 2011, then he would have three months remaining to file for
federal habeas review if his complete PCR-that is, his PCR and subsequent
appeal-prove unsuccessful, because after the nine-month delay, there are only
three months remaining in the year. The clock for habeas review is not tolled
after the date of conviction or judgment unless a prisoner files for direct appeal
or other "[s]tate post-conviction or other collateral review."225 Tolling merely
pauses the clock; it does not restart anew the limitations period. 226 The tolling
period is also not limited to only the court of appeals on direct appeal or the PCR
court, but extends itself to the review of these courts by any subsequent petition
for writ of certiorari.227 The tolling period does not extend itself, however, when
a prisoner seeks review of an adverse decision by the South Carolina Supreme
Court by way of petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court.228 A potentially important distinction to make between the one-year
statute of limitations for filing a PCR and the one-year statute of limitations for
filing a federal habeas petition is that the PCR's clock begins to run on the date a
290
prisoner is convicted, while the federal habeas clock actually begins to run on
223. See, e.g., Harris, 209 F.3d at 328 (holding that petitioner's habeas petition was time
barred because both his PCR and habeas one-year period had expired).
224. See, e.g., id. (explaining that after the court denied petitioner's PCR application, the clock
began running again, so that his federal habeas petition, which was filed six months after his one-
year period had expired, was time-barred).
225. § 2244(d)(1)(A), (d)(2).
226. Trapp v. Spencer, 479 F.3d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting § 2244(d)(2)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
227. See, e.g., Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219 20 (2002) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1669 (1993) (An action is pending for the purpose of
§ 2244(d)(2) as long as the action is "'in continuance,"' that is, "'until the completion of' that
process. In other words, until the application has achieved final resolution through the [s]tate's
post-conviction procedures, by definition it remains 'pending"').
228. See Crawley v. Catoe, 257 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that "the time that [a]
petition for certiorari, which sought review of [an] adverse decision in the state habeas proceeding,
was pending in the United States Supreme Court did not toll the one-year limitations of
§ 2244(d)(1)").
229. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-45(A) (2006); see also Green v. State, 353 S.C. 29, 30-31, 576
S.E.2d 182, 183 (2003) (per curiam) (dismissing petitioner's PCR application and stating that
section 17-27-45(A) does not "provide any exception for tolling the statute of limitations where an
applicant seeks federal habeas relief prior to exhausting his state remedies"); Peloquin v. State, 321
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the day the time for seeking direct review expires.230 In South Carolina, a
prisoner has ten days to seek an appeal from his conviction. 231 Thus, using the
example above, the prisoner who was convicted on January 1, 2011, would
actually begin his one-year time limitation for habeas review on January 11,
2011. Of course, if a direct appeal is taken then neither PCR nor habeas time
limitations begin to run until it has ended.232 Prisoners should take caution and
realize that it is usually the "gap" period between the conclusion of a direct
appeal and the filing of a PCR action that does the most damage to a prisoner's
233
limitation period for the filing of a federal habeas action.
Secondly, prisoners should be clear on what it means to have a pleading
"properly filed" in state courts. A PCR application is properly filed within the
meaning of the statute when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with
the laws and rules governing filing, which usually prescribe "the form of the
document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must
be lodged, and the requisite filing fee." 234 For example, if a prisoner filed his
PCR application before his direct appeal ended 235 or filed his PCR application in
a court other than the proper one, then his application would not be properly
filed for purposes of tolling the federal habeas time limitation until the
application was filed correctly.236 Additionally, the limitation period is not
tolled during the time an applicant has filed a second or successive petition if it
is determined that the petition does not meet the limited circumstances to which
the statute of limitations would not apply. 237  State law governs whether a
S.C. 468, 470, 469 S.E.2d 606, 607 (1996) (holding that the legislature failed to provide time for
applications which would otherwise be barred by the one-year statute of limitations).
230. See § 2244(d)(1)(A); see also Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d. 701, 704 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating
the "one-year limitation period begins running when direct review of the state conviction is
completed or when time for seeking direct reviews has expired").
231. S.C. App. CT. R. 203(b)(2).
232. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
233. See, e.g., Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 327 (4th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the
time between the conclusion of direct review and the filing of a PCR is not tolled because no state
court application is pending).
234. Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000).
235. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(b) ("An application for post-conviction relief cannot be made
while an appeal from the conviction or sentence is pending or during the time in which an appeal
may be perfected.").
236. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-40 (2003) ("A proceeding is commenced by filing an
application verified by the applicant with the clerk of court in which the conviction took place.");
see also Artuz, 531 U.S. at 9 (providing that limitations are not tolled where application filed in the
wrong state court).
237. See, e.g., Pettinato v. Eagleton, 466 F. Supp. 2d 641, 655 (D.S.C. 2006) (finding that
"extraordinary circumstances" did exist to justify tolling petitioner's second PCR).
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pleading is properly filed238 and a review of the applicable law governing a filing
can be found in the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.239
VI. LAW LBRARY
A. Access
In Bounds v. Smith,240 the United States Supreme Court held that "the
fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison
authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal
papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance
from persons trained in the law." 241 The Bounds Court sufficiently recognized
the need for prisoners to conduct adequate claim research in order to rebut a
state's argument in opposition to submitted pleadings or to file an initial pleading
in general.242 The Court left open the method a state may employ (libraries,
inmate paralegals, clinical programs including law students or professionals,
legal assistance organizations, etc.) in ensuring compliance with this mandate
and deemed the course of action taken as a purely administrative matter. 243In
response, South Carolina has opted to provide its prisoners with law libraries
staffed with inmate law clerks.244 The decision in Bounds, however, was later
trimmed in respect to how far a state must go to meet these requirements.
In Lewis v. Casey,245 the United States Supreme Court retracted from the
statements in Bounds suggesting that prison authorities must enable a prisoner to
discover grievances or effectively litigate in court.246  The Court stated that
prisoners need only be given the "tools . . . to attack their sentences, directly or
collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions of their confinement." 247
Justice Scalia, writing rather sarcastically for the Court in Lewis, noted that
"Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves
238. See id. at 649 (alteration in original) (quoting Merritt v. Blaine, 326 F.3d 157, 167 (3d
Cir. 2003) ("[W]e must look to state law to determine whether the state petition is 'properly filed."'
(alteration in original)).
239. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-27-40, -45, -50 (2003).
240. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
241. Id. at 828.
242. See id. at 825 (stating that although some petitions only require a petitioner to set forth
facts and not law, "it hardly follows that a law library or other legal assistance is not essential to
frame such documents. It would verge on incompetence for a lawyer to file an initial pleading
without researching such issues as jurisdiction, venue, standing, exhaustion of remedies, proper
parties plaintiff and defendant, and types of relief available. Most importantly, of course, a lawyer
must know what the law is in order to determine whether a colorable claim exists, and if so, what
facts are necessary to state a cause of action.").
243. See id. at 830.
244. See GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 46, §§ 1, 4.1.
245. 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
246. See id. at 354.
247. Id. at 355.
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into litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative
actions to slip-and-fall claims."248 While the majority of prisoners pursuing
PCR are not attempting to "transform" themselves into anything other than a free
citizen, it is doubtful the limited access to and deficiency of the SCDC's law
libraries (combined with the other roadblocks discussed below) would suffice to
pass constitutional muster under Bounds. Indeed, however one looks at the
situation, the deficiencies meant to be alleviated in Bounds v. Smith and Lewis v.
Casey remain a common problem for prisoners to overcome.
When a prisoner comes to the law library attempting to gain insight into his
situation, he often finds this task to be a formidable one. In general, institutional
law libraries are required to be open a total of 37.5 hours per week.249 This
includes two nights per week totaling at least six hours. 250 As all prisons have
several dorms on each compound, each dorm is usually assigned a specific day
of the week to utilize the law library. This assignment breaks down to allow a
prisoner a total of around six to seven available hours to utilize the law library
each week. On weekends, law libraries typically operate for two to three hours
and rotate so that each dorm on the compound is given one weekend a month to
visit the library. Often, attendance in the law library is limited for various
reasons. For example, a fog around the facility is considered a security hazard
and will cause the law library to be closed or its opening to be delayed. If it is
raining or exceptionally cold, prisoners will likely be told that the weather is not
acceptable and the law library will not open. These examples illustrate that the
hours of operation for institutional law libraries are simply the projected hours a
prisoner may receive and not, in most cases, the actual time a library is available
to be used.
Moreover, because all prisoners are required to work, the time provided for
prisoners in the law library is further significantly reduced.25' Prisoners are
generally not allowed to leave their work assignment without facing disciplinary
action.252 Additionally, most job assignments usually run concurrent with the
hours of operation for the law library (usual business hours). This limitation
usually leaves only the evening hours of operation, typically an hour or two,
available to many prisoners wishing to use the law library, and then only on the
day their dorm is assigned to use the law library. Work supervisors are about
even both ways on the issue of allowing a prisoner to leave work to use the law
library. Some will let a prisoner go if he is not actually needed or if the prisoner
248. Id.
249. GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 46, § 3.
250. Id.
251. See S.C. DEP'T OF CORR., No. OP-22.08, OPERATIONS MANUAL: CONTROLLED INMATE
MOVEMENT § 1.4 (July 1, 2008) [hereinafter CONTROLLED INMATE MOVEMENT] (stating that all
inmates will participate in a productive duty assignment).
252. See S.C. DEP'T OF CORR., No. OP-22.14, OPERATIONS MANUAL: INMATE DISCIPLINARY
SYSTEM app. A (July 1, 2012) [hereinafter INMATE DISCIPLINARY SYS.] (listing various disciplinary
offenses, including offenses 826 for "Refusing to Work" and 828 for being "Out of Place").
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has finished his assignment early. Others will strictly forbid the absence of a
prisoner until scheduled work hours are over, regardless of why the absence is
needed. It really boils down to the luck of the draw.
If a prisoner does manage to obtain a pass to the law library, it is still no
guarantee that the law library will be open. Not infrequently, a prisoner will
attempt to gain access to the law library only to find that it has been closed for
one of a number of reasons. The most common reason given is that there is a
shortage of staff and no security available to supervise the educational building
where institutional libraries are located.253  When this occurs, it is usually
another week before a prisoner can attempt to gain access again. While SCDC
policy requires that prisoners be allowed to attend the law library for at least two
hours daily, 25 4 this policy is simply not the reality of the situation. Among other
things, the law library is frequently closed when contraband searches are being
conducted, when test drills are being exercised, and when the institution is on
lockdown. Even greater limitations occur when a prisoner is placed in a prison's
"lock-up" unit.255
Prisoners in an institution's SMU, commonly referred to as "lock-up," are
prisoners who have been separated from the general population due to
disciplinary infractions.25 6 While a rules violation may seem like an unnecessary
and self-imposed hardship, it is not an uncommon occurrence. During its 2009
fiscal year, the SCDC recorded a total of 22,716 disciplinary convictions. 257 As
of March 27, 2013, there were a total of over 2,000 prisoners in SMUs in South
Carolina.258 Considering the fact that a prisoner may spend anywhere from
several days to several years in an institution's SMU, obtaining legal material
from the law library during this time is arguably even more vital, yet more
limited, than that of prisoners in general population.259 In order to obtain legal
material from the law library while in SMU, policy requires prisoners to submit
an SCDC Form 9-2, titled "Law Book Request," to an SMU supervisor. 260
Within three business days, the prisoner is supposed to receive up to three
requested books or policies.261 What actually occurs, however, is that inmate
law clerks circulate SMU on one day to pick up request forms and legal material,
253. Contrary to the language in SCDC policy, it is usually a correctional officer, not a trained
librarian, who operates and oversees the libraries at most institutions. See, e.g., GEN. ADMIN.
MANUAL, supra note 46, §§ 2,2.4 (discussing duties of "Institutional Librarians").
254. CONTROLLED INMATE MOVEMENT, supra note 250, §§ 2.3.2, 2.4.2.
255. See generally GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 46, § 9 (describing the access afforded
to inmates in other units).
256. For infornation on the operation and procedures of SMUs, see generally SPECIAL MGMT.
UNIT, supra note 107.
257. S.C. DEP'T OF CORR., AGENCY ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 38 (2012), http://www.doc.sc.
gov/pubweb/research/AccountabilityReportFY2012.pdf.
258. Population Counts and Capacities, supra note 82.
259. For a review of the amount of time a prisoner can spend in an SMU, see INMATE
DISCIPLINARY SYS., supra note 251, § 17.1.
260. GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 46, § 9.2.
261. Id.
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then circulate SMU on another day to deposit the requested material and books.
Therefore, an SMU prisoner might receive books on Thursday and be required to
turn in those books the following Tuesday (along with a request for more books
to be delivered again Thursday). The prisoner would again receive books on the
following Thursday, and the cycle would continue. This is the typical routine
employed at most institutions. The handicap in this routine is that prisoners may
only review three cases a week, and sometimes the cycle is delayed if an inmate
law clerk cannot make his scheduled rounds. Special procedures are rarely, if
ever, employed for prisoners with court deadlines or any other type of special
concern. 262 The most effective way prisoners combat this reduction in access to
legal publications is to have other prisoners in close vicinity to them in SMU
place a law book request for them so that they may have the benefit of reviewing
more than three cases in a one- or two-week period.
As a final consideration regarding prisoners housed in SMU: Prisoners and
lawyers alike should be aware that a prisoner and his property will be separated
during his time in SMU. While prisoners are allowed to keep their legal box and
legal materials in SMU, legal material that does not fit into a prisoner's 15" x
12" x 10" legal box is placed in a property box and cannot be accessed by the
prisoner. A common problem occurs when a prisoner needs to remove
material from his property box but is forbidden from doing so. Prisoners will
often need to ensure, to the extent possible, that their most important documents
are within the legal box if they are faced with the possibility of placement in
SMU. Attorneys should also take seriously a prisoner's claim that he is unable
to access necessary paperwork and advocate retrieval on a prisoner's behalf,
since prison administrators sometimes respond only to outside influence.
Of course, these restrictions and roadblocks only occur when an institution
has a law library to attend. Several institutions have no law library at all, and
prisoners wishing to attend one must be transported to another institution to do
so.264 Generally, institutions that do not have law libraries are lower-security
facilities, and the prisoners there have generally received a lesser term of
imprisonment than prisoners at other higher-security institutions or have
graduated to a reduced custody level. 265 However, prisoners at these lower-
security facilities may still have received significant sentences they wish to
262. But see Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1126 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that right of
access violated when prisoners in administrative segregation allowed only two to three law books
per day, without justification for that limitation).
263. SPECIAL MGMT. UNIT, supra note 107, § 17.
264. See GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 46, § 7.1 (stating that prisoners at facilities
without a law library must submit a request to be transported to the law library of another institution
and must be so transported within a "reasonable amount of time").
265. See generally INMATE CLASSIFICATION PLAN, supra note 42, § 8 (stating that inmates
who are within eight years of being released may be placed at Level lB institutions). Therefore, a
prisoner with a twelve-year nonviolent sentence may automatically meet the time requirement for
placement at such a facility. See generally S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-13-230 (Supp. 2012) (describing
generally the credits given for good behavior).
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challenge through a PCR action or other post-conviction avenue. Since the
decision to pursue post-conviction relief is a subjective evaluation of the facts
and law in any given case and is not limited by a prisoner's sentence alone,
prisoners who are housed at a facility without a law library often request,
unsuccessfully, equal access to needed legal materials. Unfortunately, such
prisoners are only given a mere two hours per week to conduct their studies, 266 if
they are given the opportunity to do so at all. Since two hours per week is
wholly inadequate, prisoners in these situations generally attempt to simply
make the most out of a challenging situation, as the only alternative is to be
reassigned to a more restrictive facility with a law library.
Once a prisoner has gained access to the institutional educational building
and has been given a valid pass, it is still not guaranteed that he will actually
make it to the law library itself Guards assigned to the educational building are
generally unpredictable in their antics and mannerisms towards prisoners. While
policy provides that all prisoners will be provided with access to the law
library,267 there are usually differences between practice and policy. On the one
hand, a prisoner may be able to show the guard a pass and move directly to the
law library. On the other, the guard may determine that a prisoner's shirt is not
properly tucked in or that he is not properly groomed, and thus order that he exit
the law library.268 This practice has the effect of forcing prisoners to return to
their donnitories and waive their library privileges for that day, which, in turn,
means that a prisoner must wait another week before being able to return. Once
again, it all boils down to the luck of the draw on the type of guard a prisoner
will encounter.
Lastly, institutional mailrooms can prove to be an almost impossible hurdle
to overcome for prisoners attempting to gain "access to the courts." 269 Although
the SCDC has an established policy outlining the guidelines for outgoing and
incoming mail, 270 this policy, like many, is often conservatively construed to the
effect of placing additional hardships on a great number of indigent and pro se
litigants. For example, although indigent prisoners are supposed to be able to
mail necessary paperwork to the courts without limitation,271 to do so they are
often required to demonstrate that they are initiating or have a pending action in
the courts. While it could possibly be argued that this practice serves a logical
penological interest-preventing prisoners from frivolously abusing the
privilege-the frustration lies with mailroom personnel who are not trained to
266. See GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 46, § 1.
267. See id.
268. For more information on the grooming standards of prisoners, see generally S.C. DEP'T
OF CORR., No. OP-22.13, OPERATIONS MANUAL: INMATE GROOMING STANDARDS (Nov. 1, 2006).
269. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977).
270. See generally S.C. DEP'T OF CORR., No. PS-10.08, PROGRAM SERVICES MANUAL:
INMATE CORRESPONDENCE PRIVILEGES (May 1, 2008) [hereinafter INMATE CORRESPONDENCE
PRIVILEGES] (providing the guidelines).
271. See id. § 11.1 (stating that inmates are allowed to send legal mail as needed, regardless of
indigent status).
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recognize legitimate court documents and often deny prisoners postage out of
ignorance. Mailroom personnel typically demand to review a prisoner's
personal legal correspondence from a court officer in order to determine whether
a prisoner has a pending court action, 272 and then they often deny postage simply
because they do not sufficiently understand what it is they have read. One of the
most common demands that mailroom personnel make on indigent prisoners
seeking postage with which to access the courts is requiring that the prisoner
produce a recent letter from his lawyer or the court demonstrating the pendency
of an action. Doing so is not always an easy task. As previously discussed,
appointed counsel often go long periods without responding to a prisoner's
inquiries and sometimes do not respond at all, thereby preventing a prisoner
from making this requested showing. For this reason, this practice serves as a
major hindrance to a significant number of prisoners attempting to communicate
with the court and its officers.
B. Capacity
Another common roadblock prisoners encounter is the limited capacity of
the law library itself SCDC policy limits the total number of prisoners allowed
in the law library.273 Most institutions within the SCDC are designed to hold a
274
total population of between 1,100 and 1,800 prisoners. This statistic means
that if even one percent of an institution's population (eleven to eighteen
prisoners) decided to utilize the law library on any given day, it is not likely that
the prisoner who is not quick on his feet will be admitted.
Some prisoners spend only a fraction of the time available to them in the law
library when they are granted access. Others will often come simply to browse
and kick around ideas. Therefore, a logical solution to capacity space might be
to allow prisoners awaiting access to actually wait in the vicinity until a chair
becomes available. This is a reasonable proposition because some prisoners
come to the law library only to secure an address or to quickly check a fact and
then leave shortly thereafter. Another reasonable proposition might be to allow
prisoners to check out legal material and conduct their research in another area of
the educational building. Both of these options are feasible because the
adjoining library, which is attached to the law library, can seat a minimum of
eighteen prisoners and is rarely at full capacity. Unfortunately, neither of these
advancements seem likely to be implemented anytime soon. As no legal books
are allowed to be checked out of the educational building,275 prisoners often
272. See id. § 7.2 (providing that legal mail will be opened and inspected in front of prisoner).
273. See GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 46, § 7.2 (limiting inmate access to law libraries
to existing seating capacity). However, there are exceptions. Broad River CI, for example, seats at
least sixteen prisoners in its law library. This is the only prison known to the author with a capacity
this high.
274. See Population Counts and Capacities, supra note 82.
275. GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 46, § 7.5.
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must return to their living units and attempt to gain access yet again at a later
time or date. The most effective countermeasure against being denied access to
the law library because of capacity is simply to ensure that one is familiar with
the available time frames for access and is the first to sign up to attend.
C. Inmate Law Clerks
Once in the law library, a prisoner's obstacles really begin to unfold.
Prisoners generally have no idea what it is that they need to research or where to
begin doing so. While many have asked enough questions to have a very general
understanding of what PCR is about, prisoners are basically left to examine the
merits of their claims through independent research. Prisoners usually find this
to be an extremely daunting task for several reasons.
To begin, prisoners typically want a quick prognosis for their situation when
one is not available. Many also wish to assess their situation through diligent
research, but they are not in possession of all-if any-of their discovery-related
documents and transcripts to enable them to do so.276 Others come to the law
library without even pen and paper. Thus, it is usually to the prisoner law clerks
that inquiring minds first turn.
Inmate law clerks fall into one of two categories: those who are
knowledgeable and skilled in legal research and those who are not. Those law
clerks in the former category are mostly self-trained through determination and
diligence. Many have taken paralegal courses and stay abreast of changes in the
law by personally purchasing recent opinions, periodicals, and other legal
publications. The majority of these inmate law clerks do not give "curbside"
advice and do not have a problem telling an inquiring prisoner that they do not
know the answer to a question, if that is indeed the case.277 These law clerks not
only inform and guide other prisoners with the knowledge within their
possession on any given topic but also teach others how to research effectively
so that an answer is always available to a prisoner, no matter what question he
may have. These law clerks are truly few and far between, and prisoners seeking
guidance in the law library have really found a "diamond in the rough" should
they cross paths with one.
The second category of inmate law clerks mentioned is definitely the most
dominant. Their existence is due to the fact that no qualifications or
prerequisites exist for becoming a law clerk within the SCDC. 278 A prisoner
need not take any courses in legal education, meet any standard in legal training,
or know the difference between the Georgetown Law Journal and The Bluebook
276. Criminal discovery in the prosecution of a crime is regulated by Rule 5 of the South
Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure. See S.C. R. CRI. P. 5. For the rule governing discovery in
PCR actions, see S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-150 (2003).
277. SCDC policy bars inmates from giving other inmates any form of legal assistance. See
GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 46, § 4.3. However, prisoners do so on a regular basis.
278. See generally id. § 4 (describing inmate law clerks).
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in order to become a law clerk in the SCDC. The only quasi-requirement
mentioned in SCDC policy is that potential law clerks read, voluntarily, a
pamphlet on how to conduct legal research.279 It is very true that a prisoner can
have absolutely no understanding of the law yet become an institutional law
clerk simply because an educational guard has a position that needs to be filled.
These prisoner law clerks are the origin of horrendous pleadings and bad advice.
Nonetheless, many inquiring prisoners seek the advice and assistance of these
types of law clerks for the simple reason that they are more likely to tell an
inquiring prisoner what it is they desire to hear, regardless of its validity. To
speak of such concepts as dictum, plurality opinions, and stare decisis to these
law clerks is to speak in a foreign tongue. In this most common of situations, it
is truly the blind leading the blind.
It should be additionally noted that it is not unheard of for prisoners seeking
enlightenment as to their legal concerns to fall victim to those prisoners who can
only be described as scam artists. These are individuals who prey on a
prisoner's fear and ignorance to portray themselves as legal scholars for
pecuniary gain. It is usually the victims of these scam artists who end up coming
to the institutional law library at a later date seeking to "fix" what they had
originally believed to be an adequate pleading or motion. Whether in or out of
the law library, bad advice and insufficient pleadings can have a devastating
effect upon a prisoner's chances of success by PCR. A signature trait of the
conversations that occur in institutional law libraries is prisoners taking a rumor
or error of law and portraying it as a fact. Very often, prisoners are led away
from a correct understanding of the law and how it may apply because they take
the words of other prisoners as fact and do not bother to ascertain the truth for
themselves. Legal research can get very complex, and what may seem like a
common sense answer may not turn out to be the correct one upon reviewing the
relevant case law. Good arguments are often lost or diluted because prisoners
take as true the fictional beliefs of others. Law libraries tend to be breeding
grounds for prisoners who desire to exert themselves as legal geniuses but who
often only accomplish misguiding others due to their own unseen and
unacknowledged misunderstanding of the law. Prisoners should ensure that they
do the research necessary for their case themselves.
Another warning about this practice is that the preparation of legal
documents or the giving of legal advice by anyone who is not a member of the
Bar of this state is against the law. 28 0 Thus, prisoners are often faced with
279. Although SCDC policy states that "law clerks will be trained in law library research by
the institutional librarian using the reference packet prepared by the Office of General Counsel titled
'How to Use the Law Library,"' id. § 4.2, this statement is misleading. As stated before, most
libraries are operated by whatever correctional officer that happens to be working and not by an
actual trained librarian. These correctional officers have no legal training whatsoever and can
provide law clerks with no more, if not less, assistance than that which they can provide themselves.
280. S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-310 (2011); see also State v. Despain, 319 S.C. 317, 319-20, 460
S.E.2d 576, 577 78 (1995) (discussing what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law).
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deciding among one of the following three avenues when preparing a PCR
application: (1) research and draft the claims in their PCR application
themselves, (2) seek out the assistance of another prisoner to do so, or (3) turn in
their PCR application with only vague claims and rely on the attorney
subsequently assigned to them to remedy the deficient pleadings. Most prisoners
trust neither themselves nor any subsequently appointed counsel to adequately
plead or advance their claims and frequently feel the best option is to seek out
the assistance of other prisoners to do so. It is understandable, and quite natural,
for prisoners with lengthy prison sentences to seek out the assistance of more
knowledgeable prisoners for advice on legal matters but blindly following advice
without checking and rechecking a position taken is both careless and
destructive. Slick words and fast talk that promise a prisoner an easy and sure
way to relief should always be viewed with skepticism and should never be
taken as an invitation to relax the need to conduct the relevant research.
Prisoners should always be wary of the advice of others and should attempt to
better understand the law surrounding their case themselves before seeking
guidance somewhere else. Additionally, prisoners helping other prisoners in
preparing PCR applications should know that serious consequences can ensue.281
2812In State v. McLauren, the defendant was charged with the unauthorized
practice of law for preparing and filing a PCR application on behalf of another
prisoner. McLauren, a self-proclaimed "jailhouse lawyer," was found guilty
of the charge and later appealed.284 Before the South Carolina Court of Appeals,
McLauren argued several points revolving around two South Carolina statutes
that he asserted gave him the right to advocate the cause of another person
despite not being a member of the Bar.28 In rejecting his argument, the court of
281. SCDC policy states that prisoners who do help other prisoners with legal matters may be
charged with a disciplinary infraction. GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 46, § 4.3.
282. 349 S.C. 488, 563 S.E.2d 346 (Ct. App. 2002).
283. McLauren helped another prisoner by filling out his PCR application, and signed the
application as "Brent C. McLauren, Esq.... Of Legal Counsel to Petitioner." Id. at 491, 563 S.E.2d
at 347. McLauren was not a licensed attorney in South Carolina. Id.
284. See id. at 490-91, 563 S.E.2d at 347.
285. See id. at 498, 563 S.E.2d at 351. Specifically, McLauren attempted to construe
section 40-5-310 to exclude his conduct because he was not "in a court of this state." Id. at 497,
563 S.E.2d at 350 (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 40-5-310 previously provided the
following:
No person may practice or solicit the cause of another person in a court of this State
unless he has been admitted and sworn as an attorney. A person who violates this section
is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, must be fined not more than five thousand
dollars, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-310 (2001) (amended 2009). The court rejected McLauren's argument by
defining the word "practice" to include his conduct. See McLauren, 349 S.C. at 498, 563 S.E.2d at
351. McLauren also attempted to construe section 40-5-310, in conjunction with section 40-5-80,
for the proposition that his conduct was permitted as long as he did not take "fees or gratuities." Id.
Section 40-5-80 previously provided as follows:
This chapter shall not be construed so as to prevent a citizen from prosecuting or
defending his own cause, if he so desires, or the cause of another, with leave of the court
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appeals ruled that "South Carolina does not allow 'jailhouse lawyers' to practice
law under the guise of an inmate giving advice or preparing legal documents for
another inmate." 286 McLauren was sentenced to three years' imprisonment for
practicing law, consecutive to the time he was already serving, for preparing
another prisoner's PCR application.287
D. Materials and Holdings
The road to the law library itself, sadly, does not lead to a pot of gold. When
a prisoner does manage to make it into the law library and find useful directions
from a knowledgeable law clerk, the reality of the law library's limitations
becomes readily apparent to the researcher. The available material in the law
library is governed by policy and is strictly enforced.288 This enforcement means
that any material not listed in the law library's holdings, dictated by policy, are
strictly forbidden. For example, the South Eastern Reporter, second edition
(S.E.2d), goes up to volume 576 in all institutional law libraries.289 Volume 576
was published in early 2003.290 Therefore, any post-2003 cases that cannot be
found in the South Eastern Reporter, second edition, cannot be found in any
SCDC law library and are effectively barred from placement in any prisoner's
legal argument.29 '
The exclusive holdings of the SCDC's law libraries, presently, are
comprised of the following: South Eastern Reporter, second edition, volumes
374-576; Federal Supplement (F. Supp.), volumes 302-999; Federal
Supplement, second edition (F. Supp. 2d), volumes 1-244; Federal Reporter,
second edition (F.2d), volumes 859-999; Federal Reporter, third edition (F.3d),
volumes 1-320; Corpus Juris Secundum, volumes 14A, 22, 22A, 23, 23A, 24,
and 28A; Modern Criminal Law, one volume; South Carolina Digest, second
edition, complete set; Supreme Court Reporter, volumes 80 to present; South
Carolina Code of Laws (1976, as amended), complete set; Shepard's for United
States, Federal, and South Carolina citations; Criminal Law Reporter (BNA);
South Carolina Rules of Court, state and federal; United States Code Annotated,
first had and obtained; provided, that he declare on oath, if required, that he neither has
accepted nor will accept or take any fee, gratuity or reward on account of such
prosecution or defense or for any other matter relating to the cause.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-5-80 (2001) (amended 2002). The court rejected this argument on the ground
that leave had not been first obtained by McLauren. McLauren, 349 S.C. at 498, 563 S.E.2d at 351.
The concluding language in this case also indicated that leave of the court in this manner should
rarely and cautiously be granted. Id. at 499, 563 S.E.2d at 351.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 490-91, 563 S.E.2d at 347.
288. See GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 46, §§ 2.1-.4.
289. See id. § 2.1.
290. 576 SOuTH EASTERN REPORTER (2d ed. 2003).
291. Some of the more significant and sought-after cases may still be found in some
institutional law libraries due to the thoughtfulness of prisoners who have purchased these recent
opinions and donated them for the general population of prisoners to view.
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Title 28, Sections 2201 to end and Title 42, Sections 1771 to 2010; West's
Federal Practice Digest, fourth edition, complete set; Black' Law Dictionary;
South Carolina Bar Lawyers Desk Book; the United States and South Carolina
Constitutions; a list of addresses for state and federal courts in South Carolina; a
"How to Use the Law Library" reference packet; and SCDC Operations
Manuals.292 Most of the material available, however, is dangerously outdated.
To start, the only reporter that is up to date in institutional law libraries is the
Supreme Court Reporter.293 All other reporters stopped being distributed to
institutional law libraries somewhere around the early part of 2003 .294 Corpus
Juris Secundum is updated only through 1996, the United States Code is updated
through 1987 (with supplements going until possibly 2001), Shepard's Citations
are through 2001, Modern Criminal Law is only as modem as its publishing date
in 1976, and the Lawyers Desk Book is dated 2002.295 Institutional libraries are
provided with current supplements for both the South Carolina Code of Laws
and the South Carolina Digest, second edition, but finding a recent opinion in
either means only that a prisoner has found a case that he will need to order if he
is interested in reading it. 296  For the prisoners attempting to gain an
understanding of the merits of the claims they wish to pursue during PCR and in
the face of the attorney general's office citing recent authority in responsive and
opposition motions against applicants, this practice can be exceptionally
discouraging. 297
While it is true that much of the material in the law library is dated,
prisoners can still benefit a great deal by using this material to research. Many
prisoners are under the mistaken belief that unless more recent material becomes
available, the law library is of no use to them. While the lack of recent state and
federal opinions is indeed a major hindrance, most of the legal principles that
fonn the law today have been around for decades, and prisoners can gain
invaluable insight into their legal concerns simply by reading the state and
federal opinions that are available on a topic, in conjunction with any recent
Supreme Court opinions available on point. Although complete research cannot
292. GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL supra note 46, § 2.1.
293. See id.
294. See id. (showing volumes of reporters available in institutional law libraries).
295. See generally id. (showing volumes of legal sources available in institutional law
libraries).
296. See generally id. (describing the sources and updated volumes thereof available to
prisoners).
297
. Recently, the SCDC has attempted to correct the antique nature of its law libraries by
installing at certain institutions computers with LexisNexis-like software that provide prisoners with
select up-to-date legal sources. Prisoners are hopeful that the SCDC will continue this effort and
place similar computers at all institutions.
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be accomplished using the SCDC law libraries by themselves, taking a proactive
position is better than taking an inactive one.298
Another major barier prisoners encounter is the lack of explanatory texts
available in the law library. Law libraries contain only graduated material, or
"hard law," and prisoners pursuing a PCR action generally only have statutes
and case law to review when doing so.299 Most prisoners would rather dispense
with even attempting to understand such clinical material, and many simply give
up doing so. There is no doubt that more easily understandable publications and
periodicals, such as law reviews,300 encyclopedias, 3 01 and other publications,
that explain, rather than define, the PCR process would more immediately
benefit pro se litigants and indigent applicants attempting to understand their
position. The SCDC, however, has taken the stance that no such publications are
to be made available to prisoners regardless of whether prisoners, private
citizens, or organizations decide to donate them. For this reason, relying on
institutional law libraries alone to attack the validity of a prisoner's conviction
and sentence is simply not possible.
E. Legal Community
To combat the inadequacies of institutional law libraries, prisoners often
seek out the members of the legal community in their prison to aid and assist
them in their research. What is meant by "legal community" is simply the group
of those prisoners who have taken an interest in post-conviction and appellate
remedies and have obtained publications and other relevant material to increase
their understanding of the legal avenues they are attempting to travel. If a
prisoner desires to better understand PCR, for example, it is likely that one or
more copies of the South Carolina Post-Conviction ReliefManual (or a similar
text) can be found within the possession of another prisoner.303 Books on brief
writing, evidence law, criminal procedure, federal habeas, and individual forms
298. Prisoners should take this advice with a dose of caution and ensure that they are not
relying on "bad law" (overturned opinions, abrogated statutes, etc.) when researching and preparing
documents to be submitted to a court.
299. See generally GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 46, § 2.1 (providing an inventory of
legal sources available to inmates).
300. See, e.g., Blume, supra note 147 passim (discussing the various aspects of post-
conviction remedies available to inmates in South Carolina); Blume & Paavola, supra note 144
passim (providing an updated discussion of post-conviction practice and procedure in South
Carolina and explaining statutory amendments to South Carolina's PCR Act that have occurred
since 1994).
301. See, e.g., 17 S.C. JUR. Post-Conviction Relief (1993) (legal encyclopedia explaining post-
conviction relief).
302. See, e.g., DAVID A. SPENCER, SOUTH CAROLINA POST-CONVICTION RELIEF MANUAL
(2000) (addressing the procedure and substantive law of post-conviction relief in the state courts of
South Carolina).
303. The SOUTH CAROLINA POST-CONVICTION RELIEF MANUAL is published by the South
Carolina Bar's Continuing Legal Education Division, P.O. Box 608, Columbia, SC 29201. See id.
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and comments can usually be found if a prisoner knows the right person to ask.
Most prisoners who frequent the law library are well-acquainted with each other
and understand the bartering system in place enough to allow their material to be
borrowed in return for the same privilege from someone else. This lending
system between prisoners cuts down on the cost that prisoners have to spend to
purchase the same material and creates a much more up-to-date "library" from
which prisoners can benefit. Since the law library does not contain the most
recent published opinions, it is likely that someone on the compound will have a
subscription to the Shearouse Advance Sheets to rectify this.304 Even more
prisoners likely will order an untold number of cases from either the South
Carolina Supreme Court Library305 or the University of South Carolina Coleman
Karesh Law Library.306 Both libraries have an established procedure for selling
copies of legal materials to prisoners that is efficient, vital, and appreciated.307
Admittedly, few prisoners opt to utilize their available resources to purchase
necessary legal materials in the face of more instantly gratifying options (such as
canteen, magazines, and hobby craft items). However, there are usually enough
prisoners on any given compound who do purchase a substantial amount of legal
materials to constitute an adequate community. When a prisoner needs to know
if an older case he is reviewing is still good law or review material on an issue
other than case law and statutes, this community can be invaluable.
Donations made by the legal community outside of prison can play a
significant part in a prisoner's research and preparation abilities as well. Since
most of the materials available in the SCDC law libraries are only as current as
2003, several sympathetic attorneys have donated more current legal materials
on a regular basis (especially when the attorneys receive newer editions of the
material). 308  Attorneys who wish to do so must submit a request to an
institution's associate warden for program services or mail the donated material
304. The Advance Sheets contain the most recent opinions of the South Carolina Court of
Appeals and the South Carolina Supreme Court. For more information on how to obtain this
publication, a prisoner may write to: South Carolina Supreme Court, Atn. Advance Sheets, P.O.
Box 11330, Columbia, SC 29211.
305. South Carolina Supreme Court, Atn. Law Library/Photocopy Services, P.O. Box 11330,
Columbia, SC 29211. Copies are currently twenty cents per page plus postage.
306. University of South Carolina Coleman Karesh Law Library, Attn. Photocopy Services,
701 South Main Street, Columbia, SC 29208. Copies are currently fifty cents per page plus a
handling fee.
307. Both the South Carolina Supreme Court Law Library and the University of South
Carolina's Coleman Karesh Law Library require prisoners to forward to them a list of the materials
they want copied. Once this is done, a return letter will be sent to the prisoner stating a price for the
requested material. After a prisoner forwards payment, copies will be made and mailed out. This
whole procedure usually takes anywhere from ten to fourteen days.
308. Mr. John H. Blume, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School and Director, Cornell Death
Penalty Project, Ithaca, NY, and Mr. Patrick Flynn, Associate Professor of Law, University of South
Carolina School of Law and Member, University of South Carolina Department of Clinical Legal
Education, Columbia, SC, are worth mentioning here. Both of these individuals have taken
measures and utilized resources for the benefit of prisoners.
1210 [VOL. 64: 1167
42
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 5 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss5/3
20131 SOUTH CAROLINA PCR FROM A PRISONER'S PERSPECTIVE
directly to an individual prisoner. Unfortunately, most of these donations do not
get accepted by prison administrators on the grounds that the material being
donated is not listed in the designated law library holdings.3 09 In addition to
attorneys, a prisoner's family is often a great help in the research process as well.
An important note to make here is that family members usually send prisoners
requested material they have looked up on the Internet, and they should know
that the SCDC policy only allows a prisoner to receive five Internet pages in
each envelope.310 When the prisoner is receiving something this way, it may
help to mark larger packages of legal materials with the words "legal materials"
or "legal mail."
F. Statistics and Comprehension
The SCDC possesses a total of thirty-one facilities and houses 21,924
prisoners committed to its care.311 Prisoners are usually committed to the SCDC
by commitment orders of the county in which they were convicted of a crime
exceeding three months' imprisonment.312 In 2012, approximately 10,170
prisoners entered the SCDC. 313 Out of that number, 7,966 of those were new
admissions from court and 1,959 of the new admissions were parole or probation
revocations.314 While the full picture normally encompasses more than just bold
statistics, these statistics are intended to give the reader an appreciation of the
prisoner population within the SCDC and a relevant profile of the prisoners
incarcerated.
The SCDC's population consists of 20,592 male prisoners-94% of its total
population-whereas its 1,332 female prisoners make up the remaining 6% of
the population.3 15 The average length of sentence in the SCDC is thirteen years
and seven months,316 with an average of five years and nine months of time
remaining prior to release.317 Over 52% of the population, or 11,506 prisoners,
309. GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 46, § 2.1 (June 1, 2004).
310. INMATE CORRESPONDENCE PRIVILEGES, supra note 269, § 5.5.1 ("However, if the
inmate can demonstrate that the excessive material is supportive documentation as it relates to
accessing the courts, an inmate may have it for the purpose of his/her legal defense/claim, provided
that the contents do not depict questionable material.").
311. Population Counts and Capacities, supra note 82.
312. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-20(A) (Supp. 2012).
313. Admission to SCDC Base Population, S.C. DEP'T OF CORR. (Aug. 8, 2012), http://
www.doc.sc.gov/research/Admissions/ADMFromBASEPOPFY12.pdf.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Sentence Length Distribution ofSCDC Total Inmate Population as ofJune 30, 2012, S.C.
DEP'T OF CORR. (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.doc.sc.gov/research/InmatePopulationStats/ASOF
SentenceLengthDistrib_063012.pdf.
317. Remaining Time to Serve Before Expiration of Sentence of SCDC Total Inmate
Population as of June 30, Fiscal Years 2008 2012, S.C. DEP'T OF CORR. (Aug. 8, 2012), http://
www.doc.sc.gov/research/InmatePopulationStatsTrend/ASOFTrendRemainingTimeToServeFYO8-
12.pdf.
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are not eligible to receive parole, and 14% of the population, or 3,206 prisoners
(excluding those with life sentences), have been sentenced to twenty years of
imprisonment or more.318 Considering the average prisoner's lengthy sentence
and time served, and given the significant amount of time a number of prisoners
have in general, one would think that a majority of prisoners would be primarily
focused on obtaining post-conviction remedies. Unfortunately, the reality is that
few prisoners put forth any real effort to pursue their options. The plus side to
this, however, is that the few prisoners who do put forth a respectable effort to
research, develop, and present their claims are an anomaly to PCR courts and
greatly increase their chance of success.
As true as this is, it may not always be a prisoner's lack of determination
that prevents him from fully presenting and litigating a claim, but instead an
overall mental inability to do so. This factor in the equation is often overlooked
when evaluating the "access to courts" prisoners are entitled to. The practical
side of prison demonstrates that incarcerated individuals are generally an under-
classed and under-educated community. With the right resources, however,
most prisoners can do a fairly decent job of researching and presenting their
claims to the courts. The potential or ability to learn what steps need to and
should be taken in order to maximize a prisoner's chance of success on PCR is
not a problem for most prisoners; some simply do not attempt to utilize their
potential to do so and are procrastinators at best or lazy or indifferent at worst.
A significant number of prisoners, however, simply will never understand or
comprehend the gravity of the situation they are in and the due process that
needs to be taken in order to correct any constitutional violations that may have
occurred because they do not have the ability to do so.
To begin with, the overall education level of prisoners within the SCDC is a
mere 10.5.319 This number represents an educational level of someone in the
tenth grade.3 20 The overall reading level of prisoners averages out at 8.8, with
48% of the total population reading below a ninth-grade level.3 21 With these
statistics in mind, it is understandable that the majority of prisoners usually have
a hard time comprehending the material they read in the law library. Those
reading this text who have a background in legal research only have to recall the
cases they needed to read two or three times in order to comprehend its meaning
to understand the average prisoner's dilemma. Indeed, one of the questions that
prisoner law clerks are asked most frequently is: "What is this case talking
about?" There is no simple solution to this problem. Not everyone can, nor is
everyone meant, to understand the law the same way the next person does.
Some people just understand the law better than others. As a result, it is a major
318. Profile ofInmates in Institutional Count (Including Inmates on Authorized Absence), S.C.
DEP'T OF CORR. (Aug. 8, 2012), http://www.doc.sc.gov/research/InmatePopulationStats/ASOF
InstitutionalCountProfile FY12.pdf
319. Id.
320. See id.
321. Id.
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roadblock to many prisoners that the SCDC forbids the discussion of legal
322matters amongst prisoners. Receiving another person's point of view on an
issue, like reading a dissenting opinion, can vastly increase a person's
understanding of the issue. While prisoners should be wary of the legal advice
given to them from anybody but a member of the Bar who has been trained in
legal matters, not allowing a prisoner to explain to another prisoner what a term
or legal principle means does not fit well with the reality of prison life. This is
because when attorneys fail to answer letters from prisoners, refuse to accept
telephone calls, and neglect to visit or otherwise communicate with their prisoner
clients, the result is that prisoners will either allow their claims to perish or else
seek help from other prisoners.
A further extension of this topic involves those prisoners with a diagnosed
mental illness. Understanding and discovering potential claims a prisoner may
ultimately present at PCR can be a tough task for some but an impossible task
for others. Approximately 13% of the SCDC's prison population, or over 2,800
prisoners, are classified as mentally ill.3 23  The percentage of mentally ill
prisoners almost undoubtedly corresponds with the nearly 10% of prisoners who
are treated with psychotropic medication in state prisons.324 These prisoners
suffer a handicap in pursuing PCR that is not addressed by SCDC policy in any
way. Other prison systems have at least attempted to take measures to assist
prisoners who lack the mental competency necessary to pursue direct or
collateral relief, but the SCDC has remained silent on the topic. 325 Additionally,
by way of restrictions imposed by policy, the SCDC effectively works against
this class of prisoners by forbidding other prisoners from assisting them. 326
Fortunately, South Carolina jurisprudence provides some measure of protection
for such prisoners wishing to pursue PCR.
In Council v. Catoe,327 the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether PCR proceedings of a mentally incompetent applicant
should be stayed until the applicant regains competency.328 The applicant here
322. GEN. ADMIN. MANUAL, supra note 46, § 4.3 (stating that inmate law clerks will not type
forms or letters for other inmates or provide any other form of legal assistance).
323. Profile of Inmates in Institutional Count (Including Inmates on Authorized Absence),
supra note 317.
324. ALLEN J. BECK & LAURAM. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT IN STATE PRISONS, 2000, at 4 (2001), available at
http://www.ojp.gov/jbs/pub/pdf/mhtsp00.pdf
325. See Thomas C. O'Bryant, The Great Unobtainable Writ: Indigent Pro Se Litigation After
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 299, 312
(2006) ("Inmates who are illiterate or have disabilities that hinder their ability to research the law
and prepare legal documents and legal mail, and need research assistance, shall be provided access
to the law library and to inmate law clerks.... Upon receipt of [a] ... request ... the law library
supervisor shall schedule the inmate for a visit to the law library or a visit with an inmate law clerk."
(quoting FLA ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 33-501.301(3)(e) (2005))).
326. See supra note 322 and accompanying text.
327. 359 S.C. 120, 597 S.E.2d 782 (2004).
328. Id. at 124, 597 S.E.2d at 784.
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had attempted to waive his PCR rights.3 29 The court, after hearing testimony that
clearly indicated that the applicant was unstable, ordered a competency
evaluation that ultimately determined that the applicant suffered from
schizophrenia.33 0 In holding that the applicant's PCR should not be delayed due
to the applicant's mental incompetency, the court noted that the issues raised
were not "extraordinarily fact intensive" and did not require the applicant's
assistance.33' The court went on to carve out an exception to the bar on
successive PCR applications by holding that "[i]f, at a future date, the petitioner
regains his competency and discovers that at his original PCR hearing, his
incompetency prevented his ability to assist his counsel on a fact-based claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, he may then raise that claim in a subsequent
proceeding." 332
In Ferguson v. State,333 the court examined the opinion in Council v. Catoe
to determine whether the one-year statute of limitations set forth in section 17-
27-45(A) of the South Carolina Code was tolled by an applicant's incapacity. 334
The court asserted that difference between the two cases was that Council had
already filed his PCR application and was seeking to stay his hearing until he
regained competency.335 Ferguson, on the other hand, had never filed his PCR
application and was asking the court to allow him to file out of time because he
was mentally incompetent and unable to file on his own during the one-year
limitation period. 336 In remanding the matter to the PCR court for a hearing to
determine whether Ferguson's mental incapacity prevented his filing an
application in the year following his guilty plea, the court held that to deny a
prisoner the right to file a PCR application because of his mental incapacity
would not allow such a prisoner "one full bite at the apple."337 In such
situations, the court held, a hearing shall be held to determine the dates the
prisoner suffered from mental incompetency and to calculate his one year for
filing a PCR application.338 If the applicant is within one year from the time he
regained competency, then he will not be barred from pursuing post-conviction
relief.339
329. Id. at 123, 597 S.E.2d at 783.
330. Id. at 123, 597 S.E.2d at 784.
331. Id. at 127, 597 S.E.2d at 785-86.
332. Id. at 129, 597 S.E.2d at 787.
333. 382 S.C. 615, 677 S.E.2d 600 (2009).
334. Ferguson v. State, 382 S.C. 615, 617-18, 677 S.E.2d 600, 601 (2009) (citing S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-27-45(A) (2003); Council, 359 S.C. at 129, 597 S.E.2d at 787).
335. Id. at 618, 677 S.E.2d at 601.
336. Id. at 616, 618, 677 S.E.2d at 601.
337. Id. at 619 20, 677 S.E.2d at 602.
338. Id. at 620, 677 S.E.2d at 602.
339. See id. For more information on mental incompetency, see generally 7 WEST'S S.C.
DIGEST 2D Criminal Law, Key No. 385 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
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VII. INITIAL FILING
A. Standing, Filing, and Return
Under the PCR Act, an individual who has been convicted of or sentenced
for a crime has standing to pursue post-conviction relief.340 For purposes of the
PCR Act, the word "convict" simply means to prove a person guilty of a crime
and the word "sentence" means "the judgment formally pronounced by the court
or judge upon the defendant after his conviction in a criminal prosecution,
imposing the punishment to be inflicted." 341 A sentence is not limited to a term
of imprisonment but instead may either be a term of imprisonment or a fine or
both.342 Accordingly, an applicant has standing to petition for post-conviction
relief if he is in custody or the results of his prior conviction still persist.343 This
is true regardless of whether a person has served jail time or not.344
An action for PCR is initiated when a person properly files a standard
application to the clerk of court in the county in which he was convicted.345
Simply mailing a form off, however, does not constitute filing; "[w]hen a statute
requires the filing of a paper or document, it is filed when delivered to and
received by the proper officer." 346 Forms are supplied by the Office of Court
Administration to circuit court clerks for distribution upon request.347 Although
340. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a) (1976); Jackson v. State, 331 S.C. 486, 489, 489 S.E.2d
915, 916 (1997) (citing Jones v. State, 322 S.C. 101, 102, 470 S.E.2d 110, 110 (1996)); Sutton v.
State, 361 S.C. 644, 647, 606 S.E.2d 779, 780 (2004) (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-27-10 to -160),
abrogated on other grounds by Bray v. State, 366 S.C. 137, 620 S.E.2d 743 (2005).
341. Jackson, 331 S.C. at 489, 489 S.E.2d at 916 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD
DICTIONARY 97 (Compact School & Office ed. 1967); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1222 (5th ed.
1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
342. Id.
343. Id. at 487, 489 S.E.2d at 916 ("The [PCR] Act does not contain an express "in custody"
requirement."); see also McDuffie v. State, 276 S.C. 229, 231, 277 S.E.2d 595, 596 (1981) ("We
hold where an applicant for [PCR] alleges in his application that the results of his prior conviction
still persist, even though the sentence has been fully served, he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing
to determine whether or not he has been prejudiced.").
344. Pierce v. State, 338 S.C. 139, 142 n.1, 526 S.E.2d 222, 223 n.1 (2000) ("Although
respondent did not receive a prison sentence, he has standing to bring a PCR action because he
alleged the conviction has affected his ability to get ajob in law enforcement.").
345. Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 363, 527 S.E.2d 742, 747 (2000) ("The applicant
submits his claims on a standard PCR application, initiating a civil action governed by the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure in the Court of Common Pleas in the county where he was
convicted." (citing §§ 17-27-40, -50, -80; S.C. R. CIV. P. 71.1, Form 5)).
346. Pelzer v. State, 378 S.C. 516, 520, 622 S.E.2d 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing Gary v.
State, 347 S.C. 627, 629, 557 S.E.2d 662, 663 (2001)); see also Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9
(2000) (noting that if an application is erroneously sent to the wrong location, it may be considered
pending, but not properly filed). In Pelzer, the applicant incorrectly sent his PCR application to the
South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense one day prior to his deadline for filing. Pelzer, 378
S.C. at 518-19, 662 S.E.2d at 619. Although the appropriate clerk of court received his application
only a few days later, the PCR court refused to hear his application and deemed it untimely. Id.
347. S.C. R. CIV. P. 71.1(b).
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the SCDC law libraries do not provide forms for inmates, prisoner law clerks
will usually have one available for viewing upon request. A sample application
for PCR can also be found in the forms/appendix section of the South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure, 348 available to prisoners in the law library. Prisoners
are not required to pay a filing fee for submitting PCR applications.349
An application for PCR is a civil action filed in the South Carolina Court of
Common Pleas and, as such, the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure apply
to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the statutory language of the
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act. 35 0  All PCR applications should be
filled out using a prisoner's full name and prison number.351 Facts within the
personal knowledge of the applicant and the authenticity of all documents and
exhibits included in or attached to the application must be sworn to affirmatively
as true and correct.352  This may be accomplished by a prisoner submitting a
sworn (notarized) affidavit attesting to the authenticity of the submitted
material.3 53 Furthermore, the PCR Act provides:
The application shall identify the proceedings in which the applicant
was convicted, give the date of the entry of the judgment and sentence
complained of, specifically set forth the grounds upon which the
application is based, and clearly state the relief desired. Facts within the
personal knowledge of the applicant shall be set forth separately from
other allegations of facts and shall be verified as provided in
[section] 17-27-40. Affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its
allegations shall be attached to the application or the application shall
recite why they are not attached. The application shall identify all
previous proceedings, together with the grounds therein asserted, taken
by the applicant to secure relief from his conviction or sentence.
348. S.C. R. Civ. P., Form 5.
349. §§ 17-27-20(a)(6), -60; see also Thompsonv. State, 325 S.C. 58, 59, 479 S.E.2d 808, 808
(1997) (stating that a PCR action "may be instituted without the payment of a filing fee, regardless
of a person's financial status"). However, "[a] litigant proceeding in forma pauperis is only entitled
to filing fees, not court reporter's costs or copying costs." Lakes v. State, 333 S.C. 382, 385, 510
S.E.2d 228, 230 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Quillian v. Evatt, 308 S.C. 555, 555, 419 S.E.2d 783, 783
(1992)).
350. S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(a); see also Sutton v. State, 361 S.C. 644, 647-48, 606 S.E.2d 779,
780 (2004) ("A PCR action is ... generally subject to rules and statutes that apply in civil
proceedings." (citing Wade v. State, 348 S.C. 255, 263, 559 S.E.2d 843, 846-47 (2002); § 17-27-
80)), abrogated on other grounds by Bray v. State, 366 S.C. 137, 620 S.E.2d 743 (2005); Hiott v.
State, 375 S.C. 354, 357, 652 S.E.2d 436, 437 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Council v. Catoe, 359 S.C.
120, 125, 597 S.E.2d 782, 784 (2004)) (stating that because PCR actions are civil actions, all rules
that apply in a civil case apply to PCR actions), rev'd, 381 S.C. 622, 674 S.E.2d 491 (2009).
351. S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(c).
352. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-40 (1976).
353. The standard PCR application requires a signed and notarized statement verifying the
accuracy of the information presented before a PCR application will be accepted by the court. S.C.
R. Civ. P., Form 5.
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Arguments, citations and discussion of authorities are unnecessary. The
application shall be made on such form as prescribed by the [South
Carolina] Supreme Court.35 4
Once a prisoner's application is received by the clerk's office, it is clock-
stamped and given a docket number.355 Prisoners frequently request that a copy
of their clock-stamped PCR application be returned to them and should be aware
that it is not uncommon for a clerk's office to request that a copying fee be paid
in advance for doing so. Additionally, thoughtful prisoners sometimes submit
any memoranda in support of their claims and motions for expert expenses at the
same time they turn in their application to avoid hybrid representation
challenges.356  The attorney general's office will often refuse to acknowledge
documents submitted by a prisoner who is represented by counsel, and so
prisoners can avoid this problem by submitting documents at the time of filing
because no attorney has been appointed to them yet, and there is no chance of a
violation of hybrid representation occurring. By the same token, submitting
documents at this stage also avoids any complications that may arise from trying
to do so at a later time through counsel who is less than active in a prisoner's
case. Lastly, prisoners should be mindful that clerks of court often ask prisoners
to file additional motions and pleadings in duplicate if a prisoner desires to have
a clock-stamped copy returned to him.
Once received by the clerk's office, the application is forwarded to the
attorney general's office, and this office is then given thirty days to respond to
the application by way of an answer or motion. 5 7 If a prisoner's application
contains claims alleging disputed material facts, then an answer will be returned
requesting an evidentiary hearing to be held to fully develop these facts and
sufficiently explore a prisoner's claim.358 A standard answer from the attorney
general's office will usually deny all of a prisoner's claims as meritless and
without cause for relief, but it will nonetheless request that a hearing be held to
allow the claims to be explained and explored. If the state moves for summary
disposition, it will be granted only "when it appears from the pleadings,
depositions and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits
submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is
354. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-50 (1976).
355. § 17-27-40.
356. Foster v. State, 298 S.C. 306, 306-07, 379 S.E.2d 907, 907 (1989) (holding there is no
right to "hybrid representation" which is representation that is partially pro se and partially by
counsel where petitioner attempted to file substantive document in her PCR case, thereby
precluding petitioner from filing the document despite seemingly contrary language of S.C. CONST.
art. I, § 14).
357. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-70(a) (1976); see also Guinyard v. State, 260 S.C. 220, 225,
195 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1973) ("Compliance with the thirty day time limit prescribed by [this section]
is, therefore, not mandatory ... but discretionary with the trial court.").
358. § 17-27-70(a).
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entitled to judgment as a matter of law."35 9 When considering the state's motion
for summary dismissal, a judge must assume that facts presented by an applicant
are true and view those facts in a light most favorable to the applicant.3 60 Either
side may request summary disposition, and the party against whom this action is
taken must be given an opportunity to reply to the proposed dismissal.3 61
Summary dismissal is not appropriate if there exists a material issue of fact.3 62
Prisoners commonly submit an application alleging only that counsel was
ineffective in failing to consult with the prisoners regarding important decisions
in their cases and in failing to properly research the prisoners' defenses in hopes
of avoiding summary dismissal.363 With supporting facts, this may be sufficient
to avoid summary dismissal, but it will also have drastic consequences if not
properly remedied.
If, after the state has filed its return, the application presents questions of law
or fact that will require a hearing, the court will, upon the recommendation of the
attorney general's office, appoint counsel to assist and represent the applicant.3 64
B. Habeas Considerations
An unforeseen consequence of inadequate pleading, whether it is due to lack
of involvement by appointed counsel or lack of understanding or self-
determination by the prisoner, may occur if the applicant is unsuccessful in state
courts and opts to have his claims reviewed under a writ of habeas corpus in the
365federal courts. On April 24, 1996, President Clinton signed into law the
359. § 17-27-70(c); see also Coardes v. State, 262 S.C. 493, 497-98, 206 S.E.2d 264, 265-66
(1974) (holding that an application for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed where
applicant's only material allegation of fact that he suffered lack of effective assistance of
counsel was conclusively refuted by the record).
360. Sutton v. State, 361 S.C. 644, 647, 606 S.E.2d 779, 780 (2004) ("When considering the
State's motion for dismissal of an application, where no evidentiary hearing has been held, the
circuit court must assume facts presented by an applicant are true and view those facts in the light
most favorable to the applicant."), abrogated on other grounds by Bray v. State, 366 S.C. 137, 620
S.E.2d 743 (2005).
361. § 17-27-70(b).
362. Id.
363. The applicant also has the authority to amend or supplement an application. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-27-90 (1976); see also S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(d) ("Counsel shall insure that all available
grounds for relief are included in the application and shall amend the application if necessary.").
364. S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(d); see also S.C. Sup. Ct. Admin. Order No. 2008-10-06-01 (Oct. 6,
2008), available at http://www.sccourts.org/courtOrders/displayOrder.cfmorderNo=2008-10-06-01
("In its return, the Attorney General's Office shall clearly state in the caption heading whether it
requests that counsel be appointed for the applicant.").
365. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241, 2254 (2006). Both of these statutes provide jurisdiction for state
prisoners challenging the lawfulness of their imprisonment. Specifically, § 2254(a) provides: "The
Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for
a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court
only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States."
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Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).366 This Act created a
number of new procedural defenses applicable to state prisoners and expanded
already existing procedural hurdles to federal habeas consideration and relief 367
For instance, the AEDPA imposed stricter standards that make it almost
impossible to secure evidentiary hearings in federal courts to develop facts that
3681could have been developed in such forums as PCR hearings or through
diligence by an applicant.369  Statute of limitations, procedural adherence,
exhaustion, sufficient factual pleadings, specific pleadings, and the preciseness
of legal advancements will all play a part in whether a federal habeas court will
hear a prisoner's claims or grant the requested relief
Many prisoners are under the assumption that specific fact or legal pleading
is unnecessary when applying for post-conviction relief The main reasoning
used by these prisoners is that the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act states
that "[a]rgument, citations and discussion of authorities are unnecessary."370
Relying on this, prisoners sometimes file a vague PCR application in which they
make broad and general claims of constitutional violations and sprinkle their
application with selected facts.37' While doing so may allow their application to
survive summary disposition, it is certainly not a wise course of action for the
prisoner who, after exhausting his state remedies without success, may elect to
pursue federal relief through a writ of habeas corpus. The adequate presentation
of a federal claim (and federal claims encompass virtually all claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel and other constitutional violations) to the state
courts is a requirement before a prisoner may pursue federal habeas.372
The exhaustion of state remedies requires that prisoners adequately present
federal claims to the state courts to allow such courts the "opportunity to pass
366. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
367. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 399 (2000) (explaining that AEDPA "placed a new
restriction on the power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to state prisoners"); see
also Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 788 (2011) (stating that federal habeas is difficult to
obtain and that "[t]he standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both 'highly deferential,'
and when the two apply in tandem, review is 'doubly' so" (citing Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S.
111, 123 (2009); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 689 (1984))); Jimenez v. Walker, 458 F.3d 130, 135 n.2 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) can "more accurately be called a 'limitation on relief").
368. See § 2254(e)(2).
369. Conaway v. Polk, 453 F.3d 567, 589-91 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating that petitioner was not
barred from obtaining hearing where he reasonably attempted to investigate and pursue claim in
state court).
370. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-50 (1976).
371. This so-called "notice pleading" may not sufficiently present a claim, and applicants are
expected to state facts that show a real possibility of constitutional error. See id.
372. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2006); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515-22 (1982)
(providing an excellent discussion on the exhaustion requirement); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270,
276 (1971) ("A state prisoner [must] present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the
federal courts.").
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upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights."373  The
"exhaustion requirement 'reduces friction between the state and federal court
systems by avoiding the unseem[liness] of a federal district court's overturning a
state court conviction without the state courts having had an opportunity to
correct the constitutional violation in the first instance."' 374  To meet this
exhaustion requirement, a prisoner must have cited a specific federal
constitutional or statutory provision in filings submitted to the highest state
court.37' This requires that a prisoner provide the state courts with both a
thorough description of the operative facts and controlling legal principles that
drive his claim.376 A prisoner filling out a PCR application would do well to
keep this in mind and ensure the claim he is presenting has a foundation under
the United States Constitution or federal law if he later wishes to submit such a
377
claim for federal review. Prisoners should not assume that simply citing a
federal case, without more, or vaguely touching upon some constitutional theory
or principle will suffice. Exhaustion for federal review demands more than
"drive-by" citation and general appeals to broad constitutional principles such as
due process and the right to a fair trial.378 All claims must be presented "face-up
and squarely," and mystic prose that a constitutional theory or principle "may be
lurking in the woodwork will not" turn the trick.379
To safeguard against this, a prisoner should adequately encompass both the
state and federal source of law his claim relies upon, as well as properly title his
claim. 380 Prisoners typically only look to state case law when researching their
claims and do themselves a great injustice in this regard. All PCR applications
should be drafted in preparation of possible federal habeas review. Knowing
what the United States Supreme Court and lower federal courts-particularly the
373. Picard, 404 U.S. at 275 (quoting Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
374. Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 448 (4th Cir. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting
O'Sullivanv. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999)).
375. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (citing Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364,
365-66 (1995); O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845).
376. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 162-63 (1996) (citing Picard, 404 U.S. 270); see
also Longworth, 377 F.3d at 448 (finding that exhaustion was not met because operative facts were
not presented to state supreme court); Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997) (noting
that "both the operative facts and controlling legal principles must be presented to the state court"
(quoting Verdin v. O'Leary, 972 F.2d 1467, 1474 (7th Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
377. See Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 913 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that petitioner's "vague
appeal" to "constitutional error" and the "deprivation of a fair trial" was insufficient to fairly present
federal constitutional issues when "bolstered only by state law cases that focused on state
procedural or state constitutional error").
378. Gray, 518 U.S. at 163.
379. See Matthews, 105 F.3d at 911 (quoting Mallory v. Smith, 27 F.3d 991, 995 (4th Cir.
1994)).
380. See Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 33 (denying petitioner's habeas claim based on the exhaustion
doctrine, noting that "[t]he petition provides no citation of any case that might have alerted the court
to the alleged federal nature of the claim").
1220 [VOL. 64: 1167
52
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 5 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss5/3
20131 SOUTH CAROLINA PCR FROM A PRISONER'S PERSPECTIVE
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit and the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina-have said with regard to any
given claim is a necessity in doing this.38' A prisoner should not "veil" his claim
in such a manner that a habeas court has to search to find the grounds upon
which the prisoner relies.382 Obviously, a claim devoid of "[a]rgument, citations
and discussion of authorities"3 8 3 is counter-productive to this end.
To illustrate further, assume a prisoner wishes to raise a PCR claim alleging
that he invoked his right to counsel upon arrest, and that a violation occurred
when officers questioned him about the same incident at a later date. Further
assume that the prisoner later discovered documentary evidence showing that he
invoked his right to counsel prior to his questioning, and that he also wishes to
raise a claim of ineffective assistance of his counsel at trial for failing to present
favorable evidence. When these claims are put forth in the prisoner's PCR
application, he will need to entitle his claims in such a manner that a reviewer
will immediately know what violations are alleged and the source of law upon
which those allegations rely.384 In this example, the prisoner may simply title his
claim as: "Trial counsel provided deficient performance in failing to present
evidence that the applicant invoked his right to counsel." While such a title may
adequately state the prisoner's claim, the broad and general terms "deficient
performance" and "right to counsel" in the above title are not enough to alert the
reader that a federal violation has occurred and are insufficient to establish
exhaustion for federal review.385 Likewise, stating a claim as "unconstitutional"
is insufficient to apprise the reader of the federal nature of the claim because a
claim under the PCR Act can be in violation of the "Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution . . . of this State."3 86  Indigent prisoners often
mistakenly assume that an appointed counsel will remedy any deficiencies or
defects in a prisoner's application at a later date, which may or may not be an
accurate assumption. It is, however, always the better practice to eradicate
3817ambiguity and squarely identify the law relied upon. In this hypothetical, the
prisoner would do much better to title his claim as two distinct claims. An
381. South Carolina is part of the Fourth Judicial Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2006).
382. BRIAN R. MEANS, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL: A GUIDE TO FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
LITIGATION 491 (2012) ("Notice pleading is not sufficient, for the petition is expected to state facts
that point to a real possibility of constitutional error." (citing Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 4
of Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in United States District Courts (internal quotation marks
omitted))).
383. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-50 (1976).
384. See Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1, 3-4 (2005) (discussing, in part, the adequacy of
petitioner's argument heading).
385. See Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 163 (1996) ("[Ilt is not enough to make a general
appeal to a constitutional guarantee as broad as due process to present the 'substance' of such a
claim to a state court.").
386. § 17-27-20(a)(1).
387. See Martens v. Shannon, 836 F.2d 715, 717 (1st Cir. 1998) ("The exhaustion doctrine
requires a habeas applicant to do more than scatter some makeshift needles in the haystack of the
state court record.").
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adequate way to phrase the alleged violations that the prisoner wishes to assert
could be as follows:
1. Applicant's right to counsel, as guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and state law,
was violated when officers held a custodial interrogation of the
applicant despite the fact that the applicant had previously invoked his
right to have counsel present.
2. Applicant's right to effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed
by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and state law, was violated when the applicant's trial
counsel failed to present evidence that the applicant had invoked his
right to have counsel present prior to questioning. 388
Both headings sufficiently put the reader on notice of the constitutional principle
relied upon (right to counsel and right to effective assistance of counsel), the
federal provision (Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution) in conjunction with state law, and the violation the prisoner is
asserting.
Additionally, the prisoner in this example would benefit by incorporating
federal law into the brief or memorandum he ultimately presents to the court.3 89
This can be accomplished in either the prisoner's original, supplemental, or
amended filings.390 During research of the prisoner's first claim here (invocation
of right to counsel during questioning), he will likely come across various state
court cases such as State v. Owens39 and State v. Binney39 that deal with this
claim. In both of these cases, the federal source of law for this claim-Miranda
v. Arizona 393 and Edwards v. Arizona394 -can be found and should be cited in
conjunction with the state cases the prisoner ultimately decides to use. Doing so
will help ensure the exhaustion requirement is met by identifying the exact
principles of law on which the applicant is relying.
388. See Council v. Catoe, 359 S.C. 120, 127 n.4, 597 S.E.2d 782, 785 n.4 (2004) (providing a
good example of the proper way to frame claims).
389. See Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004) (holding that "a state prisoner does not
'fairly present' a claim to a state court if that court must read beyond a petition or a brief (or a
similar document) that does not alert it to the presence of a federal claim in order to find
material ... that does so"). To exhaust a federal claim in state courts, a prisoner must present it
"within the four corners" of his brief. Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2005).
390. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-90 (1976) (providing authority for amending and
supplementing PCR applications).
391. 346 S.C. 637, 659, 552 S.E.2d 745, 756 (2001), overruled by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C.
93, 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005).
392. 362 S.C. 353, 358, 608 S.E.2d 418, 421 (2005).
393. 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
394. 451 U.S. 477, 482-87 (1981).
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Lastly, a prisoner must raise his claim in the state's highest court in order for
that claim to be considered exhausted, even if that review is discretionary.3 95 A
prisoner's PCR claim need not be considered or even discussed by the state's
highest court designated to review PCR matters because exhaustion only requires
that a claim be properly presented.396  This is because the exhaustion
requirement is a matter of comity, not of jurisdiction, and a "full and fair"
opportunity for state courts to resolve a federal claim means that a prisoner must
exhaust all available avenues before seeking review.3 97  In South Carolina,
however, PCR appeals are transferred to the South Carolina Court of Appeals for
review from the South Carolina Supreme Court in order to ease the supreme
court's workload.3 98 When this occurs, "a litigant is not required to petition for
rehearing and certiorari following an adverse decision of the [South Carolina]
Court of Appeals in order to be deemed to have exhausted all available state
remedies respecting a claim of error."399 Exhaustion in state courts is a
mandatory prerequisite to federal habeas review because habeas review is not
otherwise available.400
C. Cognizable Claims
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act sets forth six statutory grounds
pursuant to which a prisoner may seek relief.401 They are:
395. See Longworth v. Ozmint, 377 F.3d 437, 447 (4th Cir. 2004) ("While we would find no
merit in any of these contentions, we conclude that they are procedurally defaulted as a result of
Longworth's failure to raise them in his petition for certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court
for review of the State PCR Court's decision."); see also O'Sullivanv. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845,
847 (1999) (stating that prisoners must run their claim through "one complete round of the State's
established appellate review process," to include "petitions for discretionary review when that
review is part of the ordinary appellate review procedure in the State"); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S.
346, 350-51 (1989) (stating that a state appellate court cannot choose to ignore a federal
constitutional claim squarely raised in a petitioner's brief and render such a claim unexhausted by
the state court's inaction (quoting Smith v. Digmon, 434 U.S. 332, 333 (1978); Picard v. Connor,
404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971))); MEANS, supra note 381, § 9C:29, at 957 ("If the federal claim was
properly presented to the state's highest court, the court's failure to address the claim does not
render it unexhausted." (citing Castille, 489 U.S. at 350-51)).
396. See supra note 372.
397. See Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251-52 (1886); see also O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845
(noting that "the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity
to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts").
398. Dunlap v. State, 371 S.C. 585, 585, 641 S.E.2d 431, 431 (2007).
399. Id. at 585, 641 S.E.2d at 431 (citing In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal &
Post-Conviction Relief Cases, 321 S.C. 563, 564, 471 S.E.2d 454, 454 (1990)).
400. Frierson v. State, 314 F. Supp. 444, 446 (D.S.C. 1970) (noting that "the failure of the
petitioner to exhaust State remedies [under the PCR Act] would justify dismissal" of his petition for
federal habeas corpus relief).
401. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a)(1)-(6) (1976).
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(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this
State; (2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence; (3)
That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law; (4) That
there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and
heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest
of justice; (5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, parole or
conditional release unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully
held in custody or other restraint; or (6) That the conviction or sentence
is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error
heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other writ,
402motion, petition, proceeding or remedy ....
PCR is a proper avenue for prisoners seeking relief "only when the applicant
mounts a collateral attack challenging the validity of his conviction or sentence"
as authorized by section 17-27-20(a). 403 The only two non-collateral exceptions
are specifically listed in the PCR Act. They are: (1) the claim that an applicant's
sentence has expired, and (2) the claim that an applicant's probation, parole or
conditional release has been unlawfully revoked.404  A prisoner may not seek
post-conviction relief on the ground that the evidence presented against him was
insufficient to support a conviction. 05 Furthermore, an issue "that could have
been raised at trial or in direct appeal cannot be asserted in PCR application
absent a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." 406
In Al-Shabazz v. State,4 o? the South Carolina Supreme Court significantly
clarified the grounds upon which a PCR action may stand. Al-Shabazz brought a
PCR action alleging that the SCDC's Adjustment Committee improperly took
away good-time credits, unlawfully found him guilty of violating institutional
rules, and illegally placed him in solitary confinement.4 0 Al-Shabazz alleged
that his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection were violated
when he was not provided adequate representation at his disciplinary hearing or
allowed to call witnesses.409 While a prior decision by the South Carolina
402. Id.
403. Williams v. State, 378 S.C. 511, 515, 662 S.E.2d 615, 617 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Al-
Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 367, 527 S.E.2d 742, 749 (2000)).
404. § 17-27-20(a)(5).
405. § 17-27-20(a)(6); see also LoPiano v. State, 270 S.C. 563, 569, 243 S.E.2d 448, 451
(1978) (holding that because the prisoner's "plea was entered voluntarily and understandingly, he
does not now have the right, in post-conviction proceedings, to attack the plea upon the ground that
the facts were insufficient to establish the offense to which he pled." (citing § 17-27-20(a)(6);
Ramey v. State, 257 S.C. 127, 130, 184 S.E.2d 544, 546 (1971))).
406. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 363-64, 527 S.E.2d at 747 (citing Drayton v. Evatt, 312 S.C. 4,
9, 430 S.E.2d 517, 520 (1993)).
407. 338 S.C. 354, 527 S.E.2d742.
408. Id. at 361, 527 S.E.2d at 746.
409. Id. at 361-62, 527 S.E.2d at 746.
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Supreme Court seemingly deprived a PCR court of the authority to hear such
claims by prisoners, 410 the Al-Shabazz court noted that it had previously allowed
similar claims to be heard primarily because such claims lacked an adequate
judicial review process, and because PCR provided "an established and uniform
process, as well as the availability of appointed counsel.'" The court undertook
the task of squarely defining reviewable (collateral) and non-reviewable (non-
collateral or administrative) claims and held that issues of solitary confinement,
downgrading of custody status, credit-related issues, and other conditions of
imprisonment are administrative matters and a prisoner's proper course of
review in these matters is through the SCDC's internal grievance system and the
South Carolina Administrative Law Court. 412
The PCR Act otherwise allows a prisoner to raise virtually any claim
imaginable, absent one regarding the sufficiency of the evidence.413  The Act
also prohibits a prisoner from bringing a claim that could have been raised on
direct appeal, unless the prisoner frames a direct appeal issue in language that
converts the claim into one of ineffective assistance of counsel.1 4 What claims a
prisoner can and should raise on his behalf is a decision that should only be
410. See Tutt v. State, 277 S.C. 525, 526, 290 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1982) (per curiam) (stating
that PCR does not give a court the authority to consider an allegation that a prisoner's downgrade in
custody and transfer to another facility violated his constitutional rights (citing Crowe v. Leeke, 273
S.C. 763, 763-64, 259 S.E.2d 614, 614-15 (1979))).
411. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 366, 527 S.E.2d at 748.
412. See id. at 383-84, 527 S.E.2d at 757-58. But see Delahoussaye v. State, 369 S.C. 522,
526, 633 S.E.2d 158, 160 (2006) (noting that defendant's case encompassed a claim that his state
sentence had expired while he served time in federal custody and that the claim for credit for time
served in federal custody could be brought under the PCR Act and was not required to be filed
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)). The court in Al-Shabazz went on to detail both
the procedures an inmate must undertake to pursue such claims in both the SCDC and under the
APA. 338 S.C. at 371 76, 527 S.E.2d at 751-53. While neither will be discussed here, the author
would like to expound on one aspect relative to credit-related issues that often plague prisoners.
Many times, prisoners spend a significant amount of time in the county jail prior to coming to
the SCDC. A prisoner is entitled to have this time-the time between his arrest and conviction--
credited against his sentence. See Blakeney v. State, 339 S.C. 86, 89, 529 S.E.2d 9, 11 (2000). It is
not uncommon for prisoners to later discover that no credit was received. Prisoners typically
respond to this revelation by writing their sentencing judge and trial counsel requesting them to
"fix" their sentence. However, the correct approach to this situation can be found in the SCDC
policy, titled "Inmate Records Plan." INMATE RECORDS PLAN, supra note 121, § 12.3. Section 12
of this policy states that prisoners who feel that they have not been credited for served jail time
should contact their classification caseworker and fill out an SCDC Form 18-11, "Request for Jail
Time." Id. § 12.3.1. Once this form is completed, it will be sent to the records analyst responsible
for jail-time credits who will either forward it to the appropriate county jail or respond to the
designated caseworker and explain why jail-time credit is not applicable. Id. § 12.3.2-4. If jail-
time credit is awarded to the inmate, the appropriate modifications to a prisoner's record will be
made and the designated caseworker will be notified. Id. § 12.3.5.
413. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a)(6) (1976).
414. Al-Shabazz, 338 S.C. at 363-64, 527 S.E.2d at 747 (citing Drayton v. Evatt, 312 S.C. 4,
9, 430 S.E.2d 517, 520 (1993); Hymany. State, 278 S.C. 501, 502, 299 S.E.2d 330, 331 (1983) (per
curiam)).
1225
57
Sears: South Carolina Post-Conviction Relief: Practical Considerations a
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEw
made after counseled guidance and thorough research.4 " This often conflicts
with a prisoner's position, as most times an indigent prisoner will only have the
assistance of law clerks and other prisoners. Prisoners typically base their claims
on the constitutional principles and rights provided for in the Fourth
(unreasonable search and seizure and probable cause), Fifth (Due Process and
Fair Trial Clauses), and especially Sixth (right to counsel and right to impartial
jury) Amendments to the United States Constitution and corresponding state
law.416 The state constitution may sometimes provide greater protection than the
federal Constitution and the jurisprudence surrounding both should be
thoroughly examined regarding any claim a prisoner intends to advance.1  As a
majority of claims raised in a PCR application revolve around the allegation of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a broad overview of several different types of
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and the standards of review that govern
them is important.
1. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
In Strickland v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court set forth a
two-pronged test for determining whether counsel rendered a criminal defendant
effective assistance.419 First, a prisoner "must show that counsel's performance
was deficient."42 0 Under this prong, a defendant must show "that counsel made
415. Such a decision rests upon the particular facts relating to each applicant and is therefore
not within the scope of this Commentary.
416. The constitutional principles in parentheses here are not exhaustive, merely
demonstrative. Additionally, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have no bearing on the
constitutionality of a criminal conviction. Lomax v. State, 379 S.C. 93, 101, 665 S.E.2d 164, 168
(2008) (quoting Langford v. State, 310 S.C. 357, 360, 426 S.E.2d 793, 795 (1993)).
417. In State v. Forrester, 343 S.C. 637, 541 S.E.2d 837 (2001), the defendant was approached
by an officer suspicious of her activity and agreed to let the officer search her luggage. Id. at 640,
541 S.E.2d at 839. When the officer requested to search her purse, the defendant held the purse
open for viewing and the officer took the purse, tore out the bottom, and discovered crack cocaine.
Id. at 640-41, 541 S.E.2d at 839. The defendant was convicted and appealed on the grounds that
the South Carolina Constitution, with an express right to privacy provision included in the article
prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure, provides a higher level of protection from government
searches than the United States Constitution, requiring the exclusion of the discovered evidence. Id.
at 641, 541 S.E.2d at 839. The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed and stated:
The relationship between the two constitutions is significant because "[s]tate courts may
afford more expansive rights under state constitutional provisions than the rights which
are conferred by the Federal Constitution." Therefore, state courts can develop state law
to provide their citizens with a second layer of constitutional rights. This relationship is
often described as a recognition that the federal Constitution sets the floor for individual
rights while the state constitution establishes the ceiling.
Id. at 643, 541 S.E.2d at 840 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Easler, 327
S.C. 121, 131 n.13, 489 S.E.2d 617, 622 n.13 (1997)).
418. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
419. Id. at 687.
420. Id.; see also Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 117-18, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1989)
(discussing the Strickland test).
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errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." 421 In determining this, courts measure an
attorney's performance by examining whether his action or inaction was
422reasonable under current prevailing professional norms.4
Prisoners must identify "the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not
to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment" 423 and overcome a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct was reasonable or might be
424considered sound trial strategy. The presumption that counsel acted in a
reasonable manner is applicable to all of counsel's plausible strategic
425
judgments.
The second prong of the Strickland test requires a showing that counsel's
deficient performance actually prejudiced the defendant to the extent that "there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.'4 26 "A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of [the
proceeding]. ,427 In making this determination, courts must consider the totality
of the evidence before the judge or jury, differentiate between errors that had a
pervasive effect and those with only a trivial one, and take into account the fact
that errors will have a more significant impact upon a conviction only weakly
supported by the record than those with overwhelming record support.428
Prisoners should be wary that courts are instructed to dispose of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim without making an inquiry into counsel's conduct if
it is easier to do so on the grounds that a claim lacks any possible showing of
prejudice. 429 The overriding theme of Strickland's two-pronged test is one of
fundamental fairness of the proceedings and whether the adversarial process was
adequately engaged in and not undermined by counsel's conduct.430
The language in Strickland usually strikes a familiar chord with prisoners
attempting to understand ineffective assistance of counsel claims in preparation
of filling out a PCR application. Emphasizing counsel's "duties to consult with
the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of
important developments in the course of the prosecution"41 is usually an
421. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
422. Id. at 688.
423. Id. at 690.
424. Von Dohlen v. State, 360 S.C. 598, 603, 602 S.E.2d 738, 740 (2004) (citing Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690; Cherry, 300 S.C. at 118, 386 S.E.2d at 625).
425. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
426. Id. at 667, 694.
427. Id. at 694.
428. Id. at 695-96; see also Slate v. Locklair, 341 S.C. 352, 365, 535 S.E.2d 420, 427 (2000)
("Error without prejudice does not warrant reversal." (quoting State v. McWee, 322 S.C. 387, 393,
472 S.E.2d 235, 239 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
429. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
430. Id. at 696.
431. Id. at 688.
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excellent stepping stone for prisoners to begin their research. Another mandate
from the Court that may be applicable and helpful to a prisoner's research is the
requirement that counsel "make reasonable investigations or . .. make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary."432
Typical PCR claims include prosecutorial misconduct,433 counsel's failure to
research and investigate, 434 counsel's failure to request a jury instruction,435 and
counsel's failure to call potential witnesses. 436
2. Ineffective Assistance of Guilty-Plea Counsel
In Hill v. Lockhart,437 the United States Supreme Court adopted the two-
pronged test for analyzing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel with
respect to guilty pleas. 438  A variance on the prejudice prong for guilty pleas
requires a prisoner to show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial."439 A defendant who pleads guilty on the advice of counsel may
only "attack the voluntary and intelligent character" of the plea by showing that
the "advice he received from counsel was not within the range of competence
432. Id. at 691.
433. See, e.g., Riddle v. Ozmint, 369 S.C. 39, 48, 631 S.E.2d 70, 75 (2006) (requiring reversal
because solicitor failed to correct testimony he knew to be false).
434. See, e.g., Nance v. Ozmint, 367 S.C. 547, 553, 626 S.E.2d 878, 881 (2006) (reversing
PCR decision because counsel failed to adequately investigate and plan defense and the court
presumed prejudice where numerous errors "helped to bolster the case against his client"); cf
Rollison v. State, 346 S.C. 506, 510, 552 S.E.2d 290, 292 (2001) ("Failure to conduct an
independent investigation does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel when the allegation is
supported only by mere speculation as to the result." (quoting Moorehead v. State, 329 S.C. 329,
334, 496 S.E.2d 415, 417 (1998))).
435. See, e.g., Riddle v. State, 308 S.C. 361, 363, 418 S.E.2d 308, 309 (1992) (finding trial
counsel ineffective for failing to request alibi instruction).
436. See, e.g., Glover v. State, 318 S.C. 496, 498-99, 458 S.E.2d 538, 540 (1995) ("In order to
support a claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview or call potential alibi
witnesses, a PCR applicant must produce the witnesses at the PCR hearing or otherwise introduce
the witnesses' testimony in a manner consistent with the rules of evidence."). For particular claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel, prisoners may wish to comb through the criminal law section of
the South Carolina Digest, key number 1519, and the accompanying supplements. See 8A WEST' S
S.C. DIGEST 2D Criminal Law, Key No. 1519 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
437. 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
438. Id. at 58; see also Alexander v. State, 303 S.C. 539, 542-43, 402 S.E.2d 484, 485-86
(1991) (granting new trial in case where the defendant pleaded guilty and "[t]rial counsel's
sentencing advice was obviously defective").
439. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59; see also Pierce v. State, 338 S.C. 139, 144, 526 S.E.2d 222,
224-25 (2000) ("Where there has been a guilty plea, the applicant must prove counsel's
representation fell below the standard of reasonableness and, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, there is a reasonable probability he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial." (citing Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59; Alexander, 303 S.C. at 541-42, 402 S.E.2d at
485)).
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demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." 440 Claims challenging guilty pleas
typically couple the "voluntary and intelligent" requirement within a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. For example, a properly constructed claim
might read as follows:
1. Applicant's guilty plea was not knowingly, voluntarily, or
intelligently entered due to counsel's ineffective assistance in violation
of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution and state law, when counsel erroneously advised the
applicant that the maximum allowable sentence for the charged offense
of murder is ten (10) years' imprisonment.
The "terms 'knowingly' and 'intelligently' are often used
interchangeably." 4 4' That a plea must be knowingly and voluntarily made is
essentially saying that a plea must be entered into with a full understanding of
the consequences it entails.442 A very common claim raised at PCR is that
counsel failed to advise a prisoner of a later-discovered consequence of a plea
such as sex offender registry or subsequent parole conditions.
Recently, in the two companion cases of Missouri v. Frye443 and Lafler v.
Cooper,444 the United States Supreme Court clarified the role of defense
attorneys in two important aspects of the plea-bargaining process. In Frye, the
Court held "that, as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate
formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that
may be favorable to the accused."4 4 ' This case arose from the fact that defense
counsel did not inform his client of a favorable plea deal and allowed the time
for accepting the plea deal to expire, which led the defendant to accept a harsher
plea deal at a later time. 4 The Court recognized that plea bargaining comprises
approximately ninety-five percent of all criminal convictions and that counsel
has a duty to be effective at this critical stage in the criminal process. In order
to show prejudice from this type of claim, the Court held that defendants must:
(1) "demonstrate a reasonable probability they would have accepted the earlier
plea offer had they been afforded effective assistance of counsel"; (2)
"demonstrate a reasonable probability the plea would have been entered without
440. Griffin v. State, 361 S.C. 173, 177, 604 S.E.2d 394, 396 (2004) (citing Carter v. State,
329 S.C. 355, 359-60, 495 S.E.2d 773, 775 (1998)).
441. 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRI. PROC. 403 n.1291 (2008).
442. Boykinv. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969); see also Dover v. State, 304 S.C. 433,
434-35, 405 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1991) ("To ensure that the defendant understands [the charges against
him], the trial judge usually questions the defendant about the facts surrounding the crime and the
punishment which could be imposed.").
443. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012).
444. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012).
445. Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408.
446. Id. at 1401.
447. Id. at 1407.
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the prosecution canceling [or withdrawing the offer]"; and (3) demonstrate a
reasonable probability the trial court would have approved the plea agreement. 8
Since prosecutors and judges have wide discretion in sticking to and accepting
plea deals, the Court undoubtedly leaves open many questions as to how exactly
this prejudice showing will be applied.449 Nonetheless, prisoners should
invariably benefit from this expansion of plea-bargaining law if they are raising a
similar claim at PCR because it sketches a possible remedy or redress for
prisoners who have suffered from their counsel's neglect in this fashion.
In Lafler, the criminal defendant was charged with, among other charges,
assault with intent to murder.450 After his attorney erroneously informed him
that he could not be convicted of assault with intent to murder because the victim
had been shot below the waist, the defendant rejected a favorable plea deal and
proceeded to trial, where he was convicted and sentenced to an amount of time
that was three times more severe than the amount offered in the plea deal.45 '
Because all parties agreed that counsel's performance was deficient, the primary
question before the Court was the appropriate remedy to craft once it had
determined that rejection of a plea offer on the advice of counsel is subject to a
Strickland analysis.45 2 The Court outlined two forms of appropriate remedies:
(1) that an evidentiary hearing be held to "determine whether the defendant has
shown a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors he would have
accepted the plea" and then allow the defendant to be sentenced for anywhere
between the initial plea offer and the time he actually received after trial if such a
showing is made; or (2) require the prosecution to reoffer the plea proposal so
"the judge can then exercise discretion in deciding whether to vacate the
conviction from trial and accept the plea or leave the conviction undisturbed. 453
This case is especially noteworthy because the defendant had a constitutionally
valid trial that led to his conviction and yet the Court still erred on the side of
fairness for prisoners and rejected the state's contention that "[a] fair trial wipes
clean any deficient performance by defense counsel during plea bargaining.4 5 4
Both Frye and Lafler are admittedly vague in the precise remedy to employ and
considerations to evaluate when determining prejudice, thereby leaving further
clarification and procedural refining to the state and lower federal court judges.
Further, when a prisoner pleads guilty, he waives most nonjurisdictional
constitutional rights such as the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's
accuser, and the privilege against self-incrimination. This generally means
448. Id. at 1409.
449. See id.
450. Laflerv. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012).
451. Id.
452. Id. at 1384, 1388, 1391.
453. Id. at 1389.
454. Id. at 1388.
455. Boykinv. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (citing Duncanv. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
150 (1968); Pointery. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964)); see
also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) ("When a criminal defendant has solemnly
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that a prisoner who has pleaded guilty will have significantly reduced the
number of constitutional claims he may raise at PCR. By pleading guilty, a
prisoner also waives certain nonjurisdictional violations committed by the
government such as allegations that a confession was coerced45 6 or that an illegal
search and seizure took place.45 7 Claims typically raised by prisoners attacking
their guilty pleas at PCR include claims that counsel failed to investigate
possible defenses prior to a prisoner entering a plea,4 5 8 failure of counsel to
withdraw a plea on deviation from an agreed upon plea bargain,459 giving bad
advice,46 0 failing to convey a plea offer, failure of counsel to interview
potential witnesses, 462 and failure of counsel to discover or discuss potentially
favorable evidence with an accused.463 "Unless counsel gives erroneous parole
advice ... parole information is not a ground [to] collateral[ly] attack ... a
admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not
thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred
prior to the guilty plea.").
456. McMannv. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 768 (1970); see also United States v. Scruggs, 356
F.3d 539, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 52 (4th Cir.
1990)) (holding that a guilty plea waives a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination;
therefore, Miranda warnings are not required).
457. United States v. Dahliman, 13 F.3d 1391, 1394 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that a guilty
plea waives the right to challenge a suppression ruling); see also 37 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRI.
PROC. 419-20 (2008) (listing nonjurisdictional defects that courts often hold are waived when the
defendant enters a guilty plea).
458. See Cobbs v. State, 305 S.C. 299, 301, 408 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1991); see also Stevens v.
State, 365 S.C. 309, 313, 617 S.E.2d 366, 368 (2005) (holding that guilty-plea counsel was
ineffective for failing to properly investigate and research charged offenses where such efforts
would have significantly reduced the number of offenses with which defendant was charged).
459. Thompson v. State, 340 S.C. 112, 115-16, 531 S.E.2d 294, 296 (2000) (finding plea
counsel ineffective for failing to object to a recommendation by the solicitor of thirty years'
imprisonment where state agreed not to make any recommendation).
460. Alexander v. State, 303 S.C. 539, 542-43, 402 S.E.2d 484, 485-86 (1991) (finding plea
counsel ineffective and reversing case because plea counsel told defendant he would face a life
sentence if he proceeded to trial where he would have actually faced a seven to twenty-five year
sentence on one charge and a twenty-five year sentence on a second charge).
461. In Davie v. State, 381 S.C. 601, 675 S.E.2d 416 (2009), the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that counsel's failure to convey a plea offer constituted deficient performance and
remanded for a new sentencing hearing with the limitation that the sentence not exceed the original
sentence imposed. Id. at 617, 675 S.E.2d at 424. This method of remedy was deemed appropriate
because the court noted "that we cannot compel the State to reinstate or the circuit court judge to
accept the original ... plea offer." Id. at 616, 675 S.E.2d at 424.
462. Grier v. State, 299 S.C. 321, 323-24, 384 S.E.2d 722, 724 (1989) (upholding a PCR
judge's ruling that "counsel's failure to call these witnesses constituted deficient performance"),
overruled by Glover v. State, 318 S.C. 496, 458 S.E.2d 538 (1995).
463. Pauling v. State, 331 S.C. 606, 610, 503 S.E.2d 468, 470-71 (1998) (finding trial counsel
ineffective in criminal sexual conduct case where victim claimed penetration by the defendant but
told nurse, who made notes, that no penetration occurred, and counsel failed to call nurse or use the
notes to discredit the victim).
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guilty plea" on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.6 The potential
claims listed above are neither all-inclusive nor exhaustive, and prisoners should
know that allegations that a guilty plea was based on the inaccurate advice of
counsel will be viewed in light of the plea colloquy between the judge and the
defendant to determine if any possible error by counsel was cured by the
information conveyed therein. 4 65
3. Harmless and Structural Errors
Structural errors are defects that affect "the framework within which the trial
proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial process itself," and are so basic
to a fair trial that the error can never be viewed as harmless and prejudice is
presumed.4 6 6  In Chapman v. California,4 6 7 the United States Supreme Court
held that constitutional violations, with the exception of structural errors, are
subject to a harmless-error analysis in which "unimportant and insignificant"
errors will not require reversal if a reviewing court finds them to be "harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt."4 6  In other words, structural errors are so basic to a
fair trial that once a violation of such a right has been established, the courts
simply apply a presumption of prejudice and dispense with a harmless-error
analysis.46 9 Examples of structural errors include a trial by a partial judge,470
denial of counsel,47' denial of self-representation at trial, 472 and the denial of a
464. Knox v. State, 340 S.C. 81, 85-86, 530 S.E.2d 887, 889 (2000) (citing Smith v. State,
329 S.C. 280, 283, 494 S.E.2d 626, 628 (1997)), overruled by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93, 610
S.E.2d 494 (2005).
465. Moorehead v. State, 329 S.C. 329, 333, 496 S.E.2d 415, 416-17 (1998) (citing Wolfe v.
State, 326 S.C. 158, 164, 485 S.E.2d 367, 370 (1997)). For a review of potential claims revolving
around attacks on guilty pleas at PCR, prisoners may wish to review the criminal law section of the
South Carolina Digest, key numbers 267-303. See 7 WEST'S S.C. DIGEST 2D Criminal Law, Key
Nos. 267-303 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
466. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1986)).
467. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
468. Id. at 22, 24; see also S.C. R. Civ. P. 61 (adopting the "harmless error" rule from the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-stating that the court must disregard any error or defect that does
not affect the substantial rights of the parties).
469. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 289-90 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S.
at 23).
470. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 535 (1927) ("No matter what the evidence was
against him, [the defendant] had the right to have an impartial judge.").
471. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1984) (quoting Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal
Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1956)); see also McKnight v. State, 320 S.C. 356, 359-60, 465
S.E.2d 352, 354 (1995) (holding the Strickland standard to be inappropriate and presuming
prejudice when defense counsel not in courtroom during testimony of key witness).
472. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818, 834 (1975) (stating that an accused has a
right to represent himself out of "respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law," and
that such a right is rooted in the "structure of the Sixth Amendment" (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397
U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970)) (Brennan, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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public trial.473 These are structural errors because they "are structural defects in
the constitution of the trial mechanism" that affect the "entire conduct of the trial
from beginning to end."474 In determining whether an error is structural, courts
typically look to see if the error has undermined the integrity and adversarial
nature of the proceeding and whether the error is the type that "transcends the
criminal process." Also, denial, or constructive denial, of counsel claims are
commonly referred to as "Cronic claims" in reference to the United States
Supreme Court decision that held that prejudice is presumed where "counsel
entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial
testing."476
For claims of structural errors involving ineffective assistance of counsel,
Strickland v. Washington4 7 7 laid out the three categories of cases in which
prejudice will be presumed: (1) denial of counsel, (2) where "counsel is
burdened by an actual conflict of interest," and (3) "various kinds of state
interference." 4  Since only a select few rights are classified as structural, the
majority of claims prisoners present at PCR will fall under "trial error" and
therefore will be subject to a showing of prejudice.479
4. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
In Evitts v. Lucey,4 so the United States Supreme Court held that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant
the effective assistance of counsel on his first appeal.48s The Court recognized
that the right to counsel on appeal "would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to the effective assistance of counsel." 482 In Evitts, the
defendant's appellate attorney failed to file a statement of appeal required by
Kentucky's procedural rules when he filed the defendant's brief on appeal.483
473. See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 (1984) (noting that "the defendant should
not be required to prove specific prejudice in order to obtain relief for a violation of the public-trial
guarantee").
474. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 309-10 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
475. Id. at 311.
476. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659.
477. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
478. Id. at 692 (citing Cuylerv. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345-50 (1980)).
479. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307-08 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986)); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (citing Cuyler, 446 U.S. at
345-50). For more on structural errors, see the criminal law section of the South Carolina Digest,
key numbers 1751, 1770, 1773, 1774(2), 1871, and 1881-83. See 8A WEST'S S.C. DIGEST 2D
Criminal Law, Key No. 1169.12 (2008 & Supp. 2012); 8B WEST'S S.C. DIGEST 2D Criminal Law,
Key Nos. 1751, 1770, 1773, 1774(2), 1871, 1881-83 (2008 & Supp. 2012). Also looking under the
habeas corpus section, key number 409, may prove helpful. See 13 WEST'S S.C. DIGEST 2D Habeas
Corpus, Key No. 409 (2002 & Supp. 2012).
480. 469 U.S. 387 (1985).
481. See id. at 388-89, 396 (citing Douglasv. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)).
482. Id. at 397.
483. Id. at 389.
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Because of this error, the defendant's appeal was dismissed and the state courts
refused to consider the defendant's claims. 84 The defendant then sought relief
in the federal courts by challenging the constitutionality of the state's dismissal
of his claims, alleging that his attorney had violated his right to effective
assistance of counsel on appeal. Both the district court and the court of
appeals agreed and the United States Supreme Court held that a first appeal as of
right would not be in accordance with due process "if the appellant does not have
the effective assistance of an attomey."486 Prisoners commonly rely on Evitts
and the progeny of cases that have stemmed from it to support claims of
ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for any procedural errors that an
appellate counsel may have made on appeal and for appellate counsel's failure to
raise what a prisoner believes to be meritorious claims. In the case of a prisoner
raising a claim on PCR that appellate counsel failed to raise a "winning" claim
on appeal, prisoners should know that an appellate attorney is not required to
raise every meritorious claim that can be found in the record.
In Jones v. Barnes ,48 the defendant was appointed counsel on appeal and
wrote to his appellate counsel regarding several claims that he wished to have
included in his appellate brief.489 The defendant's appellate attorney chose not
to include all of the claims selected by the defendant on appeal and presented
only a few for consideration.490 The appeal was ultimately denied and the
defendant's conviction affirmed.49 1 Seeking federal relief, the defendant alleged
that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise his non-frivolous
issues on appeal. 492 The Court reviewed these allegations and held that an
attorney assigned to prosecute an appeal has no duty to raise every non-frivolous
issue on appeal.493 The Court noted that "[e]xperienced advocates since time
beyond memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker
arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on
a few key issues." 494 The Court in Barnes went on to cite several authorities
that stand for the proposition that presenting more than three or four issues on
484. See id. at 390.
485. See id.
486. Id. at 390-91, 396 (citing Lucey v. Kavanaugh, 724 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1984); Lucey v.
Seabold, 645 F.2d 547 (6th Cir. 1981)).
487. Thrift v. State, 302 S.C. 535, 539, 397 S.E.2d 523, 526 (1990) (citing Jones v. Barnes,
463 U.S. 745 (1983)).
488. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
489. Id. at 747.
490. Id. at 747-48.
491. Id. at 748 (citing New York v. Barnes, 381 N.E.2d 179 (N.Y. 1978) (unpublished table
decision); New Yorkv. Barnes, 405 N.Y.S.2d 621 (App. Div. 1978) (unpublished table decision)).
492. See id. at 749-50 (quoting Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 434 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 463
U.S. 745 (1983)).
493. See id. at 746, 754.
494. Id. at 751-52.
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appeal will do more harm than good.495  It is often hard for prisoners to
understand why an attorney has not chosen to include every issue that can be
included in an appeal, and the opinion in Barnes is a good starting place for
understanding the rationale employed by such attorneys. The holding in Barnes,
however, does not preclude a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
if the appellant can show that the decision not to include a claim was
unreasonable and not part of a strategic or competent decision.496
The standard for ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims is
somewhat similar to the standards for ineffective assistance of counsel claims for
guilty-plea defendants.497 For guilty pleas, a defendant must show that but for
counsel's error, the defendant would not have pleaded guilty and would have
insisted on going to trial. 498  For ineffective assistance of appellate counsel
claims, a defendant "must show that failure to raise issue[s] was objectively
unreasonable and that, but for this failure, defendant's conviction or sentence
would have reversed." 499 To be "objectively unreasonable," a defendant would
have to show that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment."5 0 0  Thus, the fact that a meritorious claim was not raised on an
appeal is not the only thing a prisoner should focus on when raising this type of
claim. 501 A prisoner will also need to focus on whether the decision not to raise
the claim can be seen as a reasonable decision in light of what was raised.502
495. Id. at 752-53 (quoting ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 7.18, at 266 (1981); John W. Davis, The Argument of an Appeal, 26 A.B.A. J. 895, 897 (1940);
Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 115, 119
(1951)). The authorities cited here can help prisoners better understand the mindset appellate
attorneys have when they approach claim selection. Knowing this infornation may help prisoners
communicate with their attorneys regarding which claims to present on appeal.
496. See Barnes, 463 U.S. at 746, 754. A list of successful PCR cases (both ineffective
assistance of counsel cases and cases dealing with other types of claims) are regularly analyzed and
compiled by Teresa L. Norris, Esq. Ms. Norris is an attorney with Blume, Norris & Franklin-Best,
LLC, a Columbia, South Carolina law firm, and she serves on the board of directors of the Death
Penalty Resource & Defense Center. See Board Members, DEATH PENALTY RES. & DEF. CENTER,
http://deathpenaltyresource.org/board.aspx (last visited May 6, 2013). A recent compilation of PCR
cases can also be found in the appendices to Blume & Paavola, supra note 144, at 280-329.
497. See Southerland v. State, 337 S.C. 610, 616 & n.6, 524 S.E.2d 833, 836 & n.6 (1999)
(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Thrift
v. State, 302 S.C. 535, 397 S.E.2d 523 (1990); Alexander v. State, 303 S.C. 539, 402 S.E.2d 484
(1991); Smithy. State, 309 S.C. 413, 415, 424 S.E.2d 480, 481 (1992)).
498. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); see also Part VII.C.2 (discussing ineffective
assistance of counsel claims in the context of guilty pleas).
499. Southerland, 337 S.C. at 616, 524 S.E.2d at 836 (citing People v. Griffin, 687 N.E.2d 820
(Ill. 1997)).
500. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
501. See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983) (holding that appellate attorneys
need not "raise every 'colorable' claim suggested by a client").
502. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88 ("When a convicted defendant complains of the
ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness."). For more infornation on ineffective assistance of
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D. Successive Applications
Generally, successive post-conviction relief applications are disfavored and
the prisoner has the burden of establishing that "any new ground raised in a
subsequent application could not have been raised by him in a previous
application."5 03 "A successive PCR application is one that raises grounds not
raised in a prior application, raises grounds previously heard and determined, or
raises grounds waived in prior proceedings." 0 4 Often, prisoners attempting to
file a successive PCR application are met with summary dismissal motions filed
by the attorney general's office alleging a procedural bar on this ground.o
Specifically, section 17-27-90 of the South Carolina Code states:
All grounds for relief available to an applicant under this chapter
must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application.
Any ground finally adjudicated or not so raised, or knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted in
the conviction or sentence or in any other proceeding the applicant has
taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent application,
unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient
reason was not asserted or was inadequately raised in the original,
supplemental or amended application. 0 6
If a motion for summary dismissal has been served upon a prisoner filing
what the attorney general is terming a successive application, the prisoner will be
given the opportunity to reply to the proposed dismissal and show "sufficient
reason" why his application is not successive.o Courts interpret the phrase
"sufficient reason" very narrowly. In Aice v. State,508 the South Carolina
Supreme Court interpreted this phrase to mean that "as long as it was possible to
raise the argument in his first PCR application, an applicant may not raise it in a
successive application." 509  This phrase alone excludes the vast majority of
potential claims from being pursued in successive applications. The court
appellate counsel, flipping through the pages of the criminal law section of the South Carolina
Digest, key numbers 1966 71, may prove helpful. See 8B WEST'S S.C. DIGEST 2D Criminal Law,
Key Nos. 1966-71 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
503. Tilley v. State, 334 S.C. 24, 28, 511 S.E.2d 689, 691 (1999) (citing Arnold v. State, 309
S.C. 157, 173, 420 S.E.2d 834, 843 (1991), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 927 (1993); Aice v. State, 305
S.C. 448, 450-51, 409 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1991); Foxworth v. State, 275 S.C. 615, 617, 274 S.E.2d
415, 416 (1981)).
504. Odomv. State, 337 S.C. 256, 261, 523 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1999) (citing Carterv. State, 293
S.C. 528, 530, 362 S.E.2d 20, 21 (1987)).
505. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-70(b)-(c) (1976).
506. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-90 (1976).
507. See id.
508. 305 S.C. 448, 409 S.E.2d 392.
509. Id.
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further explained that it "will not engage in an exploration of why the grounds
were not raised, it is sufficient that they could have been raised, but were not." 10
Thus, the courts are generally reluctant to consider successive applications
because they allow an applicant to receive more than "one bite at the apple as it
were."s" Prisoners attempting to proceed on a successive PCR application must
therefore fall within an exception to this general rule or face the certainty of the
attorney general's office being "entitled to judgment as a matter of law."512
This broad rule disfavoring successive PCR applications, however, does
allow certain exceptions. 513 Courts have allowed prisoners to file successive
applications in situations where a prisoner did not have PCR counsel that
differed from his trial counsel,514 where a prisoner's first PCR application was
dismissed without the assistance of legal counsel and without a hearing,1 5 where
a "gross miscarriage of justice" occurred, '5 1 6 where unique facts required review
in the interest of justice, 5 1 7 and where a prisoner alleged his PCR counsel failed
to file a timely appeal of the denial of his PCR application. The contention
that prior PCR counsel provided ineffective assistance is not, per se, a "sufficient
reason" to allow a successive application.519 PCR authorities additionally
believe that "circumstances satisfying the PCR Act's exception to the statute of
limitations (i.e., a new retroactive rule of law and newly discovered evidence as
defined by S.C. Code Ann. [section] 17-27-45 (2003)) should invariably qualify
as a 'sufficient reason' permitting a successive petition."520 If a prisoner's claim
does not fall within one of the exceptions to the rule barring successive PCR
applications, a prisoner will undoubtedly have a hard time proceeding. Also, if a
successive petition does not fall within the category of circumstances or
exceptions that would allow a successive petition to proceed, it will not be
considered "properly filed," and thus will not toll the time period (one year) for
521filing a federal habeas petition that the applicant may later wish to pursue. In
short, unless otherwise unavoidable, a prisoner would do well to remember that
all grounds he wishes to present "must be raised in his original, supplemental or
amended application." 522
510. Id.
511. Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 916 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Gamble v. State, 298 S.C.
176, 178, 379 S.E.2d 118, 119 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted), abrogated on other
grounds by United States v. Barnette, 644 F.3d 192 (4th Cir. 2011).
512. § 17-27-70(c).
513. Aice, 305 S.C. at 451, 409 S.E.2d at 394.
514. Carter v. State, 293 S.C. 528, 530, 362 S.E.2d 20, 21 (1987).
515. Case v. State, 277 S.C. 474, 474-75, 289 S.E.2d 413, 413-14 (1982) (per curiam).
516. Aice, 305 S.C. at 451, 409 S.E.2d at 394.
517. See Case, 277 S.C. at 475, 289 S.E.2d at 413-14.
518. Austinv. State, 305 S.C. 453, 454, 409 S.E.2d 395, 396 (1991).
519. See id.
520. Blume & Paavola, supra note 144, at 274 n.295.
521. See Pettinato v. Eagleton, 466 F. Supp. 2d 641, 651 (D.S.C. 2006) (citations omitted).
522. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-90 (1976).
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VIII. DISCOVERY
A. In General
Prisoners commonly encounter a variety of roadblocks in the pursuit of relief
through PCR. In the course of research, for example, a prisoner may recognize
the need for investigative or expert services to fully develop the factual basis of a
claim he wishes to present. Additionally, a prisoner may realize the need to
subpoena witnesses or may simply find it efficient to utilize certain discovery
tools prior to his evidentiary hearing. Interrogatories, requests for production,
requests for admissions, and subpoenas can be valuable tools for a prisoner
attempting to fully present his claims before a PCR court. Utilizing these
discovery tools, however, is not a right, and a prisoner wishing to invoke this
process must move the court for leave to do so.523 Once leave has been granted
by a judge, "in the exercise of his discretion and for good cause shown," a
prisoner is entitled to pursue discovery in accordance with the South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure.5 24 Thus, discovery in PCR proceedings is authorized
by section 17-27-150.525
In an article published about PCR and its procedure, Professor John Blume
and Ms. Emily Paavola expound on the discovery aspect of PCR and offer
several helpful tips on the topic.526 For example, a prisoner is not assigned a
judge in his PCR case until the attorney general schedules a hearing in his
case.527 Therefore, in order for a prisoner to conduct discovery prior to the
attorney general scheduling his case, Professor Blume and Ms. Paavola suggest
that a prisoner should:
(1) file the motion for leave to obtain discovery before the chief
administrative common pleas judge in the circuit in which the
conviction occurred and request a hearing on the motion from that
judge; or (2) file the motion in the appropriate circuit and then request
that the motion be scheduled for hearing at the next upcoming PCR
term-by either contacting the attorney general assigned to that term, or
523. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-150(A) (1976); see also Hiott v. State, 375 S.C. 354, 357, 652
S.E.2d 436, 437 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Section 17-27-150 indicates the legislature's express intent to
afford PCR applicants limited use of the discovery process as stated in the South Carolina Rules of
Civil Procedure."), rev'd on other grounds, 381 S.C. 622, 674 S.E.2d 491 (2009). The court also
specifically quoted the statute: "A party in a noncapital [PCR] proceeding shall be entitled to invoke
the processes of discovery available under the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure if, and to the
extent that, the judge . . .grants leave to do so .... " Id. (quoting § 17-27-150(A)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
524. See § 17-27-150(A).
525. Id.
526. See Blume & Paavola, supra note 144, at 251-52 (explaining the process PCR applicants
can utilize in trying to convince a judge to grant discovery).
527. Id. at 251.
1238 [VOL. 64: 1167
70
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 5 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss5/3
20131 SOUTH CAROLINA PCR FROM A PRISONER'S PERSPECTIVE
if necessary, by making the request to the judge assigned to the next
PCR term.528
This will give a prisoner an ample amount of time to conduct discovery prior to
his hearing.529 The unique function of each discovery tool allows prisoners to
clearly present their claims in a PCR court and avoid uncertainties in testimony
and documents that may lead to delays.
Below is an overview of some of the discovery tools available to prisoners
pursing a PCR action. The following summaries do not contain every exception,
mandate, or requirement applicable to each tool and should be read in
conjunction with the authorities that have been cited in this Commentary.
B. Interrogatories
"Interrogatories"-governed by Rule 33 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure-are essentially used to provide the requesting party with a list of
documents, parties, witnesses, photographs, addresses, and other prepared
documents and information regarding witnesses and material intended to be used
at an upcoming hearing.530 It is basically a "tell me what you got" questionnaire
sent to the opposing party, although it is rare for the attorney general to utilize
more than an applicant's prior plea or trial counsel as a witness in addition to the
record provided5 3' (after all, the burden is on the applicant to prove his
allegations in a PCR action.)532 An interrogatory is formally defined as a
"written request ([usually] in a set of questions) submitted to an opposing party
in a lawsuit as part of discovery."53 A particularly useful function of
interrogatories lies in the ability to request a summary of "facts known to or
observed by" witnesses or a party involved in a case.534 Additionally, once
submitted, interrogatories are "deemed to continue from the time of service," so
that information that surfaces after interrogatories have been submitted shall be
required to be continuously forwarded to the other party.535 Although a prisoner
will not find an example form of interrogatories 536 in any SCDC law library,
individuals who have engaged in civil litigation on any given compound will
528. Id. at 251-52.
529. See id. at 251.
530. S.C. R. CIV. P. 33(b).
531. See Blume & Paavola, supra note 144, at 261 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-130
(2003)).
532. S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(e).
533. BLACK' S LAW DICTIONARY 896 (9th ed. 2009).
534. S.C. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(7).
535. S.C. R. Civ. P. 33(b).
536. See 2 KEVIN A. DUNLAP & KELLEY M. HALL, SOUTH CAROLINA LITIGATION FORMS
AND ANALYSIS § 25.01 (1997).
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likely have one. If not, one can be ordered as discussed in this Commentary's
discussion of access to the courts.537
C. Requests for Production ofDocuments and Things
A "request for the production"-governed by Rule 34 of the South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure-is basically a request to inspect and copy any
designated document or to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangible thing
within the possession, custody, or control of the party upon whom the request is
served.538  This discovery tool is somewhat similar to the discovery rule in
criminal cases, 539 but it is not likely to produce much more than what is already
in the prisoner's possession. This is because, as stated above, the attorney
general, to whom such a request would be made, is not likely to be in possession
of much more than the transcripts of the proceedings below, an outline of the
prisoner's history within the SCDC, and current filings in regard to the present
PCR application.5 4 0 Generally, a request for the production of documents in
PCR proceedings is used to secure an attorney's case file pertaining to the charge
an applicant is incarcerated for that a prisoner was not otherwise able to obtain.
D. Requests for Admission
"Requests for admission"-governed by Rule 36 of the South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure-are used to request that a party admit or deny the truth
of any matter set forth in the request that relates to statements or opinions of fact
or of the application of law, including the genuineness of any documents
described in the request.5 4' Once a matter is admitted by a party, that matter will
be treated by the court as having been conclusively established and need not be
proved at trial.542 Requests for admission are helpful in getting straightforward
answers from individuals and in preventing an applicant's prior trial or plea
counsel from "dancing" around with evasive answers at an applicant's PCR
hearing. For example, a prisoner may wish to know beforehand the exact dates
that counsel alleges to have consulted with him prior to a trial or guilty plea,
whether counsel admits making specific statements to him, or whether counsel
admits to having overlooked certain facts or misinterpreted applicable law. A
party may not request more than twenty admissions without leave of court.543 A
party who does not respond in the required time frame runs the risk of default
537. See supra Part VI.A.
538. S.C. R. Civ. P. 34(a).
539. S.C. R. CRIM. P. 5.
540. See A-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 364, 527 S.E.2d 742, 747 (1999) (citing S.C.
CODE ANN. § 17-27-70(a) (1985)).
541. S.C. R. Civ. P. 36(a).
542. S.C. R. Civ. P. 36(b).
543. S.C. R. Civ. P. 36(c).
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judgment being entered against him and the matter being deemed admitted as a
result.
E. Subpoenas
Rule 45 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure governs the use of
subpoenas. A "subpoena" is a command to an individual to appear at a certain
time and place-usually a courthouse-to give testimony or to produce evidence
relating to a certain matter. Prisoners usually have one or more witnesses they
wish to call at their upcoming PCR hearing; therefore, issuing a subpoena to
compel their attendance is recommended regardless of whether the witness has
volunteered to attend.4  Also relevant, a "subpoena duces tecum" requires a
person served to bring forth certain specific documents and other items or
materials relevant to the facts that a prisoner is developing. For instance, a
prisoner might use a subpoena duces tecum to compel the attendance of a 911
dispatch operator and require the operator to bring the records and logs of a
certain dispatch relevant to a prisoner's claim.54" Any licensed attorney may
sign and issue a subpoena on behalf of a court, and prisoners appearing pro se
may have a subpoena issued for them by requesting the court to do so.5
Subpoena forms can usually be acquired from the clerk of court in the county in
which the PCR action is pending.5 5 0
F. Freedom of Information Act
South Carolina's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) is set forth in Title 30,
Chapter 4 of the South Carolina Code.5 5 1 FOIA provides that information held
by public agencies must be made available to the public unless the information
comes within one of the specific categories exempt from public disclosure.552
544. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 36(a); see also DUNLAP & HALL, supra note 540, § 25.33 (discussing
requests for admission in general); id. § 25.34 (providing a standard form for requests for
admission).
545. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1563 (9th ed. 2009).
546. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 45.
547. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1563; see also S.C. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(1)(C) (commanding
a person to "produce and permit inspection and copying of designated books, documents or tangible
things in the possession, custody or control of that person").
548. Cf Love v. Johnson, 57 F.3d 1305, 1313-14 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that the prisoner
adequately supported his subpoena duces tecum for material from three state agencies by arguing
that the state records "might contain material evidence favorable to [his] defense").
549. S.C. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(3).
550. See id.; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-40 (2003) (determining with which clerk of
court a prisoner may file his PCR application).
551. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-10 (2007) ("This chapter shall be known and cited as the
'Freedom of Information Act."'). See generally S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 30-4-10 to -165 (encompassing
FOIA).
552. See id. §§ 30-4-30 to -40 (2007 & Supp. 2012).
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The exemptions denying public disclosure generally concern the release of
information that may endanger the life of an individual or hamper a law
enforcement investigation.553 FOIA is an excellent avenue for prisoners to
obtain photographs, tapes, recordings, or other documents a prisoner may need,
regardless of whether a prisoner is allowed to pursue discovery in PCR.5  A
prisoner may forward a FOIA request to any state agency, commission,
department, or political subdivision, as well as any "organization, corporation, or
agency" that receives support, in whole or in part, from public funds.
Therefore, prisoners can obtain desirable information from local police and
sheriffs' departments, public defenders and solicitors' offices, the South Carolina
Law Enforcement Division (SLED), and the Department of Probation, Parole
and Pardon Services (DPPPS), to name a few. 5 5 6  Public organizations that
receive public funds, such as county hospitals and the University of South
Carolina, are also within FOIA's reach.
To obtain information under FOIA, a prisoner can simply write a letter
requesting documents or information and title the letter: "FOIA" Request.5 5 8
Most public agencies and departments designate individuals as FOIA
coordinators to handle such requests and to provide the requesting party with the
requested material at little or no charge.559  FOIA for federal agencies is
governed by 5 U.S.C. § 5 52.560
553. See id. § 30-4-40.
554. See id. § 30-4-20(c) (2007).
555. Id. § 30-4-20(a).
556. See, e.g., Newberry Publ'g Co. v. Newberry Cnty. Comm'n on Alcohol & Drug Abuse,
308 S.C. 352, 353-54 & n.3, 355, 417 S.E.2d 870, 871 & n.3, 872 (1992) (citing S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 30-4-30 to -40 (2007 & Supp. 2012)) (concluding that because SLED is a public body, criminal
investigative reports are public records appropriately released under FOIA); Burton v. York Cnty.
Sheriffs Dep't, 358 S.C. 339, 348-49, 594 S.E.2d 888, 893 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 30-4-20(a), -30(a), -40) (finding that county sheriff's department was a "public body" as
defined under FOIA).
557. See, e.g., Campbell v. Marion Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 354 S.C. 274, 281, 580 S.E.2d 163, 166
(Ct. App. 2003) (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-20(a) (2007)) (noting that county hospitals are
public bodies as defined under FOIA); Weston v. Carolina Research & Dev. Found., 303 S.C. 398,
403, 401 S.E.2d 161, 164 (1991) (rejecting respondent's argument and holding that the foundation
that had received funds from, and operated exclusively for the benefit of, the University of South
Carolina a public body was also subject to FOIA as a public body regardless of whether the
foundation was considered a "public" or "private" entity under common law principles).
558. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-30(c).
559. See, e.g., Research, S.C. DEP'T CORRECTIONS, http://www.doc.sc.gov/research/researchjsp
(last visited Apr. 20, 2013) (explaining that FIOA requests must be sent to the SCDC's FIOA
coordinator).
560. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
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G. Motion for Funds for Expert Expenses
In hames v. State,5 6' a PCR applicant sought funds from the court so that a
psychiatrist could examine her and support her claim of mental incompetency at
the time of her guilty plea.5 62 Currently, Thames is the only South Carolina
opinion on the topic of providing funds for expert services in a PCR proceeding.
In a footnote that has received some criticism,563 the Thames court noted that the
statute authorizing funds for a defendant who requests expert services is
inapplicable to PCR proceedings and that the PCR judge in the underlying case
properly conducted a hearing on Thames's motion for the payment of expert
witness fees. 64 The court upheld the denial of Thames's request on the grounds
that she had previously been examined by two psychiatrists prior to pleading
guilty and that "the mere possibility that petitioner could find an expert
somewhere to support her claim of incompetency at the time of her plea is
insufficient to warrant the authorization of funds to pay an expert.",O Therefore,
while section 17-3-50 of the South Carolina Code does not apply in a PCR
setting according to the Thames footnote, a prisoner moving the court for funds
to pay an expert should still be prepared to show the request for funds is both
"necessary" and "reasonable"-that the request is necessary to fully develop the
prisoner's claim, that the facts or evidence intended to be shown by the use of
such expert are not merely cumulative or immaterial, and that no other avenue is
available to the prisoner to develop the prisoner's claims.5 6 6 Prisoners generally
find it useful to file a motion for funds for expert services at the same time they
file their PCR application to avoid potential problems in getting their attorneys to
submit one at a later date. Additionally, a denial of ex parte proceedings for a
prisoner's request for these types of funds may trigger a violation of a prisoner's
due process and equal protection rights. In the face of recent budget cuts that
have impacted the availability of funds for expert services for PCR applicants,
prisoners should still submit requests for these funds and thoroughly detail the
necessity of these funds to the full development of their claims. In the likely
event that no funds are made available to an applicant, prisoners should
561. 325 S.C. 9, 478 S.E.2d 682 (1996).
562. See id. at 10-11, 478 S.E.2d at 682.
563. See, e.g., Blume & Paavola, supra note 144, at 255-57 (listing grounds on which the
application of Thames in a noncapital PCR case could be challenged).
564. See Thames, 325 S.C. at 11 n.1, 478 S.E.2d at 682 n.1 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-3-
26, 17-3-50 (2003)).
565. Id. at 11, 478 S.E.2d at 682-83.
566. See id. at 11 n.1, 478 S.E.2d at 682 n.1; cf S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-50 (1976) (providing
"reasonable" and "necessary" standard for defendant's request for expert services for a criminal
trial); State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 176, 508 S.E.2d 870, 879 (1998) (citing Clark v. State, 315
S.C. 385, 387-88, 434 S.E.2d 266, 267 (1993); State v. Caskey, 273 S.C. 325, 329, 256 S.E.2d 737,
738-39 (1979)) (stating that when obtaining a new trial based on after-discovered evidence is
"material to the issue of guilt or innocence" and "is not merely cumulative or impeaching").
567. See Blume & Paavola, supra note 144 at 256-57.
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sufficiently state on the record at their evidentiary hearing how the denial of
these funds adversely affected the presentation of their claims so that they can
prepare their claims for possible federal review.
For prisoners who allege counsel was ineffective for failing to call an expert
witness or for prisoners who have claims that require expert evaluation to
substantiate them, this motion will be especially important. It is important
because an applicant's "[m]ere speculation of what a[n expert] witness'[s]
testimony may be is insufficient to satisfy the burden of showing prejudice in a
petition for PCR." 569 Applicants will need to produce testimony to support their
position regarding claims that call for an expert's opinion to prevail on such a
claim. 570 Prisoners sometimes put forth only a minimal effort in attempting to
obtain funds for expert expenses and end up not being heard on the matter at all.
It is hard to imagine claims calling for expert opinion that are more routinely
dismissed than those made without expert testimony as support. Diligence,
persistence, and a clear record of the prisoner's efforts are highly recommended.
IX. EVIDENTIARY HEARING
A. In General
An application for PCR is generally heard by "a court of competent
jurisdiction in the county in which the conviction took place."5 7' It is not
unheard of, however, for an evidentiary hearing to take place in a county other
than that in which the conviction took place.572 Additionally, the judge who
presides "at the guilty plea, criminal trial, or probation revocation proceeding for
which relief is being sought" "shall, upon motion, recuse himself' from
presiding over the same prisoner's PCR evidentiary hearing.573  Evidentiary
hearings are the climax of the entire PCR proceeding, and most courts usually
conduct at least two PCR terms per year. In preparing for and attending a
hearing, a prisoner should take several considerations into account to maximize
the possibility of prevailing on the claims raised.
568. See Conaway v. Polk, 453 F.3d 567, 589-91 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating that petitioner was
not barred from obtaining a hearing where he reasonably attempted to investigate and pursue his
claim in state court).
569. Daltonv. State, 376 S.C. 130, 143, 654 S.E.2d 870, 877 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Porter v.
State, 368 S.C. 378, 386-87, 629 S.E.2d 353, 358 (2006)).
570. See Lorenzen v. State, 376 S.C. 521, 530, 657 S.E.2d 771, 776 77 (2008) (denying
prisoner's PCR petition and holding that "it is merely speculative that these allegedly favorable
expert witnesses would have aided in [Lorenzen's] defense").
571. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-80 (2003).
572. Buchananv. State, 276 S.C. 127, 129, 276 S.E.2d 302, 303-04 (1981) (citing § 17-27-80)
(holding that the PCR statutes do not require that a PCR application be heard in the county in which
the applicant was convicted, but only that the application is heard before a judge who has
jurisdiction to pass upon the matter arising within such county).
573. Floyd v. State, 303 S.C. 298, 299, 400 S.E.2d 145, 146 (1991) (per curiam).
574. See Blume, supra note 147, at 254.
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To begin with, a prisoner has the burden of proving the allegations in his
application and must establish his "entitlement to relief by a preponderance of
the evidence."575 A preponderance of the evidence is evidence that has greater
weight than the evidence opposing it or is evidence that "has the most
convincing force" and has "superior evidentiary weight that, though not
sufficient to free the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to
incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than the other."5 7 6
It is not enough to simply include claims alleging violations in a PCR
application. A PCR applicant must pursue his claims at the PCR hearing or they
will be considered abandoned and procedurally barred. 7  Prisoners should not
take lightly that the PCR statutes provide that "proof by affidavits, depositions,
oral testimony or other evidence" may be received by a court from a prisoner.5 7 8
Indeed, such evidence must be provided by a prisoner who aims to be successful
in obtaining relief Prisoners sometimes believe that it is a sound strategy to
withhold facts or evidence until their actual evidentiary hearing takes place. This
belief is usually based on the assumption that their claims will have a better
chance of success if the attorney general's office cannot prepare for what they do
not know. Prisoners who do so run the risk that their claim will likely not be
heard based upon the objection that the material was not included in an
applicant's "original, supplemental, or amended application." 579 An objection
can also be raised on the ground that such "sandbagging" has prejudicial effect
on the attorney general's office's preparation of its defenses.58  For these reasons,
withholding information or evidence is never a wise course of action.
Additionally, some prisoners neglect to fully substantiate their claims,
believing that a point they are attempting to establish in an argument is
conclusive and needs no further verification. This line of reasoning is also often
bolstered by the assumption that a PCR court is already in possession of the
575. S.C. R. Civ. P. 71(e); see also Lounds v. State, 380 S.C. 454, 460, 670 S.E.2d 646, 649
(2008) ("In a PCR proceeding, the burden is on the applicant to prove the allegations in his
application."); Butler v. State, 286 S.C. 441, 442, 334 S.E.2d 813, 814 (1985) (citing Griffin v.
Martin, 278 S.C. 620, 621 22, 300 S.E.2d 482, 483 (1983)) (stating that the burden of proof is on
the applicant).
576. BLACK' S LAW DICTIONARY 1301 (9th ed. 2009).
577. See § 17-27-80; see also Primus v. Padula, 555 F. Supp. 2d 596, 611 (D.S.C. 2008)
(citing § 17-27-80; Hughes v. South Carolina, 444 F. Supp. 2d 594 (D.S.C. 2006); Plyler v. State,
309 S.C. 408, 409, 424 S.E.2d 477, 478 (1992)) (finding that applicant, who could have raised his
claims earlier and failed to do so, was procedurally barred from doing so later); Plyler, 309 S.C. at
409, 424 S.E.2d at 478 (citing Hyman v. State, 278 S.C. 501, 502, 299 S.E.2d 330, 331 (1983))
(finding that an issue that was neither raised at the PCR hearing nor ruled upon by the PCR court
was procedurally barred).
578. § 17-27-80.
579. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-90 (2003).
580. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 15(b) (stating generally that evidence objected to at trial on the
grounds that evidence was not in the pleadings may be excluded if the opposing party proves that its
defense has been prejudiced); Simpson v. Moore, 367 S.C. 587, 599, 627 S.E.2d 701, 708 (2006)
(citing Arnold v. State, 309 S.C. 157, 172, 420 S.E.2d 834, 842 (1992)) (stating that amendments to
PCR applications must conform to evidence presented at trial and must not raise new claims).
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material needed to prove a fact or point a prisoner is attempting to establish.
This assumption is a fatal gamble that prisoners frequently lose.5 8'
Probably the most common error prisoners make in attempting to prove a
claim at evidentiary hearings is the failure to produce favorable witnesses. To
establish that prejudice resulted from a witness's failure to testify at trial, a
prisoner must produce the testimony of the witness or otherwise offer the
testimony in accordance with the applicable evidentiary rules at the PCR
hearing.582 .mere speculation of what a witness'[s] testimony may be is
,,583
insufficient... ."5 Likewise, prisoners attempting to show that promises or
specific statements were made by prior counsel in the presence of, or to, others
will need to produce those "others" (usually family members an attorney has
consulted with) to substantiate their claim. 58 Applicants are not entitled to a
new trial for the sole purpose of presenting a "fancier" case and competent
evidence in support of a prisoner's claim needs to be presented.
As the moving party in a civil proceeding, the prisoner presents evidence
first at the evidentiary hearing.5 8 6  While prisoners typically remain restrained
through the course of the hearing, most judges will allow a prisoner's dominant
hand to be freed so the prisoner can sift through documents upon request. The
gravity and imposing nature of evidentiary hearings in general is not lost on
prisoners, and many find it helpful to prepare outlines of the testimony they wish
to present in advance. A pretrial brief outlining the facts and law surrounding
each of a prisoner's claims might sound too technical to accomplish to most
prisoners, but a simple, well-formatted claim summary, or "coversheet," is an
excellent tool to keep everyone on the same page and to avoid having to sift
through paperwork to find a document. A PCR evidentiary hearing is usually
a prisoner's last chance to present claims for relief, so prisoners should be
mindful that the failure to pursue claims at that hearing will constitute
581. In other words, prisoners are often denied relief because they fail to properly assess the
depth of their duty to prove the allegations in their application. A common example of this is when
prisoners attempt to substantiate a claim based, in whole or in part, on something that occurred in a
prior proceeding but lose on that claim because they wrongly assumed the PCR court had
possession of the prior proceeding's transcripts. This practice is often fatal.
582. Bassette v. Thompson, 915 F.2d 932, 940-41 (4th Cir. 1990); Dempsey v. State, 363 S.C.
365, 369, 610 S.E.2d 812, 814 (2005) (citing Glover v. State, 318 S.C. 496, 498, 458 S.E.2d 538,
540 (1995)); Underwood v. State, 309 S.C. 560, 562, 564, 425 S.E.2d 20, 22 23 (1992) (citing
Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 118-19, 386 S.E.2d 624, 625-26 (1989)).
583. Porter v. State, 368 S.C. 378, 386, 629 S.E.2d 353, 358 (2006) (citing Bannister v. State,
333 S.C. 298, 303, 509 S.E.2d 807, 809 (1998)).
584. See generally Wolfe v. State, 326 S.C. 158, 164-66, 485 S.E.2d 367, 370-71 (1997)
(discussing counsel's "promises" regarding a potential reduced sentence); Underwood, 309 S.C. at
562, 425 S.E.2d at 22 (noting that although prisoner alleged that three witnesses could have
testified, none of them did so).
585. See Jones v. State, 332 S.C. 329, 339, 504 S.E.2d 822, 827 (1998).
586. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-80 (2003); S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(c), (e).
587. See, e.g., 2 DUNLAP & HALL, supra note 540, § 31:03 (pretrial brief sample forms); see
also S.C. R. Civ. P. 16(c) (pretrial brief requirements).
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abandonment of those claims, which will thereafter be procedurally barred."' It
is not enough to simply include potential claims in an application and hope for
relief; a prisoner must affirmatively raise claims at his evidentiary hearing. 589
Prisoners often hopefully look to their evidentiary hearings as their opportunity
to "tell their side of the story," yet many fumble at this chance due to a
preventable lack of preparation. Judges frequently deny claims for lack of
credibility-when the truthfulness of a matter may have been easily established
by the presentation of available evidence. For example, if the weather on a
specific date is material to a prisoner's claim, the prisoner should submit
documents such as weather reports to substantiate his allegation. 590 There is
simply no such thing as "over-substantiating" a claim,59' and evidentiary
hearings are generally a prisoner's last chance to develop both the factual basis
of a claim and the record of the proceedings for review.592
When speaking at evidentiary hearings and explaining claims to the court,
prisoners should be mindful that the objective is to crystallize their position for
the record. A prisoner's testimony is usually the very last chance to expand,
explain, or clarify what has been submitted in his application. The specific
objective is to persuade the court towards a desired conclusion by attempting to
harmonize the applicant's position with the position the court ultimately adopts.
Rehearsing arguments prior to attending a hearing can be a helpful method at
this stage. Prisoners should aim to be candid, clear, respectful and, at times,
passionate when presenting their claims. As one author put it:
[T]he appellant does not come to the court seeking abstract justice, but
he complains that he is the victim of injustice, in the form of a specific
violation of his substantial rights. One can only right an injustice by
doing something about it. This sense of injustice starts a swelling
motion when it is properly conveyed.593
588. Smithv. Padula, 444 F. Supp. 2d 531, 534 (D.S.C. 2006).
589. See Plyler v. State, 309 S.C. 408, 409, 424 S.E.2d 477, 478 (1992) (citing Hyman v.
State, 278 S.C. 501, 502, 299 S.E.2d 330, 331 (1983).
590. See, e.g., Palacio v. State, 333 S.C. 506, 513, 511 S.E.2d 62, 66 (1999) ("Since the
contents of these documents were never revealed at the PCR hearing, [d]efendant has failed to
present any evidence of probative value demonstrating how the failure to obtain the unproduced
statements or acquire the other documents in a more timely fashion prejudiced the defense." (citing
Jacksonv. State, 329 S.C. 345, 349, 495 S.E.2d 768, 770 (1998))).
591. See Simpson v. Moore, 367 S.C. 587, 607, 627 S.E.2d 701, 712 (2006) (finding that
allowing a petitioner to submit over forty depositions and twenty-two affidavits at his PCR hearing
was within the discretion of the trial judge).
592. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-80 (2003) provides, in part, that "[a] record of the proceedings
shall be made and preserved."
593. EDWARD D. RE & JOSEPH R. RE, BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT 152 (8th ed.
1999) (quoting Harris B. Steinberg, The CriminalAppeal, in COUNSEL ON APPEAL 3, 14 (Arthur A.
Charpentier ed., 1968)).
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While tears are not necessary, it is only natural for some passion to seep into an
applicant's speech. Also, it almost goes without saying that prisoners should at
all times speak loud enough to be heard. A good way to alleviate the anxiety
that is often the cause of inaudible responses can be to request counsel to ask
some preliminary or "warm-up" questions until a comfortable level in the
prisoner's speech has been achieved. A prisoner should not expect a judge to
strain to hear what is being said.
The attitude of the court is something the applicant should be prepared for as
well. Some judges will seem inattentive and bored while others will be actively
engaged in the hearing and will ask questions. If the court does ask a prisoner a
question directly, the prisoner should welcome this opportunity to address the
court and should also think carefully before responding. If the court displays a
hostile attitude towards the prisoner and acts with disbelief towards the claims
presented, a prisoner should not behave in kind or answer questions with any less
respect than what he would show a friendlier judge. Such action should not be
taken even if the prisoner is sure that the judge will not rule in his favor. Some
judges will, perhaps naturally, focus on the weakest part of a prisoner's claim.
Prisoners should be prepared to respond to this questioning and should not be
disheartened that the judge has bypassed the generalities and directly reached the
pros and cons of the argument. Lastly, to preserve his claims and protect any
appellate rights, a prisoner may wish to express his desire to have counsel file
appropriate post-hearing motions and appeals in the event of an adverse decision.
Once evidence and allegations are presented by an applicant, the state is next
given the opportunity to respond.594  Because most claims at PCR hearings
involve the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, prior counsel are
usually called as witnesses to defend themselves and explain their decisions
relevant to the particular applicant.5 95  By nature, ineffective assistance of
counsel claims essentially allege that prior counsel was deficient and
incompetent in representing the applicant, and applicants should expect prior
counsel to refute such allegations vehemently.5 96 While the testimony of the
witness cannot be foretold, many applicants find it useful to prepare a list of
questions to ask during cross-examination of the prior counsel. Applicants will
be given an opportunity to provide testimony in rebuttal and should pay close
attention to what is being testified to. Once this stage has concluded, both sides
594. PCR hearings are generally conducted similar to civil bench trials. S.C. R. Civ. P.
7 1.1(a).
595. See, e.g., Stokes v. State, 308 S.C. 546, 548, 419 S.E.2d 778, 779 (1992) (testimony of
trial counsel); see also Brown v. State, 383 S.C. 506, 517, 680 S.E.2d 909, 915 (2009)
("Where ... counsel articulates a valid reason for employing certain strategy, such conduct will not
be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel." (quoting Stokes, 308 S.C. at 548, 419 S.E.2d at 779)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
596. See Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 364, 527 S.E.2d 742, 747 (1999) (stating that in
PCR proceedings, "[t]he applicant attempts to show that his or her attorney erred in a manner that a
reasonably proficient attorney would not").
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will be given an opportunity to make a closing statement, and an applicant's
evidentiary hearing will thereafter conclude.
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, a judge will either "dismiss,"
"grant," "continue," or "take under consideration" a prisoner's application.
Frequently, proposed orders are requested prior to the court issuing an order on
an applicant's claim. Prisoners sometimes believe it wise to ensure that a
proposed order is prepared in advance to anticipate the court requesting one.
This position fails to account for favorable testimony presented at an evidentiary
hearing that a prisoner may wish to include in such an order. For example, if
counsel testifies at an evidentiary hearing that a particular omission was due to
his intoxication during trial, this admission is testimony that a prisoner likely
would want included in a proposed order. Obviously, proposed orders or briefs
prepared in advance deprive a prisoner of this opportunity. In considering an
application, most judges reach an answer within ninety days of an evidentiary
hearing. However, no substantial method to compel a judge to reach a
conclusion exists and waiting two years after an evidentiary hearing to receive an
answer is not unheard of597 The PCR statutes require PCR courts to "make
specific findings of fact, and state expressly its conclusions of law, relating to
each issue presented."5 98 The order ultimately issued is considered the final
judgment.
5 99
B. Relief
Historically, there have been four outcomes for a PCR action: (1) vacate the
conviction and remand to the trial court for a new trial; (2) vacate the conviction;
(3) vacate the sentence and remand to the trial court for resentencing; and (4)
dismiss the application. 00 It is an incorrect belief that a PCR court can reduce a
prisoner's sentence or that a prisoner can in some way receive a "time-cut" as a
form of relief Many applicants pursue PCR under this misconceived belief and
then withdraw their application at a later date when they discover that no such
597. Motions asserting inordinate delay and writs of mandamus are sometimes used to try to
compel a judge to act and issue a ruling in some circumstances, but the success rate of these
measures is not high and they often go unaddressed. See, e.g., City of Rock Hill v. Thompson, 349
S.C. 197, 200, 563 S.E.2d 101, 102 (2002) ("[T]he [c]ourt could direct a judge to rule on a pending
motion because the act of ruling is ministerial in nature."); see also 18 WEST'S S.C. DIGEST 2D
Mandamus, Key No. 3(3) (2008 & Supp. 2012) (acts and proceedings of courts, judges, and judicial
officers).
598. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-80 (2003).
599. Id.
600. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-70(b) (1976); see also Singleton v. State, 313 S.C. 75, 85,
437 S.E.2d 53, 59 (1993) (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(b) (1976)) (discussing the
appropriate relief in PCR cases); Gilstrap v. State, 252 S.C. 625, 628, 168 S.E.2d 88, 89 (1969)
(stating that even under the assumption that all the allegations were true, the relief to be granted in
this PCR case was remand for a new trial). The general basis for these remedies was codified in
former South Carolina Supreme Court Rule 50(1), which was repealed by adoption of the South
Carolina Appellate Court Rules.
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remedy is available. Even more prisoners voluntarily withdraw their application
when they discover that a PCR applicant can receive an even greater prison
sentence upon retrial than the one the applicant is currently serving. A good
example of this situation can be found in the following hypothetical:
If an [a]pplicant is successful in having his conviction set aside, he will
be facing the original charges all over again. If he received concurrent
sentences, he may receive consecutive sentences the next time around.
If charges were dismissed in exchange for a plea, the applicant will be
facing the dismissed charges again.
For instance, an [a]pplicant may have pled guilty and received a
sentence of ten years imprisonment for armed robbery. Armed robbery
carries a sentence of ten to thirty years imprisonment. If successful in
PCR, [a]pplicant will be facing trial for the same charge, and be facing
the possibility of a thirty-year sentence again. If a second charge was to
run concurrent to that sentence or dismissed in exchange for the plea,
the [a]pplicant may face additional exposure from that charge. For
example, kidnapping carries up to thirty years imprisonment. So if the
[a]pplicant received a concurrent sentence or the charge was dismissed
in exchange for the plea to armed robbery, his exposure would increase
601
to sixty years.
Despite such warnings, a widespread myth still remains amongst prisoners
that additional time cannot be imposed upon an applicant who prevails in
obtaining post-conviction relief This misconception is mostly due to prisoners
failing to properly understand the United States Supreme Court decision in North
602Carolina v. Pearce. In Pearce, the Court held that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prevented a trial court from penalizing a defendant
for exercising his right to appeal. 603  The defendant in Pearce successfully
attacked his conviction on appeal and received a harsher sentence on retrial. 04
In stating that vindictiveness must play no part in the sentence a defendant
receives after a new trial, the Court ruled that "whenever a judge imposes a more
severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so
must affirmatively appear . .. so that the constitutional legitimacy of the
increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal." 05  If no reasons for an
increased sentence are given, due process is presumed to have been violated. 06
This rule has become known as the Pearce presumption.
601. MCMAHAN, supra note 146, at 4 (citations omitted).
602. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
603. Id. at 725.
604. Id. at 713.
605. Id. at 725 26.
606. See id. at 726. In Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984), the defendant received
a greater sentence, from the same judge, at a retrial following a successful appeal. See id. at 562.
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In State v. Higgenbottom,07 the South Carolina Supreme Court took efforts
608to analyze Pearce and its progeny. In Higgenbottom, the defendant received
an increase in his probationary sentence following a motion for reconsideration
of his original sentence.609  The defendant appealed and claimed that a due
process violation had occurred because the judge increased his sentence without
any explanation or new evidence.6 10 Although the court recognized that several
subsequent cases seemed to have weakened Pearce, and thus weakened the
defendant's position that a Pearce violation had occurred, the court refused to
view Pearce as having been "emasculated." 6 1  The court reversed the
defendant's increased probationary sentence "[b]ecause the trial court failed to
put on the record objective reasons for the harsher sentence" and left no way for
the Pearce presumption to be rebutted.612 Therefore, as long as a judge on retrial
gives objective reasons for increasing a sentence after an applicant has
successfully pursued any sort of appellate or collateral relief, it is not likely that
grounds will exist to pursue a due process violation so long as the grounds given
by the judge are stated on the record and are not vindictive in nature.
If an applicant is successful in obtaining relief, the attorney general's office
will most certainly appeal the PCR court's order granting relief If appellate
review is denied or if the PCR court's decision is upheld, the relief granted to the
applicant will then materialize.
A valid question a prisoner might ask himself is: "Why would I pursue post-
conviction relief if I can receive more time than what I am already serving?"
There is no universal answer to this question, but there are plenty of good ones.
For example, a prisoner may have received an extraordinary amount of time to
serve after being found guilty at trial and may believe that he is actually or
Although these circumstances alone were enough to apply the Pearce presumption, the Court found
no violation because the trial judge stated objective reasons on the record for the increase. See id. at
569; see also State v. Higgenbottom, 344 S.C. 11, 15, 542 S.E.2d 718, 720 (2001) (citing Colten v.
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116-17 (1972); Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726).
607. 344 S.C. 11, 542 S.E.2d 718 (2001).
608. See id. at 14, 542 S.E.2d at 720 (citations omitted).
609. Id. at 14, 542 S.E.2d at 719.
610. Id. at 13-14, 542 S.E.2d at 719.
611. Id. at 15-16, 542 S.E.2d at 720; see also Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 801 (1989)
(holding that the presumption does not apply when a defendant is sentenced to a harsher sentence
upon retrial after successfully appealing from a guilty plea); Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134,
138 (1986) (holding that the presumption does not apply when the jury imposed the first sentence
and ajudge imposed the second, harsher sentence); Chaffinv. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 28 (1973)
(holding that the presumption does not apply when a subsequent jury on a retrial imposes a harsher
sentence than the original jury).
Additionally, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that when the second sentencing
judge is someone other than the original trial judge, the Pearce presumption does not apply. See
Higgenbottom, 344 S.C. at 15-16, 542 S.E.2d at 720 (citing State v. Hilton, 291 S.C. 276, 279, 353
S.E.2d 282, 284 (1987)). Indeed, in light of these four exceptions to the Pearce presumption alone,
it is not likely a prisoner will be able to make out a viable showing that a Pearce violation occurred
in most cases.
612. Higgenbottom, 344 S.C. at 17, 542 S.E.2d at 721.
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factually innocent of the charged offense. A prisoner may have pleaded guilty to
a crime, but he may not think that his attorney, or the court, was straightforward
with him regarding the amount of time he would receive at his guilty-plea
hearing. Likewise, a prisoner simply may not be content with the sentence he is
serving, regardless of guilt, and may truly believe that he may obtain relief
through a procedural error or a constitutional violation that may have occurred in
the course of the prosecution. After all, no one wants to be incarcerated. Many
prisoners do not see PCR as a gamble where they can receive more time but
rather as a chance, if successful, to be back in a position to negotiate a lower
term of incarceration with the solicitor. This expectation is reasonable because
of factors such as: witnesses may no longer reside in the area or remember all the
details of an event if retrial were to occur; evidence may no longer be available;
the PCR court may have found certain evidence to be inadmissible against the
defendant that would make a second conviction less likely; judicial economy
may weigh against retrying an old crime where a defendant has already served a
significant amount of time; and increasingly overloaded court dockets can play a
part in negotiations upon retrial, assuming that retrial was the granted relief.613
The decision of whether to pursue relief is a subjective evaluation a prisoner will
have to make in light of the prisoner's own particular circumstances. A ten-year
prison sentence may be an injustice to one person and a blessing to another
depending on the facts and events that occurred in any given case. Guilt or
innocence frequently do not play a major role in a prisoner's determination of
whether to pursue relief at the PCR stage, because most constitutional violations
tend to revolve around procedural errors and ineffective assistance of counsel
claims, which can be successful regardless of the guilt of the applicant.614
X. POST-HEARING MOTIONS
A. In General
Post-hearing motions are required to be made promptly after an order has
been entered by the court and not later than ten days after receipt of written
notice of entry of judgment.1 The timely filing of such a motion automatically
613. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 403-04 (1993) (noting that the "'erosion of
memory and dispersion of witnesses that occur with the passage of time' prejudice the government
and diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication" (quoting McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S.
467, 491 (1991))).
614. "The constitutional rights of criminal defendants ... are granted to the innocent and the
guilty alike. Consequently, we decline to hold either that the guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel belongs solely to the innocent or that it attaches only to matters affecting the determination
of actual guilt." Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365, 380 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
615. S.C. R. Civ. P. 52(b), 59(b); Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 14, 602 S.E.2d
772, 775 (2004). Elam arose from a tort action under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 15-78-10 to -200 (2005 & Supp. 2012), but nonetheless provides a thorough analysis
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stays the time for appeal in PCR cases until a prisoner receives written notice of
entry of the order either granting or denying such motion. 6 16 A prisoner will
then have thirty days from the date he receives a ruling on his post-hearing
motion to file and serve a notice of appeal. 1  The most commonly filed post-
hearing motions in PCR actions are motions pursuant to Rules 52(b), 59(e), and
60(a) and (b) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Each of these
motions serves a unique function and is briefly discussed below. Rule 60 is
mostly used to correct clerical mistakes, and Rule 52 is generally used to request
the court to amend its findings or make additional findings. Both of these rules
are pretty straightforward, and reviewing the appropriate section in the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure should sufficiently apprise a reader of all of
the appropriate functions of these rules. Because Rule 59(e) is more frequently
employed and more widely known to prisoners in PCR actions, it is discussed
more thoroughly below.
B. South Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)
Rule 59(e) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure is titled a "motion
to alter or amend a judgment,"6 1 " but it is more commonly referred to as a
motion for reconsideration. 619 This motion has been described as "a vehicle to
request the trial court [to] 'alter or amend the judgment"' as well as "a vehicle to
seek 'reconsideration' of issues and arguments." 620 By employing this motion, a
party is allowed to rehash, and request the court to review, all or part of a
previously presented argument and request that the court reconsider its
decision.621 In asking the court to reconsider its decision, this motion is
frequently used and inherently designed to call attention to material facts and
principles of law a party believes a court either overlooked or disregarded in its
final judgment.622 Unfortunately, many prisoners are forced to use this motion to
address the failure of a PCR court to "make specific findings of fact, and state
expressly its conclusions of law, relating to each issue presented."623
of Rule 59(e) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Elam, 361 S.C. at 15, 602 S.E.2d at
775.
616. See S.C. APP. CT. R. 203 (b)(1).
617. Id.
618. S.C. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
619. Elam, 361 S.C. at 21, 602 S.E.2d at 778; see also Arnold v. State, 309 S.C. 157, 172 73,
420 S.E.2d 834, 842 (1992) ("The purpose of [a motion] to alter or amend the judgment is to
request the trial court to 'reconsider matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits."'
(quoting Budinichv. BectonDickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 200 (1988))).
620. Elam, 361 S.C. at 21, 602 S.E.2d at 778-79.
621. Id.
622. See id.
623. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-80 (2003); see also McCray v. State, 305 S.C. 329, 330, 408
S.E.2d 241, 241 (1991) (quoting § 17-27-80) (concluding that remand was required because PCR
court did not make required findings of fact).
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In Pruitt v. State,624 the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the matter
of the increasing number of orders being issued by PCR courts that improperly
fail to address the allegations raised in prisoners' applications and at prisoners'
evidentiary hearings. 625 The Pruitt court stressed concern over this burdensome
practice and admonished counsel to be meticulous in preparing proposed orders,
for opposing counsel to be attentive and to call any omissions to the attention of
the PCR judge prior to the issuance of the order, and for a PCR judge to
carefully review the order before signing it.626 The court further placed an
obligation on counsel to file a Rule 59(e) motion when an order fails to set forth
findings regarding issues raised and the reasons for those findings. 627 The South
Carolina Supreme Court has expounded on this, stating:
A party may wish to file [a Rule 59(e)] motion when she believes the
court has misunderstood, failed to fully consider, or perhaps failed to
rule on an argument or issue, and the party wishes for the court to
reconsider or rule on it. A party must file such a motion when an issue
or argument has been raised, but not ruled on, in order to preserve it for
appellate review.628
In Marlar v. State,629 the South Carolina Supreme Court held that issues
raised but not ruled upon by a PCR court were not preserved for appellate review
where respondent did not submit a Rule 59(e) motion to correct the
630insufficiency. In Marlar, the court of appeals apparently read the following
language from the PCR judge's order to constitute an adequate ruling on
Marlar's claims:
As to any allegations raised in the application or at the hearing not
specifically addressed by this Order, this Court finds that the applicant
failed to present any evidence regarding such allegations. Accordingly,
this Court finds that the applicant failed to meet his burden of proof
regarding them. Therefore, any and all allegations not specifically
addressed in this Order are hereby denied and dismissed.63 1
This "postcard" denial does nothing to set forth findings of facts and conclusions
of law. The South Carolina Supreme Court stated that such language should not
624. 310 S.C. 254, 423 S.E.2d 127 (1992).
625. See id. at 255, 423 S.E.2d at 128.
626. Id. at 256, 423 S.E.2d at 128.
627. Id.; see also Humbert v. State, 345 S.C. 332, 338, 548 S.E.2d 862, 866 (2001) (stating
that an argument not raised and ruled upon by a PCR judge is not preserved for review).
628. Elam v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 24, 602 S.E.2d 772, 780 (2004).
629. 375 S.C. 407, 653 S.E.2d 266 (2007).
630. Id. at 410, 653 S.E.2d at 267.
631. Id. at 409, 653 S.E.2d at 266.
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be included in an order unless absolutely no evidence on the referenced claims
was presented.632
If a prisoner receives a PCR order that contains similar language, he will
likely need to file a timely Rule 59(e) motion in order for his issues to be
properly preserved for appellate review.633 Additionally, it is important to
remember that when filing this motion, the judge presiding over the case must be
634provided with a copy within ten days after the filing of the motion. Once a
Rule 59(e) motion has been submitted and ruled upon, a second Rule 59(e)
motion may be filed only if it challenges something that was altered from the
original judgment as a result of the initial Rule 59(e) motion.635 If a prisoner
submits a successive Rule 59(e) motion that simply raises the same issues and
arguments made in the first Rule 59(e) motion, the prisoner's time to appeal will
not be tolled pending its outcome, and a prisoner will run the risk of losing his
right to appeal.636
XI. APPEAL
A. PCR Appeal
A prisoner who wishes to appeal the decision of a PCR court has a right to
do so. 637 Once a final judgment has been entered by the court, counsel is
required to advise an applicant of the right to appeal the denial of PCR.638 If the
applicant is indigent, as many prisoners are, counsel is required to assist the
applicant in obtaining representation by the Division of Appellate Defense of the
South Carolina Office of Indigent Defense (SCOID).639 To appeal, a notice of
appeal must be served within thirty days after the order of the court has been
received or within thirty days after written notice is received of an order granting
or denying post-hearing motions under Rules 50, 52, or 59 of the South Carolina
Rules of Civil Procedure, which had tolled the available time to appeal.6 4 0
Prisoners do not have a state or federal constitutional right to proceed pro se in
an appeal from a criminal conviction, but they may do so if the court, in its
discretion, allows a prisoner to represent himself.641
An avoidable problem prisoners sometimes encounter during the period
immediately after an order has been issued lies in the uncertainty of whether
PCR counsel has filed appropriate post-trial motions, if necessary, and an appeal.
632. Id. at 409, 653 S.E.2d at 266-67.
633. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
634. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 59(g).
635. See Elamv. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 15, 602 S.E.2d 772, 775 (2004).
636. Id. at 16, 602 S.E.2d at 776.
637. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-100 (2003); S.C. R. Civ.P. 71.1(g).
638. Bray v. State, 366 S.C. 137, 140, 620 S.E.2d 743, 745 (2005).
639. S.C. R. Civ. P. 71.1(g).
640. S.C. App. CT. R. 203(b)(1).
641. State v. Roberts, 364 S.C. 583, 588-89, 614 S.E.2d 626, 629 (2005).
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If counsel does not contact a prisoner directly after an order has been issued and
a prisoner is unable to contact his counsel, a prisoner may wish to file
appropriate post-hearing motions himself if he recognizes the need to do so and
is capable of accomplishing the task. Whether on the grounds of allowing a
prisoner to "fully and fairly" litigate his claims or simple indifference, a PCR
court will sometimes accept such motions despite the obvious hybrid
642representation violation. Additionally, in this situation, a prisoner will want to
consider writing letters to both the clerk of court and the presiding judge
explaining the difficulty he is encountering in protecting his claims and
expressing a desire to pursue an appeal and counsel's inaction in doing so. It is
unfortunate that prisoners must sometimes take measures like these to create a
record that expresses their desire to appeal instead of PCR counsel simply
consulting or corresponding with them. However, such is often the situation and
doing nothing in the face of such serious consequences would be nothing short
of reckless. Likewise, a prisoner should submit a pro se notice of appeal within
thirty days if he is not sure if counsel has done so regardless of whether he has
submitted a pro se post-hearing motion.643 The philosophy is: A prisoner loses
nothing by exercising caution and diligence.
The procedures for review of PCR applications are governed by Rule 243 of
the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules. A final decision of a PCR court is
reviewed by the South Carolina Supreme Court upon petition by either party for
644a writ of certiorari. A writ of certiorari is a discretionary writ pursuant to
which an appellate court has discretion over whether to hear an appeal from a
645-lower court. As such, review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right and
will only be granted in limited situations where there are special and important
reasons to do so.64  To lighten its workload, the South Carolina Supreme Court
647
will sometimes transfer PCR cases to the court of appeals for review. When
this occurs, applicants will not then, again, need to seek review in the same
642. See State v. Stuckey, 333 S.C. 56, 58, 508 S.E.2d 564, 564 (1998) ("Since there is no
right to hybrid representation, substantive documents filed pro se by a person represented by
counsel are not accepted unless submitted by counsel." (italics omitted) (citing Foster v. State, 298
S.C. 306, 307, 379 S.E.2d 907, 907 (1989))).
643. See, e.g., S.C. APP. CT. R. app. C, Form 4 (providing example notice of appeal).
644. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-100 (2003); S.C. APP. CT. R. 243(a).
645. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 258 (9th ed. 2009).
646. See Haggins v. State, 377 S.C. 135, 137 n.2, 659 S.E.2d 170, 170 n.2 (2008) (stating that
certiorari review will only be granted "[w]here there are novel questions of law; where there is a
dissent in the decision of the [South Carolina] Court of Appeals; where the decision of the [South
Carolina] Court of Appeals is in conflict with a prior decision of the [South Carolina] Supreme
Court; where substantial constitutional issues are directly involved; and/or where a federal question
is included and the decision of the [South Carolina] Court of Appeals conflicts with a decision of
the United States Supreme Court" (quoting S.C. APP. CT. R. 242(b))).
647. See, e.g., Dunlap v. State, 371 S.C. 585, 585, 641 S.E.2d 431, 431 (2007) (stating that the
South Carolina Supreme Court has "only recently been transferring PCR actions to the [South
Carolina] Court of Appeals").
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manner to the South Carolina Supreme Court.6 48 When an applicant is denied
review by the court of appeals in a PCR matter and receives a "letter of denial,"
such denial will not constitute a "special reason" justifying additional South
Carolina Supreme Court review.649 If the PCR court determines that the action is
barred as successive or untimely under the statute of limitations, an appellant
must submit an explanation as to why this determination was improper at the
time of his filing a notice of appeal.6 5 0  "If the petitioner fails to make a
sufficient showing, the notice of appeal may be dismissed.'
651
Within ten days of the filing of the notice of appeal, counsel shall order a
652transcript of the lower court proceedings from the court reporter. Applicants
represented by SCOID usually receive a copy of these transcripts within the first
few months of SCOID's representation. Moreover, within thirty days of receipt
of the transcript, the petitioner is required to serve on opposing counsel a copy of
the appendix and a copy of the petition for writ of certiorari. 653 The petitioner
must also file an original plus six copies of the petition, two copies of the
appendix, and proof of service on opposing counsel with the clerk of the South
Carolina Supreme Court. The petition must contain: "(1) [t]he questions
presented for review.... (2) [a] concise statement of the case .... [and (3) a]
direct and concise argument in support of the petition."'55 The appendix must
contain the entire lower court record, a copy of the PCR court's final order, and
an index setting forth the principal matters contained in the appendix.6 5 6 Then,
the respondent must draft his return, not to exceed twenty-five pages, and must
serve it on opposing counsel within thirty days after service of the petition and
appendix.6 5 7 The respondent must file an original, plus six copies, with the clerk
of court along with proof that the return has been served on opposing counsel.
Thereafter, the petitioner will then have ten days from the date of service of the
return to file a reply, which must not exceed fifteen pages in length.659 The
petitioner is required to file an original of the reply, six copies, and proof of
648. See id.
649. Haggins, 377 S.C. at 136 n.1, 659 S.E.2d at 170 n.1 (explaining that a "letter of denial" is
what parties receive when "[they] are informed that their petitions for writs of certiorari have been
denied by letter from the appellate court clerk's office").
650. S.C. App. CT. R. 243(c) (formerly S.C. APP. CT. R. 227). This rule was renumbered from
227 to 243, effective April 29, 2009.
651. Id.
652. See S.C. App. CT. R. 243(b); see also S.C. APP. CT. R. 203, 207 (providing the applicable
time limitations).
653. S.C. APP. CT. R. 243(d)
654. Id.
655. S.C. APP. CT. R. 243(e)(1)-(3).
656. S.C. APp. CT. R. 243(f)(1)-(3).
657. S.C. APP. CT. R. 243(g).
658. Id.
659. S.C. APp. CT. R. 243(h).
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service on opposing counsel with the clerk of the South Carolina Supreme Court
within the same ten days.66 o
On appeal, the supreme court gives great deference to a judge's findings of
fact and conclusions of law, especially when matters of credibility are involved
because the supreme court lacks the opportunity to directly observe witnesses.6 6 1
Additionally, a PCR judge's findings will be upheld only where there is
probative evidence to support it.662 The term "probative evidence" simply means
"[e]vidence that tends to prove or disprove a point in issue."663 This definition is
important to understand when seeking appellate review from a PCR denial
because prisoners often focus on the evidence presented in support of their claim
and not the evidence, or lack thereof, in opposition to their claim. Even when it
seems that the evidence in support of a claim outweighs the evidence against it, a
reviewing court may still uphold a PCR court's decision on the ground that
"any" evidence was found to support the ruling. 66 A PCR judge's decision will
be reversed, however, when it is controlled by an error of law.
B. Belated Appeal
In White v. State,6  the South Carolina Supreme Court carved out an
exception to the prohibition against appellate courts considering appeals in the
absence of a notice of appeal. 6  This exception "permits consideration of the
full trial record on this issue in conjunction with appellate review of the PCR
proceeding."6 6 8 The special procedures for applicants who seek a belated appeal
are detailed in Rule 243(i) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules and
provide as follows:
(1) When the [PCR] judge has affirmatively found that the right to a
direct appeal was not knowingly and intelligently waived, the petition
660. Id.
661. Hugglerv. State, 360 S.C. 627, 632, 602 S.E.2d 753, 756 (2004) (citing Caproodv. State,
338 S.C. 103, 109, 525 S.E.2d 514, 517 (2000)); Soloman v. State, 313 S.C. 526, 529, 443 S.E.2d
540, 542 (1994) (citing Drayton v. Evatt, 312 S.C. 4, 11, 430 S.E.2d 517, 521 (1993)), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Cheeks, 401 S.C. 322, 737 S.E.2d 480 (2013).
662. Brown v. State, 340 S.C. 590, 593-94, 533 S.E.2d 308, 310 (2000) (citing Holland v.
State, 322 S.C. 111, 113, 470 S.E.2d 378, 379 (1996); Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 119, 386
S.E.2d 624, 626 (1989)).
663. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 639 (9th ed. 2009).
664. Brown, 340 S.C. at 593-94, 533 S.E.2d at 310 (citing Cherry, 300 S.C. at 119, 386
S.E.2d at 626).
665. Pierce v. State, 338 S.C. 139, 145, 526 S.E.2d 222, 225 (2000).
666. 263 S.C. 110, 208 S.E.2d 35 (1974).
667. See id. at 119, 208 S.E.2d at 39-40 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-405 (1962) (current
version at S.C. App. CT. R. 203); State v. Wright, 228 S.C. 432, 436, 90 S.E.2d 492, 494 (1955); 3
WEST'S S.C. DIGESTAppeal andError, Key Nos. 425-30 (2008 & Supp. 2012)).
668. Wicker v. State, 3 10 S.C. 8, 9, 425 S.E.2d 25, 25 (1992); Whitehead v. State, 308 S.C.
119, 121, 417 S.E.2d 529, 530 (1992).
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shall contain a question raising this issue along with all other [PCR]
issues petitioner seeks to have reviewed. At the same time the petition
is served, petitioner shall serve and file a brief addressing the direct
appeal issues. This brief shall, to the extent possible, comply with the
requirements of Rule 208(b). Respondent's return to the petition shall
address the [PCR] issues, including whether the direct appeal was
knowingly and intelligently waived. At the same time the return is due,
respondent shall also serve and file a brief addressing the direct appeal
issues. Within ten (10) days after service of respondent's brief,
petitioner may file a reply brief on the direct appeal issues.
(2) When the [PCR] judge has found that the applicant is not
entitled to a White v. State review, the petition shall raise the question of
wavier of the right to a direct appeal along with all other [PCR] issues
petitioner seeks to have reviewed. The petition shall also contain a
"Statement of Issues on Appeal" listing the issues to be raised if a White
v. State review is granted; this statement of issues shall comply with the
requirements of Rule 208(b)(1)(B). Briefing of the direct appeal issues
will not be allowed unless certiorari is granted on the issue.669
Additionally, the South Carolina Supreme Court has held that the one-year
statute of limitations for the filing of a PCR action does not apply where
defendants are denied a direct appeal due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 70
C. Johnson Petition
Indigent applicants who wish to appeal the denial of a PCR order may be
represented by SCOID.6 7 ' As similar offices in different states all handle a great
number of prisoner appeals, the United States Supreme Court long ago set out a
procedure to ensure indigent prisoners do not have their appeal dismissed
without proper consideration. In Anders v. California,672 the Supreme Court
held that when appointed counsel determines that an appeal is frivolous and
requests to withdraw, such counsel must brief "anything in the record that might
arguably support [an] appeal" and must furnish a copy of the brief to both the
appellant and the court.673 The indigent is then given time to "raise any points
that he chooses." The court then reviews the proceedings to determine
669. S.C. App. CT. R. 243(i) (italics added).
670. Wilsonv. State, 348 S.C. 215, 218, 559 S.E.2d 581, 582-83 (2002) ("A defendant has the
procedural right to one fair bite at the apple. That is, every defendant has a right to file a direct
appeal and one PCR application.").
671. See S.C. R. Civ. P.71.1(g); S.C. App. CT. R. 602(e)(3).
672. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
673. Id. at 744.
674. Id.
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whether the appeal is, indeed, "wholly frivolous." 675 If the court decides that it
is frivolous, counsel's request to withdraw may be granted.7  If the court
decides that arguable issues do exist, the court will "afford the indigent the
assistance of counsel to argue the appeal."6 7 7  The Court stated that "[t]his
procedure will assure penniless defendants the same rights and opportunities on
appeal-as nearly as is practicable-as are enjoyed by those persons who are in
a similar situation but who are able to afford the retention of private counsel."6 7 8
In Johnson v. State,679 the South Carolina Supreme Court "approved the
withdrawal of counsel in meritless post-conviction appeals, provided the
procedures outlined in [Anders are] followed."68 0 Thus, in South Carolina, when
counsel requests to withdraw from a PCR appeal pursuant to Anders, counsel's
brief containing an arguable issue is called a "Johnson petition."6 ' If such a
brief is submitted by counsel, the appellant will be notified by the clerk of court
and will be given forty-five days from the date of notification to submit a pro se
brief addressing any issues the appellant believes the court should consider on
6812appeal. Upon receipt of an appellant's pro se brief, or the expiration of forty-
five days, the court will then review the record.683 If a Johnson petition is filed
on an appellant's behalf and the appellant is debating whether to file a pro se
brief, the appellant should be mindful that, should his writ of certiorari be
denied, only issues presented to the South Carolina Supreme Court for
consideration will be considered on federal habeas review.
XII. STATE HABEAS CORPUS
The remedial avenue of state habeas corpus is provided for by sections 17-
17-10 to -200 of the South Carolina Code. The purpose of a state habeas
petition "is to test the legality of [a] prisoner's present detention"; the only
675. Id.
676. Id.
677. Id.
678. Id. at 745.
679. 294 S.C. 310, 364 S.E.2d 201 (1988) (per curiam).
680. Id. at 310, 364 S.E.2d at 201 (citingAnders, 386 U.S. at 744-45).
681. See, e.g., Edmond v. State, 341 S.C. 340, 343 & n.2, 534 S.E.2d 682, 684 & n.2 (2000)
("Counsel for petitioner filed a Johnson petition for a writ of certiorari.").
682. State v. Williams, 305 S.C. 116, 117, 406 S.E.2d 357, 357-58 (1991).
683. Id. at 117, 406 S.E.2d at 358.
684. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989) (noting that it is "well settled that 'once
[a] federal claim has been fairly presented to the state courts, the exhaustion requirement is
satisfied"' (alteration in original) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971))); see also
O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845-47 (1999) (citations omitted) (noting that the fact that a
petitioner has a right to raise a claim through a discretionary review process in the state supreme
court is sufficient to require presentation to the state court in order to exhaust state remedies prior to
federal habeas review).
685. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-17-10 to -200 (2003).
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remedy to be granted is release from custody.86 While the option of pursuing
state habeas relief is still available to prisoners, its availability has been severely
limited by the enactment of the PCR Act.87  This limitation is due to the fact
that the PCR Act "takes the place of all other common law, statutory or other
remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or
sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them."688 Although the PCR
Act supersedes and encompasses the state habeas corpus procedure provided for
by statute, it does not supplant the constitutional right to seek habeas corpus nor
does it unconstitutionally suspend that right.689
A petition for state habeas corpus is usually a last resort to challenge the
validity of a prisoner's conviction or sentence, initiated after an unsuccessful
direct appeal, PCR, and federal review.690 State habeas is only available where
"other remedies, such as PCR, are unavailable or inadequate." 691 The South
Carolina Supreme Court retains jurisdiction over state habeas petitions, and a
claim "cognizable under the [PCR] Act may not be raised by a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus before the circuit [court] or other lower courts."692
Additionally, like PCR, a state habeas petitioner is entitled to proceed in forma
pauperis-without payment of filing fees.693
When filing a petition for state habeas corpus, a prisoner should ensure that
the document they are submitting contains a proper case caption designating the
document as a state habeas corpus petition, has a proper county designation, and
694is signed by the submitting party to assure the clerk of court's acceptance. A
686. Gibsonv. State, 329 S.C. 37, 40, 495 S.E.2d 426, 427 (1998) (citing McCall v. State, 247
S.C. 15, 18, 145 S.E.2d 419, 419 (1965)).
687. See id. at 40, 495 S.E.2d at 428; see also Al-Shabazz v. State, 338 S.C. 354, 365, 527
S.E.2d 742, 748 (2000) ("[W]e clearly have indicated that we wish to limit habeas petitions and
funnel issues raised by inmates challenging their conviction or sentence into the PCR process.").
688. Gibson, 329 S.C. at 41, 495 S.E.2d at 428 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(b)
(1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
689. Id. ("[H]abeas corpus continues to be available as a constitutional remedy provided a
petitioner qualifies for this extraordinary relief and clears the procedural hurdles.").
690. See, e.g., Williams v. Ozmint, 380 S.C. 473, 479-80, 671 S.E.2d 600, 603 (2008) (citing
Aice v. State, 305 S.C. 448, 451, 409 S.E.2d 392, 394 (1991)) (recognizing that the petitioner had
run through the avenues of state and federal review and that the writ of common law habeas corpus
can only issue in the "very rarest of exceptions" in light of the review that the claims have already
received).
691. Gibson, 329 S.C. at 42, 495 S.E.2d at 428.
692. Simpsonv. State, 329 S.C. 43, 46, 495 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1998).
693. Lakes v. State, 333 S.C. 382, 385, 510 S.E.2d 228, 230 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting
Thompsonv. State, 325 S.C. 58, 59, 479 S.E.2d 808, 808 (1997) (citing Gibson, 329 S.C. at 41, 495
S.E.2d at 428). A proceeding in forma pauperis generally relieves the applicant of both filing fees
and court costs; however, a litigant filing a PCR application in forma pauperis is only entitled to
filing fees and is not entitled to court costs. Id. (citing Quillian v. Evatt, 308 S.C. 555, 555, 419
S.E.2d 783, 783 (1992)).
694. Miller v. State, 377 S.C. 99, 101-02, 659 S.E.2d 492, 493 (2008) (citing S.C. JUDICIAL
DEP'T, CLERK OF COURT MANUAL § 6.2.4, available at http://wwwjudicial.state.sc.us/clerkOf
CourtManual/displaychapter.cfm?chapter-6#6.2.4). Miller clarified the clerk of court's duties upon
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petition may be viewed by the court as a PCR application if the petitioner does
not satisfy the procedural requirements or fails to allege sufficient facts to justify
a habeas corpus hearing. 695 Although the allegations in a state habeas petition
are to be treated as true, "the petition must make out a prima facie case showing
[that the] petitioner is entitled to relief."696
To prevail in a state habeas action, the petitioner must raise a constitutional
claim that meets the standards set out in Butler v. State.697 In Butler, the South
Carolina Supreme Court ruled that a state habeas corpus petition "will issue only
under circumstances where there has been a 'violation, which, in the setting,
constitutes a denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the universal sense of
justice."' 698 This intentionally high showing leaves all but the rarest
constitutional claims to a PCR court and sufficiently corresponds to the court's
overall reluctance to issue a writ of habeas corpus.699  The court in Butler
emphasized that the state habeas writ was being issued "under the unique and
compelling circumstances of th[e] case," with the obvious implication that most
cases will not be as "unique and compelling."700  State habeas is available to
correct an injustice, not to relitigate an applicant's claims simply because they
have been denied elsewhere.7 0' While it is not impossible to obtain state habeas
relief, prisoners are seldom successful, as the PCR Act seemingly leaves very
little function for state habeas.
receipt of a state habeas petition and can be an insightful read for prisoners when a clerk of court
fails to recognize their state habeas action as such. See id. at 102, 659 S.E.2d at 493.
695. See Gibson, 329 S.C. at 41, 495 S.E.2d at 428 (citing Hunter v. State, 316 S.C. 105, 108,
447 S.E.2d 203, 205 (1994), abrogated by Simpson, 329 S.C. 43, 495 S.E.2d 429). If a prisoner's
state habeas petition is construed as a PCR application, it will most likely be deemed successive,
and the prisoner will be required to show why he did not raise the present claims in the previous
PCR application. See Aice, 305 S.C. at 450, 409 S.E.2d at 394.
696. Gibson, 329 S.C. at 40, 495 S.E.2d at 427 (citing Welch v. MacDougall, 246 S.C. 258,
260, 143 S.E.2d 455, 456 (1965); Crosby v. State, 241 S.C. 40, 43, 126 S.E.2d 843, 844 (1962);
Tillmanv. Manning, 241 S.C. 221, 224, 127 S.E.2d 721, 722 (1962)).
697. 302 S.C. 466, 397 S.E.2d 87 (1990).
698. Id. at 468, 397 S.E.2d at 88 (quoting State v. Miller, 84 A.2d 459, 463 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1951)).
699. See id; Gibson, 329 S.C. at 41, 495 S.E.2d at 428.
700. Butler, 302 S.C. at 468, 397 S.E.2d at 88; see also Williams v. Ozmint, 380 S.C. 473,
477, 671 S.E.2d 600, 602 (2008) ("Habeas relief is seldom used and acts as an ultimate ensurer of
fundamental constitutional rights. For these reasons, a defendant bears a much higher burden in a
habeas proceeding. A writ of habeas corpus is reserved for the very gravest of constitutional
violations 'which, in the setting, constitute[] a denial of fundamental fairness shocking to the
universal sense of justice."' (alteration in original) (quoting Green v. Maynard, 349 S.C. 535, 538,
564 S.E.2d 83, 84 (2002))).
701. See Gibson, 329 S.C. at 41, 495 S.E.2d at 428.
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XIII. UNDERSTANDING CASE LAW
Case law is law created by the courts, as opposed to statutory law created by
the legislative branch, and may be cited as precedent.702  In the appellate
courts-including the state courts of appeals and state supreme courts and the
federal circuit courts of appeals and United States Supreme Court-a majority of
judges are required to agree in order to create law. For example, a majority of
the United States Supreme Court is generally five Justices; therefore, a Supreme
Court judicial opinion will generally require five votes to make new law.703
However, the more votes a judicial opinion receives, the more persuasive it is.
As a result, briefs and opinions often emphasize that a cited opinion was a
"unanimous decision" so as to show the strength of the decision.
A. Opinions of the Court
The opinion of a case is simply the reasoning of the court on any issue
before it. The formal definition of the word "opinion" is "[a] court's written
statement explaining its decision in a given case, usu[ally] including the
statement of facts, points of law, rationale, and dicta."704  The court's
determination of a matter of law that is pivotal to its decision in the case is
referred to as the "holding." 05 The holding of a case, and the rationale
necessary for reaching it, carries the precedential value that is relied upon for the
* * 706disposition of similar issues.
Not every opinion of a court carries the same weight because it is not
uncommon for a judge or justice to disagree with the reasoning or holding of the
court. Appellate courts are not required to be unanimous in resolving a question
before them and frequently are not. A "majority opinion" of the court is the
reasoning agreed to by more than half of the judges deciding an issue.707
Appellate judges who are not in agreement with the majority's reasoning or
holding will sometimes write a "dissenting opinion," also known as a "dissent,"
702. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 244 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "caselaw" or "case law" as
"[t]he law to be found in the collection of reported cases that form all or part of the body of law
within a given jurisdiction").
703. See 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("The Supreme Court of the United States shall consist of a
Chief Justice of the United States and eight [A]ssociate [Jiustices, any six of whom shall constitute
a quorum."). If less than the full nine Justices participate, a majority may be made up of less than
five votes. By contrast, the South Carolina Supreme Court is made up of one chief justice and only
four associate justices. S.C. CONST. art. V, §2.
704. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1201. "Dicta" (plural of "dictum") is "[a] statement of
opinion or belief considered authoritative because of the dignity of the person making it." Id. at
519.
705. Id. at 800 ("A court's determination of a matter of law pivotal to its decision; a principle
drawn from such a decision.").
706. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 382 (2000) (discussing the relationship between
"bright-line rules" and dicta).
707. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1201.
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to explain why.708 A "concurring opinion," also known as a "concurrence," is
one that agrees with the outcome of the majority opinion, but is written to
express a different view of the issues or to expound upon a principle that the
particular judge holds in high esteem. 709 Concurring opinions are not part of the
majority opinion and do not maintain the same precedential value. 710 Plurality,
dissenting, and other disjointed opinions are explained more thoroughly below.
1. Dissenting Opinions
It is a common mistake for applicants researching an issue to overlook a
dissenting opinion when reading a case. Dissenting opinions generally provide
the reader with a point of view or analysis that the majority opinion does not
reveal. Too often applicants skip over reading the dissent simply because it has
no precedential value, and applicants believe that there is no reason to read it.
While it is true that a dissenting opinion has no precedential value, a dissent
should always be read to obtain a "full picture" from both sides of an issue.
Also, dissenting opinions may be cited as "persuasive" authority for an argument
that a previous court decision was incorrect or should be limited in scope. Such
an argument can sometimes result in a new majority opinion being written on the
same principle as a previous dissent. A good example of this situation can be
found in Murray v. Carrier.712
In Murray, the United States Supreme Court decided the question of
"whether a federal habeas petitioner can show cause for a procedural default by
establishing that competent defense counsel inadvertently failed to raise the
substantive claim of error rather than deliberately withholding it for tactical
reasons." 713 In analyzing the law, the Court held that cause and prejudice must
be shown in order to overcome a procedural default, regardless of whether it was
deliberate or inadvertent. Justice Stevens wrote a concurring opinion
examining several prior decisions of the Court. In relying on a dissenting
opinion, Justice Stevens noted that "because the [first case's] holding was
repudiated in [a later case], Justice Black's penetrating dissent commands greater
708. See id. (defining "dissenting opinion" as 'Ja]n opinion by one or more judges who
disagree with the decision reached by the majority").
709. Id. at 331 (defining "concurrence" as "[a] vote cast by a judge in favor of the judgment
reached, often on grounds differing from those expressed in the opinion or opinions explaining the
judgment" or "[a] separate written opinion explaining such a vote").
710. See, e.g., Bailey v. U.S. Fid. Guar. Co., 185 S.C. 169, 174, 193 S.E. 638, 640 (1937)
(explaining that a concurring opinion "while deserving of great respect, not being a holding of the
court, is, of course, without binding force or effect").
711. Purcell v. BankAtlantic Fin. Corp., 85 F.3d 1508, 1513 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that "a
dissenting Supreme Court opinion is not binding precedent").
712. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
713. Id. at 481-82.
714. Id. at 491, 496-97.
715. Id. at 497.
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respect than Justice Reed's ambiguous opinion for the Court."716 This example
is not to say that a dissenting opinion will always be useful to an applicant or that
it is equally persuasive as controlling law, but it does show that courts may look
to prior dissenting opinions when overruling or modifying a prior decision. If an
applicant's claim is going against precedent in a particular area, dissenting
opinions may be the only support available for such an uphill battle.
The obvious flaw in relying on dissenting opinions to support an argument is
that the reasoning encompassed in a dissent has already been rejected by the
majority of the court. A better course of action might be to alter an argument
and word it in such a fashion so that the dispositive issues in a claim do not find
their complete basis in a dissenting opinion. Whether or not an applicant uses a
dissenting opinion in his argument, such opinions are truly vital to a full
understanding of an issue and too informative to disregard. Furthermore,
dissents and concurrences sometimes contain stinging comments when
discussing a majority opinion, which makes reading case law slightly more
entertaining than clinical.
2. Plurality Opinions
A plurality opinion is an opinion-or reasoning of the court-that is agreed
to by less than a majority of the court but that "receiv[es] more votes than any
other opinion." 7 1  When there is no majority supporting the rationale but there is
a majority supporting the result, the United States Supreme Court has stated that
"[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds."' 719  Therefore, when there is no majority opinion, the
holding of the Court may be found in either a plurality opinion or a concurring
opinion, whichever resolves the question on the narrowest grounds. However, in
some cases, there may be more than one plurality opinion written.720 Again, in
716. Id. at 508.
717. For example, see the colorful words of Justice Scalia in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,
428 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("If the system that has been in place for 200 years (and remains
widely approved) 'shock[s]' the dissenters' consciences, ... perhaps they should doubt the
calibration of their consciences, or, better still, the usefulness of 'conscience shocking' as a legal
test." (alteration in original) (quoting id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
718. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1201 (9th ed. 2009). For an example of a plurality opinion,
see Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
719. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
720. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (two, three-Justice
opinions); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (two, four-Justice
opinions); State v. Hollman, 232 S.C. 489, 102 S.E.2d 873 (1958) (two-justice main opinion, one-
justice concurrence in result, and two-justice dissent), overruled by Stevenson v. State, 335 S.C.
193, 516 S.E.2d 434 (1999).
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these instances, the holding of the Court is determined by the narrowest rationale
for the decision in which a majority of the Justices agree.721
3. Other Disjointed Opinions
Courts may also issue other disjointed opinions in which there are multiple
writings, parts of each which gain a majority. These can be as difficult as
plurality opinions to determine what the important parts are. The key to finding
the holding and the precedent set by these confusing opinions is to look for those
portions that garner the approval of the majority of the court. A good study
example of this can be found in Arizona v. Fulminante.722
In Fulminante, the United States Supreme Court decided the question of
whether the admission at trial of a coerced confession is subject to a harmless-
error analysis. 723 The three major components relevant to the resolution of this
question were: (1) whether the confession was inadmissible because of coercion;
(2) whether harmless-error analysis was appropriate; and, if so, (3) whether any
error was harmless.724 Overall, the Court found that the confession was coerced,
was subject to harmless-error analysis, and was prejudicial to the defendant;
however, these findings were close ones.725 Three Justices Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice White, and Justice Kennedy-authored opinions in this
case.726 Justice Kennedy authored a concurrence, while both Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice White authored opinions with parts that represented
727
majority opinions for the Court and parts that were dissents. The difficulty in
reading an opinion such as this, and the confusion that can result, is easily
illustrated. Justice White's full opinion appears first in the decision and contains
four parts-three of which represent the opinion of the Court and one of which
constitutes a dissent.728 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion appears second and
contains three parts-one part that represents the opinion of the Court and two
parts that constitute dissents.729 Justice Kennedy's concurrence appears last.730
As this order demonstrates, the opinion of the Court on the issues does not
necessarily appear first, followed by each dissent. Recognizing this phenomenon
is key to avoiding confusion over what segment of the decision represents a
majority or minority opinion on a particular issue before the Court. For a better
visual of the Court's decision in Fulminante, examine the following table:
721. See supra note 724 and accompanying text.
722. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
723. Id. at 285.
724. See id. at 284, 288, 295-96.
725. Id. at 287, 295, 297.
726. See id. at 282 (White, J.); id. at 302-03 (Rehnquist, C.J.); id. at 313 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
727. See id.
728. Id. at 282.
729. Id. at 302-03.
730. Id. at 313.
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Justice White's Opinion
Part Members of the Court Pages Opinion
I White, Kennedy, Marshall, Blackmun, 282-85 Majority
Stevens, Scalia
II White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, 285-88 Majority
Scalia
III White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens 288-95 Dissent
IV White, Kennedy, Marshall, Blackmun, 295-302 Majority
Stevens
ChiefJustice Rehnquist's Opinion
Part Members of the Court Pages Opinion
I Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, 303-06 Dissent
II Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, 306-12 Majority
Scalia
III Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia 312 Dissent
Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Part Members of the Court I Pages Opinion
I Kennedy 313-14 Concurrence
As shown above, Justice White's opinion served as the majority for all parts
of the Court's opinion except Part 111.731 Part III of Justice White's opinion
reflects the belief that the harmless-error rule should be "inapplicable to
erroneously admitted coerced confessions."732 However, because a majority of
the Court rejected that position (which is, in turn, Part II of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion), Part III of Justice White's opinion is necessarily a dissent.
B. Supremacy Clause
Article VI, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, also known as the
Supremacy Clause, provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
731. Id. at 282.
732. Id. at 288.
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any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.733
Reading the above, it is not hard to wonder why the Supremacy Clause often
presents a myriad of questions for prisoners attempting to understand the
difference between federal and state law and the interplay between the two.
Most of these questions revolve around which law to follow and whether to cite
state or federal law in a brief The first thing applicants should recognize in
preparing PCR documents is that, while the Supremacy Clause demands that
state law yield to federal law, a state court is only bound by the interpretation of
federal law as decided by the United States Supreme Court-not the federal
district courts or circuit courts of appeals.734
In State v. Al-Amin,735 the South Carolina Court of Appeals dealt with the
issue of whether armed robbery constituted a crime of dishonesty for the purpose
of admitting a prior conviction into evidence under Rule 609(a)(2) of the South
Carolina Rules of Evidence.736 Because the question was a novel one in South
Carolina, the court looked to both federal and other states' jurisprudence for
guidance. 737 While the majority of federal courts of appeals that had decided the
question had found armed robbery not to be a crime of dishonesty, the South
Carolina Court of Appeals stated that "[t]he precedent set by the federal circuit
courts is not binding on this [c]ourt" and that "[w]e decline to follow the federal
courts' restrictive interpretation of the phrase 'dishonesty or false statement' in
Rule 609(a)(2)."738 In other words, if a state court follows a lower federal
court's interpretation of federal law, "it does so only because it chooses to and
not because it must."739 If, on the other hand, the United States Supreme Court
or the South Carolina Supreme Court had already ruled on the issue, the South
Carolina Court of Appeals would have been bound to follow their
interpretation.7 4 0
Just as state courts are not required to follow the lower federal courts'
interpretations of federal law, federal courts are not bound by a state court's
interpretation of federal law.7 4' Not being bound to follow each other, however,
does not mean that state and federal courts work against each other or do not
respect each other's opinions. To the contrary, state courts often look to federal
733. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
734. Lockhartv. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring).
735. 353 S.C. 405, 578 S.E.2d 32 (Ct. App. 2003).
736. See id. at 415, 578 S.E.2d at 37.
737. See id.
738. Id. at 416, 578 S.E.2d at 38.
739. Lockhart, 506 U.S. at 376.
740. See id.; see also S.C. CONST. art. V, § 9 ("The [South Carolina] Court of Appeals shall
have such jurisdiction as the General Assembly shall prescribe by general law. The decisions of the
[South Carolina] Supreme Court shall bind the [South Carolina] Court of Appeals as precedents.").
741. MEANS, supra note 381, at 1021. Federal courts, however, are bound to follow a state's
highest court's interpretation of that state's law. See Johnsonv. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997).
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courts for guidance-as the South Carolina Court of Appeals did in Al-
Amin 742 -and federal courts respect state court decisions in the habeas
context. 743 The distinctions between the two may seem confusing at times, but
knowing how both state and federal courts have applied and interpreted an issue
will greatly benefit applicants drafting PCR claims. This way, a prisoner can
draft a claim to fit into South Carolina's interpretation of an issue and still
arrange his argument to meet the federal court's interpretation in case he is not
successful on PCR and must pursue federal habeas relief Accordingly, citing
the controlling federal opinion on an issue along with the relevant state opinion
is often a wise course to follow.744
All PCR applications should be prepared in anticipation of being denied and
the applicant having to pursue federal relief Citing the federal source of law on
a claim is often a good way to alert the state courts that an applicant is invoking
his rights to federal review, because although state case law may be enough for
PCR-claim-drafting purposes, it will not likely be enough to alert a state court
that a federal violation is being alleged.7 4 ' Additionally, if a federal court's
interpretation of federal law differs in any way from the state court's
interpretation, being able to draft a claim to encompass both, or recognizing the
need to "split" the claim (that is, drafting two claims from a single issue), will
invariably aid in the pursuit of relief-whether that relief be state or federal.
Lastly, while federal district courts are no less competent than other courts,
their published opinions are not binding on any other court or even on any other
judge in the same district.7 4 6 Prisoners should be mindful of this fact when they
742. See supra notes 740-43 and accompanying text.
743. See, e.g., Swainv. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 383 (1977) (stating that state judges are "fully
competent to decide federal constitutional issues, and that their decisions must be respected by
federal district judges in processing habeas corpus applications pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254").
744. See Matthews v. Evatt, 105 F.3d 907, 911 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404
U.S. 270, 275 78 (1971)); see also Verdinv. O'Leary, 972 F.2d 1467, 1474 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating
that for a claim to be exhausted in state court, the petitioner must present to the state court the
substance of their federal claim that includes "both the operative facts and the 'controlling legal
principles"' (quoting Picard, 404 U.S. at 277)); Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004) ("A
litigant wishing to raise a federal issue can easily indicate the federal law basis for his claim in a
state-court [PCR] petition or brief, for example, by citing in conjunction with the claim the federal
source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such a claim on federal grounds, or by simply
labeling the claim 'federal."').
745. See, e.g., MEANS, supra note 381, at 973 ("For a federal issue to be 'fairly presented' by
the citation of a state decision dealing with both state and federal issues relevant to the claim, the
citation must be accompanied by some clear indication that the case involves federal issues. Where
the citation to the state case has no signal in the text of the brief that the petitioner is raising federal
claims of relies on state law cases that resolve federal issues, the federal claim is not fairly
presented." (citing Casey v. Moore, 386 F.3d 896, 911-12 n.12 (9th Cir. 2004))). Furthermore, the
"four corners" rule states that a federal claim is not adequately presented to a state court if the court
must look outside of the "four corners" of a petition or brief to locate it. Baldwin, 541 U.S. at 32.
746. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 430 n.10 (1996); see also 6A
WEST'S S.C. DIGEST 2D Courts, Key No. 96(4) (2008 & Supp. 2012) (outlining the
"[c]onclusiveness of decisions of [the c]ourt of [a]ppeals within its circuit").
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are reading case law from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina. In light of this reality, applicants may wish to rely on opinions
from the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals when drafting claims, as that court's
decisions are binding on the district courts within the Fourth Circuit-the same
district court to which many applicants later submit federal habeas
applications. And, of course, decisions from the United States Supreme Court
are the "supreme law of the land" to be followed by all.
C. Dictum
Judicial dictum is formally defined as "[a]n opinion by a court on a question
that is directly involved, briefed, and argued by counsel, and even passed on by
the court, but that is not essential to the decision." 749 Dictum is basically the
language or statements in an opinion that can be deleted without impairing the
analysis necessary to reaching the holding, because by "being peripheral, [it]
may not have received the full and careful consideration of the court that uttered
it.",7o One of the clearest ways of describing dictum in an opinion is:
[D]ictum is an assertion in a court's opinion of a proposition of law
which does not explain why the court's judgment goes in favor of the
winner. If the court's judgment and the reasoning which supports it
would remain unchanged, regardless of the proposition in question, that
747. See Doe v. Chao, 511 F.3d 461, 465 (4th Cir. 2007). In Chao, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals dealt with the issue of whether a district court violated a previously issued mandate from
their court. See id. at 464. In examining the question and finding a violation, the court stated that
'Ji]t is axiomatic that in our judicial hierarchy, the decisions of the circuit courts of appeals bind the
district courts just as decisions of the Supreme Court bind circuit courts." Id. The court proceeded
to state that "[t]his is not to say appellate courts are somehow superior or always correct, but only
that our system has been served well by the availability of review and the need for appropriate
review to be final." Id.
As a side note, applicants often question whether to include decisions from other federal
circuit court of appeals in their arguments when drafting claims. While decisions from other circuit
courts and state courts can be persuasive and should be respected, applicants in South Carolina
should see whether the Fourth Circuit or South Carolina has resolved an issue first before going
elsewhere. See, e.g., Arriaga v. Fla. Pac. Farms, L.L.C., 305 F.3d 1228, 1240 n.15 (11th Cir. 2002)
(stating that a circuit court's decision is only binding on the federal district courts within its own
circuit); Bajkowski v. United States, 787 F. Supp. 539, 541 n.2 (E.D.N.C. 1991) ("[W]hen there is
mandatory authority governing a dispute, persuasive authority from other jurisdictions is
irrelevant."); Jones v. Equicredit Corp., 347 S.C. 535, 542, 556 S.E.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 2001)
("When there is no South Carolina case directly on point, [the appellate] court may look to other
jurisdictions for persuasive authority.").
748. See supra note 731 and accompanying text. For cases on the United States Supreme
Court's influence in South Carolina state courts, see 6A WEST'S S.C. DIGEST 2D Courts, Key No.
97(1).
749. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 519 (9th ed. 2009).
750. Sarnoff v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 798 F.2d 1075, 1084 (7th Cir. 1986).
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proposition plays no role in explaining why the judgment goes for the
winner. It is superfluous to the decision and is dictum.7 5 1
Drawing the line on what is dictum and what is not is not always simple, but it is
an important distinction to make. The importance of the distinction lies in the
fact that dictum in a decision is considered separate from the material holding of
the opinion and is not given precedential value. In other words, a prisoner must
know what is considered dicta and what is the holding because not all the
language in the majority opinion of a case is given the same precedential value.
Dicta may be disregarded by a court when cited in a brief. An examination of
several cases may help to illustrate this point.
In Smith v. Robbins,752 the United States Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether the procedure set out in Anders v. California,753 requiring
appellate counsel to brief an arguable issue before requesting to be relieved on an
indigent defendant's appeal, was obligatory upon the states to follow.754 Prior to
Robbins, California adopted new procedures that departed from the procedures
set forth in Anders, but that still adequately safeguarded the defendant's right to
appeal and ensured counsel's performance met constitutional muster.5 5 In
deciding that the procedures laid out in Anders were not obligatory upon the
states and that California was free to craft its own procedures, the Court held that
the statements in Anders, and any subsequent cases that indicated that the Anders
procedure was mandatory, were no more than dicta.5 The Court stated that "it
is true that in [a case subsequent to Anders] we used some language suggesting
that Anders is mandatory upon the States, but that language was not necessary to
the decision we reached. "75 The language from which the Court retreated would
take much determination to identify as dictum; however, this case is a good
example of the way in which the term dictum can be used and applied.
In Carey v. Musladin , the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether spectators at a defendant's murder trial violated his right to a fair trial by
wearing buttons with the picture of the victim displayed to the jury.759 Without
addressing this "spectator-conduct" claim, the Court declined to answer the
question on a procedural technicality. 76 0  Because the defendant could only
receive federal habeas relief if the state court's decision denying him relief
751. Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1249, 1256 (2006).
752. 528 U.S. 259 (2000).
753. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
754. Robbins, 528 U.S. at 264-65.
755. Id. at 264, 278-79.
756. Id. at 273, 276.
757. Id. at 273 (internal citation omitted). The text referenced regarding Anders being
mandatory canbe found inPenson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80-82 (1988).
758. 549 U.S. 70 (2006).
759. Id. at 72.
760. See id. at 77.
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"resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States,"7 6' the Court held that the defendant was not entitled
to relief due to the fact that the United States Supreme Court had never squarely
decided the "potentially prejudicial effect of spectators' courtroom conduct" like
the conduct that occurred in Musladin.762 In reaching this holding, the Court
recognized that "clearly established Federal law" referred only to the holdings of
the Supreme Court and not to its dicta.763 Justice Stevens, concurring in
judgment only, took issue with the Court so easily disregarding prior statements
of the Court as dicta and pointed out that the reasoning in Strickland v.
Washington, "including [its] carefully considered dicta," had set forth the
standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims for over twenty
years. Justice Stevens went on to write:
Virtually every one of the Court's opinions announcing a new
application of a constitutional principle contains some explanatory
language that is intended to provide guidance to lawyers and judges in
future cases. It is quite wrong to invite state-court judges to discount the
importance of such guidance on the ground that it may not have been
strictly necessary as an explanation of the Court's specific holding in the
765case.
The "guidance" Justice Stevens refers to is frequently the language a prisoner
cites in support of his claims. One of the best ways for a prisoner to determine
what is dictum within a case is to take the time to understand and identify the
holding of the opinion. Then, the prisoner can determine what reasoning was
necessary to that holding as he reads through the case. Too many prisoners read
first and attempt to pinpoint the holding later, if at all. Other prisoners simply
read opinions to find favorable language without understanding that not all of the
language in an opinion is considered to have precedential value.
If a prisoner has read all of the above and still does not understand the
concept of dictum, he should know that a better understanding will come in time
now that he is at least familiar with the term. Additionally dissenting opinions
sometimes point out the dicta in majority opinions, if for no other reason than to
attack it.76  Likewise, majority opinions sometimes do the same, but they tend to
761. Id. at 74 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006)).
762. Id. at 77.
763. Id. at 74 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)).
764. Id. at 78 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 700-01 (1984)).
765. Id. at 79 (internal citations omitted).
766. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 430 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("I
therefore must disagree with the long and general discussion that precedes the Court's disposition of
this case. That discussion, of course, is dictum because the Court assumes, 'for the sake of
argument in deciding this case .... .'").
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point out dicta when deviating from what may have been previously interpreted
as being mandatory instructions or settled law. In both of these instances,
identifying dicta is made easier with the Court's aid.
Lastly, prisoners must realize that dicta should not be brushed aside. Some
circuits, including the Fourth Circuit (which encompasses South Carolina), have
held that "carefully considered language of the Supreme Court, even if
technically dictum, generally must be treated as authoritative."768  Supreme
Court dicta is very persuasive; however, if it conflicts with a holding of a circuit
court of appeals, that federal appellate court will be bound to follow its own
precedent, rather than Supreme Court dicta.769
XIV. CLAIM CONSTRUCTION
A. In General
The purpose of this Part is to provide pro se litigants with an outline of a
sufficiently constructed claim and to explore some of the writing techniques that
are widely held to be effective when addressing the courts. There are many
instructional works that provide an in-depth analysis of brief writing from
varying perspectives. 770 This Part is not intended to take the place of those
works as much as it is intended to be a distillation of the complexities
encompassed elsewhere into terms and examples more readily understandable.
This "primer" approach is more commonsensical when one considers the
practical reality that PCR applicants are merely filling out applications as
opposed to writing briefs. However, because most applicants wisely find it
necessary to attach a memorandum of law to their PCR application or later
amend one by drafting a motion to this effect, this Part attempts to provide a
clear and abbreviated format for doing so.
With regard to writing techniques, most of the principles expounded upon in
the numerous reviews and texts on the topic apply generally to the various forms
of legal writing.771 In other words, most of what one learns about writing a
memorandum of law will also apply to drafting an amendment or supplement to
one's PCR application, or to any other appellate brief.772 This Part is also
intended to help applicants avoid common mistakes when drafting a claim and to
767. See supra notes 760-62 and accompanying text.
768. Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
769. Martinez v. City of Oxnard, 270 F.3d 852, 857 n.3 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). For additional infornation on dicta,
see 6A WEST'S S.C. DIGEST 2D Courts, Key No. 92 (2008 & Supp. 2012).
770. Excellent works include: THOMAS R. HAGGARD & ELIZABETH SCOTT MOISE, THE
SCRIVENER: A PRIMER ON LEGAL WRITING (3d ed. 2009); RE & RE, supra note 597; and JEAN
HOEFER TOAL ET AL., APPELLATE PRACTICE IN SOUTH CAROLINA (1999).
771. See RE & RE, supra note 597, at 2.
772. See, e.g., RE & RE, supra note 597, at 5 (emphasizing the importance of clear writing in
all types of legal documents).
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provide helpful tips, propositions, suggestions, and insights. So many excellent
works have been generated on effective brief writing that it would simply not be
possible to incorporate all of the "gems" of the topic in this Part. Fortunately,
we are not trying to master this area, but instead are only trying to present claims
to the court in a comprehensive and effective manner. It is still advised,
however, that applicants take the time and read as much material on this topic as
they can obtain.
1. ABCs ofLegal Writing
Adequately conveying thoughts on a particular claim can be a formidable
task even to those who are accustomed to legal writing. For the rest of us, the
task can seem insurmountable. In beginning the process, however, it is helpful
to remember and adhere to what has been termed the "ABCs" of legal writing:
accuracy, brevity, and clarity. 773
a. Accuracy
Accuracy is essential to effective legal writing. The emphasis on being
accurate is generally placed upon honesty and credibility. If an applicant is not
prepared to concede what he honestly must, the brief's integrity, and more
importantly that of the drafter, will be called into question and viewed with
skepticism. If the applicant is faced with unfavorable case law that seemingly
works against his position, it is best to acknowledge its existence and attempt to
771
distinguish one's case. In doing so, it is probably better to attempt to
distinguish the case on the facts as opposed to the law, as it is generally more
difficult to succeed in telling a court that a reasoned opinion is incorrect than it is
in telling a court that a prior case is factually different than the one being
presented. 7  There is simply no sense in withholding unfavorable facts or law
from the attention of the court. Of course, this candor requirement does not
mean an applicant must play the role of the attorney general and fight against his
own position-only that the applicant should be fair in his presentation.
Accuracy, by definition, also requires an applicant to be specific when referring
773. For a more thorough look at the ABCs, see id. at 2 7. However, at least one
commentator has suggested that the ABCs should also include an "E," for "Eloquence." See
HAGGARD & MOISE, supra note 775, at 1 2. These sources are heavily relied upon in this segment.
774. RE & RE, supra note 597, at 3 (citing John C. Godbold, Twenty Pages and Twenty
Minutes Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 30 Sw. L.J. 801, 816-17 (1976)).
775. See generally TOAL ET AL., supra note 775, at 228-34 (discussing general principles of
brief writing and highlighting that attorneys should distinguish unfavorable cases cited by the
opposing side).
776. See, e.g., id. at 234 (noting the fact that direct overruling of cases does not often occur).
777. In fact, the Rules of Professional Conduct require a lawyer to disclose directly conflicting
authority in the controlling jurisdiction to the tribunal. Id. at 228 (citing S.C. APP. CT. R. 407, R.
3.3(a)).
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to the record, authorities cited, and other material or evidence used to advance
his position.778
b. Brevity
Brevity simply means that a brief or argument should be no longer than it
has to be.779 Including everything important in an argument and still achieving
the desired objective of conciseness takes a thorough understanding of the facts
and law with a keen eye towards removing the unnecessary. 780 Briefs should
exclude irrelevant and immaterial matter and avoid wordiness at all cost. It takes
real determination to be short, concrete, and to the point. A good analogy for
brevity can be to "[t]hink of words as passengers on a train. If one word has not
paid its fare by contributing something unique to the transportation of the idea,
then kick it out. No room exists, in trains or sentences, for free riders."7 8'
c. Clarity
In expressing yourself to the courts through briefs and arguments, it is
absolutely vital to a winning position that an applicant be clear, concise, specific,
and concrete.782 This means giving content to abstract principles and avoiding
vague abstractions. 783 The key to being clear is utilizing an extensive vocabulary
that eradicates muddled and confused verbiage. Finding the right word is not
always easy, and the value of a dictionary or a thesaurus cannot be overstated.7 8 5
The reader should not be left confused and in doubt about what an applicant is
attempting to say.786 Finding the right words, however, does not mean finding
words that are not commonly used or words that may force the reader to pick up
a dictionary of his own. Instead, finding the right word means choosing the most
7817
fitting word from several available options.
778. See RE & RE, supra note 597, at 3.
779. See HAGGARD & MOISE, supra note 775, at 1.
780. See, e.g., RE & RE, supra note 597, at 4 (citing John Munkman, Some Thoughts on
Drafting, 114 L.J. 420, 420 (1964)) (describing the importance of mastering the facts and law and
eliminating the unnecessary).
781. HAGGARD & MOISE, supra note 775, at 1.
782. See TOAL ET AL., supra note 775, at 229.
783. See, e.g., Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 635 (1st Cir. 1988) ("[A] litigant has
an obligation 'to spell out its arguments squarely and distinctly."' (quoting Paterson-Leitch Co. v.
Mass. Mun. Wholesale Electric Co., 840 F.2d 985, 990 (1st Cir. 1988))).
784. See RE & RE, supra note 597, at 6.
785. See id.
786. See id. at 5.
787. Id. at 6.
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2. Direction
Direction means that you must know where you are going before you can
persuade someone else to go there with you. 78 8  The best way to do this is to
focus on the conclusion, or end result, you are attempting to achieve when
drafting a claim. Focusing on the end result will help an applicant determine
what facts to include and what amount of weight or emphasis to place upon
them. 789 Also, knowing what legal test an applicant will need to overcome (such
as Strickland's "deficient performance-prejudice" test) will allow an applicant to
"direct" his interpretation of the facts towards this end.790 Sidetracking a reader
with irrelevant matter does nothing to further this goal, and applicants should
plan on leading with strength to avoid part of this confusion by opening and
closing arguments with impressive, strong points.
The direction a writer is intending to chart may also include the tone and
style of an argument. The overall composition may sometimes be read more as a
forceful demand rather than as the desired persuasive petition. A court cannot be
intimidated into ruling a particular way, and applicants should seek to draft
respectful, informative, and persuasive arguments. 791 A good way to check the
tone of an argument is to read it out loud to determine whether it is smooth and
persuasive or harsh and demanding. 792
Focusing on the end result-usually a showing that the applicant received
ineffective assistance of counsel and was prejudiced by it-will also allow an
applicant to use different reasoning to reach the end result if necessary. In other
words, to reach the end result, the applicant might be able to tell the court: "In
addition to the reasons stated above, the applicant is further entitled to relief
because . . . ," and then go on to explain the alternate reasons for granting relief
Thus, knowing the end result allows an applicant to avoid immaterial matter and
move all the facts in one direction-that an injustice has occurred. This way, a
court has several routes from which to choose to grant relief After all, whether
for one reason or another, all that matters is that the argument is won.
788. See generally TOAL ET AL., supra note 775, at 230, 236 (discussing a "clear overall
framework" and analogizing organization to the act of giving a traveler directions).
789. See generally id. at 231 (indicating that persuasive arguments are formed by first
identifying one's position before applying the facts); HAGGARD & MOISE, supra note 775, at 190
(explaining how to emphasize favorable facts and how to neutralize unfavorable facts).
790. See HAGGARD & MOISE, supra note 775, at 190. For a review of the Strickland test, see
supra text accompanying notes 418-25.
791. See generally TOAL ET AL., supra note 775, at 238 (discussing the tone attorneys should
adopt in their briefs).
792. See Diana Roberto Donahoe, Analyzing the Writer's Analysis: Will It Be Clear to the
Reader?, N.Y. ST. B.A. J., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 49.
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3. Case Selection
When researching a claim, applicants will undoubtedly come across several
cases on a particular topic that they may wish to discuss or cite in an argument.
This choice of precedent often includes "on-point" cases or cases that are in a
similar legal realm and involve a somewhat similar set of facts to the claim an
applicant is presenting. When deciding on what authority to cite in an argument,
applicants usually attach themselves to a favorable passage or particular
language in a case and often overlook other important considerations. For
example, applicants sometimes cite a case because of the favorable language it
contains even though the actual outcome of the case may work against them. 793
A case may be favorable to the applicant's position on one point and disastrous
on another. Researchers should train themselves to look not only for favorable
language, but also for favorable outcomes. It is probably not the best course of
action to cite authority that works for your position on one point and for the
attorney general on another more damaging point.
The procedural posture of the case is also a relevant consideration that is
sometimes overlooked by researchers. Citing a case that has arisen out of a civil
tort action when attempting to overturn a criminal conviction is probably not
prudent, unless otherwise unavoidable, because cases that go through different
procedural avenues may be reviewed by different standards.794
Citing a case solely on the summary of a case or a quick review of a
headnote can be another critical error applicants will want to avoid. Headnotes
and summaries can be misleading, and they deprive the researcher of the
opportunity to uncover additional facts and holdings that may be favorable or
unfavorable to a particular position. Research is research and necessarily
involves a thorough analysis of all the cases on a particular subject, even if most
of the cases ultimately prove useless. 795 As much as all of us wish otherwise,
there is simply no substitute or shortcut available for fully researching and
reading the relevant law.
Lastly, ensuring a case still represents the current law is a must.796 While
the deficiencies of the SCDC's law libraries make researching the subsequent
793. See, e.g., McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 213 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that the case cited
by petitioner "actually cuts against [petitioner's] position").
794. See, e.g., O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 440 (1995) ("Unlike the civil cases cited
by the State, the errors being considered by a habeas court occurred in a criminal proceeding, and
therefore, although habeas is a civil proceeding, someone's custody, rather than mere civil liability,
is at stake."); Williams v. Ozmint, 380 S.C. 473, 478-79, 671 S.E.2d 600, 602 (2008) (emphasizing
the fact that challenging a conviction by way of a writ of habeas corpus involves a different burden
than a direct appeal).
795. See generally STEvE BARBER & MARK A. MCCORMICK, LEGAL RESEARCH 293 (1996)
(noting that thorough research is imperative, despite the fact that it can be tedious).
796. See, e.g., Geter v. State, No. 05-95-00775-CR, 1996 WL 459767, at *3 n.2 (Tex. App.
July 31,1996) (demonstrating disapproval with counsel for citing a reversed case and "caution[ing]
counsel to choose authorities more carefully in the future").
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history of a case a difficult task, the difficulties in no way alleviate an applicant's
duty to do so. Citing a case that has been overruled or reversed is "claim
suicide." Under no circumstances should an applicant bypass this aspect of
research in the claim-selection process.797 An applicant must ensure the case
still represents current law and may have to order the necessary material himself
or employ some other method to verify the case's status. There is simply no
point in arguing a position on grounds that do not exist.798
4. Page Citations
When applicants quote favorable language from a case they have researched,
it is always better to include the actual cite from which the quotation was
extracted as opposed to the case citation in general. 799 As an example, look at
the following quotation from Jackson v. Statesoo
"A sentence is not limited to a term of imprisonment; instead, it may be
either a term in prison or a fine or both." Jackson v. State, 331 S.C. 486,
489, 489 S.E.2d 915, 916 (1997).
Citing the specific page numbers-489 in the South Carolina Reporter and 916
in the South Eastern Reporter, second edition-demonstrates that you have
actually read the case you are citing and are not simply citing a summary.
Additionally, it hones in on the accuracy and credibility of your work.s0 As
many opinions seem to go on for seemingly forever, specific page citations give
a reviewer of your work the benefit of avoiding scanning opinions to find the
specific language you have cited. In a world of overcrowded court dockets, no
one has time to read entire case opinions simply to find a single sentence you
have cited.8 02
5. String Citations
During research, an applicant is likely to find many cases that stand for a
proposition of law that he may wish to advance. Citing case after case
however-the so-called "string citation"-is not in and of itself particularly
persuasive.803 A citation is meant to point a reader to a case or work "without
797. See generally TOAL ET AL., supra note 775, at 226 ("One of the most vital, but grossly
underestimated, steps in effective brief writing is performing extensive research of the law.").
798. See BARBER & MCCORMICK, supra note 800, at 239 (explaining that overruled cases are
no longer valid authority).
799. See TOAL ET AL., supra note 775, at 231.
800. 331 S.C. 486, 489 S.E.2d 915 (1997).
801. See TOAL ET AL., supra note 775, at 231.
802. See RE & RE, supra note 597, at 4.
803. See id. at 124 (citing MARIO PITTom, SUGGESTIONS ON BRIEF WRITING AND
ARGUMENTATION 39 (1951)).
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the necessity of seeking aid or information elsewhere." 0 4 It is often better to
analyze a few key cases on a topic than to tattoo an argument with a string of
unexplained citations.so0 Breaking down the single most relevant case can carry
more weight with a court than multiple citations that are less relevant to an
applicant's position.
The total number of citations in a work should be no more than what is
needed and no less than what is necessary. 0 6 When a proposition of law is
encompassed in a great deal of case law, an applicant may want to cite the
"landmark" case first, if available. 0 7 Because many legal principles find their
origins in the United States Constitution, a controlling or "landmark" case from
the United States Supreme Court can often be found on the topic being
referenced. When this occurs, the Supreme Court case should be cited first
followed by the parallel state case controlling on the topic. For example:
Due process requires the prosecution to disclose evidence favorable to
an accused upon request when such evidence is material to guilt or
punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); State v.
Proctor, 358 S.C. 417, 421 n.4, 595 S.E.2d 476, 478 n.4 (2004) (quoting
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87).
Citing the federal case in conjunction with the state case not only brings the
court's attention to relevant authority but also is a good way to establish the
federal nature of your claim for exhaustion purposes. Once a controlling case
has been selected and the legal test to overcome has been established, most of
the following cases used in an argument will likely involve state cases that have
interpreted exactly what this proposition does and does not mean.
Another reason to "double-stack" citations (using a federal-state or a state-
state format) is when a cited case is particularly old, and you want to show the
court that the proposition cited has been recently recognized as still valid. For
example:
Even after an order is filed, counsel has an obligation to review the
order and file a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend if the order fails to
set forth the findings as required by section 17-27-80 of the South
Carolina Code and Rule 52(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure. Marlar v. State, 375 S.C. 407, 410, 653 S.E.2d 266, 267
(2007); Pruitt v. State, 310 S.C. 254, 256, 423 S.E.2d 127, 128 (1992).
804. Id.
805. See id. at 124-25.
806. See generally id. at 124 (discussing the balance between marshaling the available
authority and citing too many cases).
807. See id.
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The number of citations to use in a particular argument is a matter of
judgment to be exercised with caution. Recognizing that you cannot, and should
not, incorporate everything found during research into an argument is, however,
a good starting point. Get to the point. Start another argument if something
peripheral forces you to, but do not cloud an argument with points that do not
need to be there.
6 Words to Avoid
One of the most common mistakes applicants make when drafting a claim is
believing that they must abandon plain English and speak in "legalese." In
furtherance of this belief, words such as "hereto," "wherefore," "hereinafter,"
and "inasmuch" are commonly placed into arguments for no better reason than to
make an argument sound more professional. This practice is widely disfavored.
Words should only be used upon the consideration of whether they are
appropriate and never because they seem to make a brief sound more "lawyer-
like." An applicant will never write effectively otherwise.
Words that elude, confuse, or offend a reader should be avoided as well.os
Moreover, a confusing phrase such as "and/or" has no place in an applicant's
argument. Being specific and following the ABCs of legal writing demands that
it is either "and" or "or." Another word that should rarely find a home in an
argument is the word "must." Telling a court that it must do something is
borderline offensive and definitely not sensible. A court simply does not have to
do anything that an applicant asks of it.
B. Constructing a Claim
Picking up a pen to begin drafting a claim is the part of filling out a PCR
application or proceeding pro se over which applicants most often get nervous.
Instead of believing that the task can be accomplished with a little determination,
applicants sometimes sacrifice excellent arguments to a false sense of
hopelessness. The formula outlined in this Section is an effective and
straightforward way to adequately present a claim before a PCR court, regardless
of whether the applicant is a skilled writer. While the focus here is on drafting a
memorandum of law in support of a PCR application, the insight provided can
also apply to creating amendments and supplements as well.
1. Mastering the Facts and the Law
There are two important things to know before jumping into the brief-
writing formula below. First, the applicant must master the facts of the case
808. For a good discussion on words to avoid, see HAGGARD & MOISE, supra note 775, at 9-
11,21-33.
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before beginning. It is easy when studying PCR procedures and the relevant
authority that surrounds a claim to forget the importance of the facts involved in
a particular case. A thorough and detailed understanding of the facts is required
before one can begin to delve into the law applicable to a particular case. Facts
drive the law and are generally what a PCR court looks for first in an applicant's
argument (a judge, presumably, already knows the law). Judges cannot be
expected to properly rule on an issue before the court if they have not been given
all of the relevant facts involved. Facts are facts: they cannot be changed, and
they cannot be forced to fit into preconceived slots if they do not fit. The
applicant will need to master the facts of his case if he plans on winning because
the success of a case often depends on it.
Secondly, and equally important, an applicant will need to have a thorough
understanding of the law to prevail on a claim. Thus, the applicant must
thoroughly analyze the main proposition of law on which the applicant is relying
to advance his claims. To begin, an applicant must know the legal foundation on
which he is standing. Is an argument relying on statutory law or case law, or a
combination of both? Can support be found in the United States Constitution,
the state constitution, both, or neither? If your argument is relying on case law,
the procedural posture of the case you are citing will also be relevant. Different
fora provide different procedures and rules. For example, an analysis of an
application of law that has arisen out of a family court proceeding will not be
entirely persuasive to a PCR judge reviewing the validity of a criminal
conviction. It is also not good enough to simply cite the main case on a topic
and move on. You must explain the case enough so that your reasoning for
relying on the case is easily understood. There is no substitute for an in-depth
examination of the facts and law on any given claim, and there is no way to draft
a winning argument without such an in-depth examination.
2. The Three-Paragraph Approach
As stated before, this Section is intended to help applicants present their
claims in a manner that is both clear and effective. While pro se prisoners are
given the benefit of a liberal construction when creating a pro se motion such as
a memorandum in support of a PCR application, this benefit does not mean that
anything prisoners present to the courts will be accepted or interpreted in their
favor. "Notice pleading" is not sufficient when drafting a substantial document
such as a memorandum in support of a PCR application, and prisoners are
required to show, with specificity, the facts and law that support their claim.
Courts are not required to "add meat" to a skeletal argument simply because a
prisoner is appearing before them pro se. Neither the court-which must draw
inferences from inadequate pleadings, whether right or wrong-nor the
applicant-who runs the risk of having his application summarily dismissed-
benefit from inadequate or insufficient pleadings. Avoiding this unnecessary
complication is the aim of this Section.
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This Section does not cover all (or even most) aspects of legal writing. Pro
se applicants are not, after all, skilled in writing technical briefs. Most prisoners
simply want to do a good job writing their arguments to the courts without
making the art of writing a profession. To look at this situation as a means to an
end, however, does require that an applicant follow some sort of format so that
the end product is comprehensive and effective. To do this, the outline below
provides simple and easy instructions to complete this task. As with most
professional shortcuts, however, this Section gives an applicant only the bare
essentials to put a respectful argument before the courts and dispenses with
several aspects of brief writing. The preliminary statement, questions presented,
point heading, and other aspects of brief writing are not covered in this Section.
The statement of the facts, however, is too vital to do without and will be
discussed in the following Section. The approach taken in this Section is a pro
se litigant's approach, because every indigent prisoner is required to fill out a
PCR application on his own before they are appointed an attorney.
The following three-paragraph format for presenting a claim to a PCR court
is suggested for pro se litigants attempting to tackle this endeavor:
Paragraph One: Present the relevant facts of your
argument.
Paragraph Two: Present the relevant legal principles
and authorities.
Paragraph Three: Apply the relevant facts to the
controlling law and demonstrate how
you were prejudiced or harmed.
Utilizing this simple and easy three-step approach can be a valuable aid to
any applicant attempting to present a claim before a PCR court. To put this
format into practice, consider the following ineffective assistance of counsel
claim:
(a) Heading
An applicant's right to the effective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and state law, was
violated when counsel failed to employ an independent forensic expert to
examine the crime scene and failed to adequately cross-examine the State's
crime-scene expert, thereby failing to advance the applicant's self-defense claim.
(b) Paragraph ]
At trial, the applicant admitted to discharging a firearm in the general
direction of the victim during the altercation that resulted in his conviction. Tr.
P. 274, Lines 14-20. The applicant testified that he fired in the victim's
direction only after the victim had fired at him first and that his only intention in
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discharging his firearm was to protect himself from being injured or killed by the
victim. Tr. P. 281, Line 21-P. 283, Line 8. The applicant maintained that he
never meant to strike the victim; rather, he meant only to escape a life-
threatening situation. Tr. P. 291, Lines 6-8. Prior to trial, the applicant asserted
that he inquired about possible forensic evidence of return fire from the victim to
prove that the victim had fired shots at the applicant and to support his self-
defense theory. The applicant maintains that trial counsel ignored his numerous
requests for investigative forensic reports and stated simply that he would look
into it. Despite a report from the sheriffs forensic-analysis team stating that
''projectiles and shell casings consistent with return fire" have been located and
marked (see Appendix, Ex. 14, Investigative Report of Detective Robert
Whitaker), trial counsel neglected to inform the applicant of this evidence prior
to trial. Trial counsel also failed to use this evidence during trial to support the
theory of self-defense. The applicant contends that this was in error.
(c) Paragraph 2
The legal principles applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
are set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland
established a two-part test for assessing whether counsel rendered a defendant
ineffective assistance. First, a defendant must prove that his counsel's efforts
were objectively unreasonable when measured against prevailing professional
norms. Id. at 687-88; Brown v. State, 375 S.C. 464, 468-69, 652 S.E.2d 765,
767 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668). Second, the defendant
must demonstrate that counsel's performance, if deficient, was also prejudicial.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Miller v. State, 379 S.C. 108, 114, 665 S.E.2d 596,
598-99 (2008). Prejudice is defined as a reasonable probability that, had trial
counsel not provided deficient performance, the result of the proceedings would
have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Specifically, in discussing
counsel's duties to a criminal defendant, Strickland held that "counsel has a duty
to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary." Id. at 691. The cornerstone of any
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is whether counsel has adequately
subjected the prosecution's case to the crucibles of the adversarial testing
process. See id. at 686.
(d) Paragraph 3
In the present case, counsel failed to make a reasonable investigation to
support the applicant's testimony at trial that the victim had been in possession
of a weapon and had discharged a pistol in his direction. Tr. P. 281, Lines 2-21.
This omission is especially flagrant in the face of applicant's repeated requests
that a thorough examination of the crime scene take place and that counsel focus
his attention on the forensic aspect of the applicant's defense. Counsel's failure
to employ an expert to examine this matter or to uncover favorable evidence
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already in his possession that would have dramatically bolstered the version of
events advanced by the applicant was both unreasonable and prejudicial to the
applicant. The only direct evidence against the applicant was the testimony of
the victim, who had changed his story three times before testifying at trial. Tr. P.
172 Line 3-P. 175, Line 19; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 ("[A] verdict or
conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been
affected by errors than one with overwhelming record support."). Moreover, the
applicant relied on a theory of self-defense at trial. In order to prove self-
defense, the evidence must show that
(1) [the defendant] was without fault in bringing on the difficulty; (2)
[the defendant] actually believed he was in imminent danger of losing
his life or sustaining serious bodily injury; (3) a reasonably prudent
person of ordinary firmness and courage would have entertained the
same belief; and (4) [the defendant] had no other probable means of
avoiding the danger.
State v. Chatman, 336 S.C. 149, 153, 519 S.E.2d 100, 102 (1999) (emphasis
added) (citing State v. Bruno, 322 S.C. 534, 536, 473 S.E.2d 450, 451 (1996)).
The applicant meets all the enumerated criteria, and it is reasonable to assume
that had counsel employed an investigator to conclusively establish that return
fire had taken place, presented the material and favorable evidence at trial, and
properly cross-examined the State's forensic expert about the existence of
evidence to support the applicant's version of events, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. Counsel's failure to do so was both
unreasonable and prejudicial to the applicant.
The above approach provides a workable outline for applicants attempting to
present a claim. It is not intended to be a rigid format in any regard. If an extra
paragraph is needed to explore a collateral point or alternate reason to support a
finding in the applicant's favor, there should not be any hesitation in creating
one. It is impossible to determine how many paragraphs or how long any one
argument should be, and the format provided is simply what the applicant should
provide at a minimum. Also, many PCR applications contain more than one
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. If an applicant is raising more than one
claim, stating a legal test more than once will not normally be required. To use
the example argument above, the legal test of Strickland v. Washington will not
have to be repeatedly stated in every subsequent ineffective assistance of counsel
claim that is raised in a particular memorandum or amendment. It will suffice to
simply reference the controlling authority on any subsequent claims in
conjunction with any of the other "on-point" cases or authority that the applicant
desires to use.
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3. Statement of the Facts
While most of the elements of brief writing can be avoided when creating a
pro se memorandum of law in support of a PCR application, a sufficient
statement of the facts cannot. The best part about this section is that a good
statement of the facts is not difficult to compose. The "statement of the facts"
describes the procedural posture of the case (or its litigated history, which an
applicant is quizzed on in the actual PCR application) and basically gives a brief
overview of the material facts that gave rise to the applicant's claims. This
section is usually the part of a brief that begins by saying something like, "On
December 21, 2007, the applicant and several of his friends were attending a
party at a privately rented club in Columbia," and goes on to explain the relevant
facts that an applicant intends to use to support his claim. This section is usually
the first thing that a court reads to get a picture of what is going on in a case and
what is to come. A statement of facts section presents the facts in chronological
order and takes a reader step-by-step through the relevant facts being used to
give a fair presentation from both perspectives. A fair, credible statement of
facts should be displayed for the reader, and specific citations to the record
should always be used. Some people find it more helpful to draft a statement of
facts section after they have completed an argument to ensure that all of the
material facts that they have used in support of their claims are included. Most
memoranda and briefs set out a detailed statement of facts as the first thing
presented before an argument. If the applicant pursued a direct appeal, an
example of a statement of facts section can be found in his appellate brief.
4. Conclusion
The conclusion is usually only a sentence or two in length and summarizes
the applicant's overall position while clearly setting out the requested relief The
conclusion is often called a "prayer for relief' section as well. An example may
read something like this:
For the above-stated violations of the applicant's constitutional rights, as
guaranteed by the United States Constitution and state law, the applicant
prays that this court vacate his conviction and sentence and remand the
case to the Richland County Court of General Sessions for a new trial.
5. Editing
When a document is completed, an applicant cannot forget to check and
recheck the completed work for spelling and grammatical errors. In legal
writing, editing includes double-checking citations as well. It is a tedious task,
but it is a task that is nonetheless mandatory. Another prudent idea might be to
allow another person to proofread the completed work. Having a second set of
eyes review the work often helps locate and correct errors that an applicant may
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have overlooked. Regardless of how an applicant decides to spell-check his
work and ensure that his argument flows smoothly and reads professionally,
documents must be edited as many times as necessary to ensure that work
submitted to the court is error free.
6 Amendments and Supplements
Amendments in PCR proceedings are authorized by both statute and court
rules.8 09 Amendments and supplements are used to amend or supplement a
previously submitted claim or to add a new claim to an application prior to an
evidentiary hearing. 10 Unlike a memorandum, amendments and supplements
are usually submitted during the time an applicant is represented by counsel and
must generally be submitted through appointed counsel to be accepted by the
court.8 1 Frequently, applicants desire to amend or supplement a previously
submitted claim with additional facts, points of law, affidavits, documents, and
exhibits to further support their position. New claims are frequently added to
PCR applications through this method as continuing research often uncovers
issues that were previously missed.
In Arnold v. State,8 12 the PCR court denied the petitioner's motion to amend
his application due to its untimeliness because the request to amend had been
made after the judge had issued an order denying petitioner relief.8 13 In
upholding this decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court noted that
amendments after a final judgment are governed by Rule 15(b) of the South
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, which does not allow for new claims to be
asserted but is intended to help conform the pleadings to the evidence presented
8114at a hearing. The court likened an untimely motion to a successive PCR
application and additionally upheld the lower court's decision because the
petitioner "failed to present to the circuit court facts and circumstances to show
why the new grounds were not and could not have been presented in the prior
petitions."8 1 5  With regard to Arnold's attempt to submit a motion to alter or
amend the judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
809. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-90 (2003) ("All grounds for relief available to an applicant
under this chapter must be raised in his original, supplemental or amended application."); S.C. R.
Civ. P. 71.1(d) ("Counsel shall insure that all available grounds for relief are included in the
application and shall amend the application if necessary.").
810. See § 17-27-90; Arnold v. State, 309 S.C. 157, 173, 420 S.E.2d 834, 842-43 (1992)
(citing § 17-27-90).
811. An applicant has no right to hybrid representation. Foster v. State, 298 S.C. 306, 307,
379 S.E.2d 907, 907 (1989).
812. 309 S.C. 157, 420 S.E.2d 834 (1992).
813. See id. at 172, 420 S.E.2d at 842.
814. Id.; S.C. R. Civ. P. 15(b) ("Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any
party at any time, even after judgment. . . .").
815. Arnold, 309 S.C. at 173-74, 420 S.E.2d at 843.
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Procedure to add additional grounds for relief after the order was issued, the
court held that a Rule 59(e) motion is not a vehicle to add new grounds but rather
is a request to the trial judge to "reconsider matters properly encompassed in a
decision on the merits." 16 Therefore, applicants wishing to submit amendments
to their PCR application should do so before an evidentiary hearing takes place.
816. Id. at 172, 420 S.E.2d at 842 (quoting Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S.
196, 200 (1988)).
1287
119
Sears: South Carolina Post-Conviction Relief: Practical Considerations a
Published by Scholar Commons,
*
120
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 5 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss5/3
ORDER THROUGH HEIN!
Get your missing back volumes and issues
through Hein!
We have obtained the entire back stock, electronic,
reprint and microform rights to ...
South Carolina
Law Review
Complete sets to date are available now!
We can also furnish single volumes and issues!
BACK ISSUES ALSO AVAILABLE
IN HEIN-ON-LINE!
http://heinonline.org
Fred B. Rothman & Co.
Acme-Nebrich Bookbindeny
Fred 0. Dennis & Co.
Metro Self-Storage
Primus Inter Pares
WILLIAM S. HEIN & CO., INC.
Law Publisher /Serial & Subscrption Agent/ Micropublisher
New & Used Law Books / Preservation Printer/ Bookbinder
1285 Main Street, Buffalo, New York 14209
(716) 882-2600 * TOLL FREE (800) 828-7571 * Fax (716) 883-8100
E- Mail mail@wshein.com * Web Site www.wshein.com
121
Sears: South Carolina Post-Conviction Relief: Practical Considerations a
Published by Scholar Commons,
*
122
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 5 [], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss5/3
